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ABSTRACT
Luis N. Morones, the subject of this biography, is not the 
lackluster, insipid individual who fills countless pages of history 
books. This fascinating and complex man led a thrilling life 
during the 1920's and 1930's in Mexico. An electrician well- 
acquainted with the problems of the exploited laboring classes, 
he founded the Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), the 
first significant workers' central to be established in Mexico. 
Sentenced to death by President Venustiano Carranza for his part 
in a general strike in 1916, Morones was released from his death 
cell before his scheduled execution. Eight years later, while 
serving as a Federal Deputy, Morones was almost fatally wounded 
in a gunfight which occurred in the Chamber of Deputies.
Morones' tenure as Secretary of Industry, Commerce and 
Labor, 192^-28, included exciting and momentous events —  the 
Cristero Rebellion of the Roman Catholics, the heated controversy 
with the United States over President Plutarco Calles' contemplated 
seizure of foreign petroleum companies in Mexico, and the assassi­
nation of President-Elect Alvaro Obregon. The petroleum difficulty 
precipitated a possible armed intervention and invasion of Mexico 
by the United States.
Realizing that politics was not an exercise in civics-book 
morality, Morones acted accordingly. He was surrounded by a group 
of "yes men" of the elite Grupo Accion and even organized Mexico
ix
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City prostitutes, whom he perhaps visualized as a source of union 
dues = He had an unconcealed disdain for manual labor and a love of 
luxury. Frugality was not a trait of this bon vivant who became 
immensely rich through graft and collusion. Believing the interests 
of labor and his own to be one and the same, he applied this prin­
ciple to the CROM treasury. Reminiscent of a Chicago gangster par 
excellence during the prohibition era, this well-groomed, pistol- 
toting, diamond bedecked labor czar kept an arsenal in his home and 
ministry office, rode in costly bullet-proof automobiles, and had 
opposition congressmen kidnapped or gunned down in the streets. He 
achieved a position of power unparalleled in Mexican labor history 
in that from 1920 to 1929 he was labor personified. At the same 
time, his name became synonymous with crime, violence, venality, 
and corruption.
Few persons were indifferent to Morones. He was one of 
those men who inspired fierce loyalty or undying animosity. A 
charismatic leader and a man of action, he was (partly as a result 
of his thirst for power and mounting political ambition) accused 
of being the intellectual author of the assassinations of two men: 
Juan Field Jurado, Senator from Campeche, and Alvaro Obregon, 
President-Elect of Mexico in 1928. Morones was also blamed for 
complicity in the dynamiting of a passenger train carrying rival 
politicians in 1936. Partly because of this alleged crime he was 
exiled to the United States.
Due to Morones' capacity as an organizer, personal magnetism, 
ability as a speaker, and valor as a leader, he was interesting to 
observe in action. He was highly emotional and prone to performing
x
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dramatically before audiences. Because of bis numerous confrontations 
with political foes, be was tbe target of several assassination 
attempts. Considering bis numerous enemies and tbe political mores 
of Mexico during the 1920's when Morones and his CROM were at the 
apogee of their power, bis natural death is ironic.
XL
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INTRODUCTION
Without a knowledge of labor there can be no real under­
standing of the substantial role labor has played and continues 
to play in Latin American politics. Although we need more work 
in the field of labor history, this study is neither a history 
of the Mexican labor movement nor of the CROM. Much labor 
history has been included, however, in order to give proper 
perspective to Morones' life. The story of his rise is intimate­
ly linked with the growth of organized Mexican labor, yet so 
many individuals were involved with that development that it would 
be inaccurate to consider Morones more than a contributing factor 
to it. Nevertheless, one must not underestimate the importance 
of his role in this respect.
Since there is no comprehensive or authoritative biography 
of Morones, this study is undertaken to shed more light on this 
controversial person. It is not intended to cover all aspects 
of this complex man. The writer has attempted to be as objective 
and detached as possible, a seemingly rare characteristic of other 
accounts of Morones' life, since they are distorted by partisan­
ship. A study of Morones must show his involvement in Mexico's 
politics, petroleum problems, and her Church-State crises during 
the twelve years, 1918-30, that CROM was powerful. As a rule, 
studies in economics and political science only mention Morones 
in connection with this period; and consequently there are large 
gaps in his biography. This dissertation, based largely on data
xii
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gathered during field research in Mexico, attempts to supplement 
this early period, and to correct the oversimplified portrayals 
of Morones as a man who devoted his life only to the labor move­
ment.
In spite of the fact that most of his private papers are 
not available, enough data from personal interviews and other 
sources have been collected to reconstruct his private life. The 
following materials have been utilized: (l) Mexican and United
States government documents and publications; (2) books and 
articles; (3) encyclopedias and dictionaries; (1+) Argentine,
English, Mexican, and United States newspapers; (5) Masters' 
and Ph.D. theses written in United States universities; (6 ) inter­
views in 1968, 1970j and 1971 with individuals personally acquainted 
with Morones (including, among others, his widow, Senora Berta Pena 
Viuda de Morones; one of his sons, Luis Enrique Morones Pena, his 
personal secretary for twenty-seven years, Jose Ortiz Petricioli; 
Carleton Beals; an American journalist and historian, and ex­
president Emilio Portes Gil, one of Morones' persistent critics 
and bitter adversaries); (7 ) various photograph archives in 
Mexico City, (8 ) and the writer's personal correspondence with 
American and Mexican historians.^ Since Morones died in I96U, 
four years before the idea of this biography was conceived, none 
of the conferences was with him. However, his speeches and
unless otherwise specified, all Mexican newspapers cited 
are from Mexico City. Personal correspondence which is located in 
the Louisiana State University Department of Archives and Manuscripts 
will be listed merely as "L.S.U. Archives."
xiii
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writings which appeared in newspapers, Ministry publications, and 
in official CROM organs have formed a major segment of the source 
material. Primary sources also include some of Morones' personal 
correspondence, and the writings and memoirs of many of his 
friends and enemies. A few of these include Jose Petricioli, 
Ricardo Trevino, Samuel Gompers, Carleton Beals, Frank Tannenbaum, 
Ernest Gruening, Vito Alessio Robles, Serafino Romauldi, Jose Zuno, 
Emilio Portes Gil, Luis Araiza, Rosendo Salazar, Alberto Pani, and 
Vicente Lombardo Toledano. Some of these writings are so charged 
with rancor that they are unreliable and must be used with caution. 
Newspapers also are not always accurate, but they have been 
checked against each other and against official records, and 
constitute a valuable source of important details.
xiv
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER I
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN LABOR MOVEMENT TO 1911
A change of great importance for Mexico is the surprisingly 
rapid mass organization of its working population. This growth 
has occurred in a country where organization and collective action 
on the part of the masses were unknown before 1911. The fact 
that powerful trade unions and political labor movements should 
exist in early twentieth-century Mexico, which was so largely 
agricultural in nature, is somewhat a paradox. Industry was 
underdeveloped, the masses illiterate, and the Roman Catholic 
Church with its tremendous hold on the people was vigilant in 
obstructing theories that might upset the traditional status of 
the lower classes.
Although there were beginnings of an organized labor 
movement as early as the middle decades of the nineteenth century, 
the most important group, the Gran Cxrculo de Obreros (Grand 
Circle of Workers), was not founded until 1876. The usual forms 
of unionism were mutualistic societies —  ostensibly for educa­
tional, social, and burial purposes. These societies existed as 
weak and isolated groups which broke and reformed repeatedly, and 
exerted little influence outside their own local spheres.
PORFIRIO DIAZ'S LABOR POLICY, I876-I9IO
President Diaz stressed the industrialization of Mexico. He 
invited foreign capital into the country. Railroads were built
1
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
and factories appeared. One of the favorable terms Diaz promised 
foreigners was a docile and cheap labor force. By the later l880's 
his regime no longer tolerated the opposition and political 
"sedition" represented by the labor movement. Its press was 
suppressed, and the labor organizations themselves found it 
increasingly difficult to pursue their activities.
The most outstanding labor events during the years pre­
ceding the Revolution were two strikes in 1907 both led by 
adherents of Ricardo Flores Magon, who sought to overthrow 
Diaz by means of a huelga general. These occurred in the impor­
tant Cananea copper mines in the North and among the textile 
workers of Puebla in the South. Although the workers lost these 
strikes, they contributed considerably to the development of 
labor discontent during Diaz's rule, revealing that the president 
vigorously opposed any action which disturbed the social or 
economic order.
FRANCISCO MADERO AND LABOR
Since one of Francisco Madero's goals was the advancement 
of labor, there was widespread support among the workers for the 
revolutionary movement launched by him in 1910. The working class 
in the early revolutionary period was a main source of military 
manpower. It provided capable fighters who, unlike the peasants, 
were concentrated in strategic urban areas. Madero's forces did 
bring about the overthrow of Diaz: and the liberal policies of the 
Madero government, 1911-13> permitted labor to organize. In 
December, 1911, President Madero created a Labor Office to carry
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
out needed studies of the workers' condition and to intervene in 
industrial disputes. In eight months this office contributed to 
the settlement of seventy strikes.
CASA. DEL OBRERO MUNDIAL
The first group to give any semblance of coherence to the 
Mexican labor movement was the Casa del Obrero Mundial, or House 
of the World's Workers. The Casa was not a labor union, but its 
aid in later union development is of importance. It served as a 
meeting place where ideas were exchanged and developed, and where 
propaganda pamphlets were prepared and disseminated to other parts 
of the country. Thus, to organize and coordinate the labor move­
ment in Mexico, these first leaders were obliged to experiment in 
forms of organization, to theorize, learn, and study existing 
conditions.
Founded in Tampico in September, 1912, by a group of foreign 
and Mexican left-wing intellectuals, the Casa's guiding voices 
were Mikhail Bakunin and Pierre Proudhon rather than Karl Marx.*' 
The Casa soon evidenced tendencies to: (l) depend on the govern­
ment for meeting places, money, and assistance in conflicts with 
employers; (2) rely on legislation as a means of protecting the 
interests of organized labor; and (3) support anarcho-syndicalist 
methods of direct violent action, such as sabotage and the general
Harvey A. Levenstein, "The United States Labor Movement and 
Mexico, 1910-1951" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin, 1966), 22. Bakunin's principal tenets were destruction 
of the state and ultraindividualistic rights.
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b2
strike- Anarcho-syndicalism begins with the assumption that private 
property and the capitalistic system are responsible for man's 
material anguish and sufferings. Inasmuch as capitalism is inherent­
ly evil, the anarcho-syndicalist concludes that the worker and 
employer can never have any common interests. In order to defeat 
capitalism and accomplish a fundamental transformation of society 
and the economy, the worker must be prepared to use direct action —  
bombing, dynamiting, arson, murder, terror, single or partial 
strikes, the general strike, boycott, slow-down (sometimes called
O
hacer la perra in Mexico), and sabotage.
The Casa's founders wanted to reduce working class aims to 
concrete doctrine and dispatch agents throughout the country to 
organize the proletariat into unions instilled with class conscious­
ness. Once established in revolutionary unions, the workers would 
be in a position to use their economic power in forming a general 
strike to topple the entire bourgeois capitalist economic and 
political structure and to replace it with an anarcho-syndicalist 
state based on the ownership by the workers of the factories and 
farms.
Although the Casa's leaders were at first sympathetic to 
President Madero, many soon became disillusioned with him. When 
the Casa urged upon Madero the necessity for a broad program of 
legislation on behalf of the working classes, he apparently had
William S. Stokes, Latin American Politics (New York, 1959)>
2b0.
3Ibid., 2 3 5-
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5little realization of the force of social protest which had been 
released by the overthrow of Dxaz. He thus failed to enact the 
reform programs which were being pressed upon him in labor relations 
by the Casa and in the agrarian field by Emiliano Zapata, an impor­
tant revolutionary leader operating southwest of Mexico City.
Zapata was seizing and distributing estates of large landholders 
among landless peasants. Consequently, there were some strikes 
during Madero's administration. Although at first giving the 
Casa full freedom to conduct its activities, Madero tended to 
become impatient with it in the last months of his rule, fearing 
its radicialism and the introduction into the labor ranks of 
foreign influence and doctrines.
Marjorie Ruth Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico (Chapel Hill, 
193*0, 2U. This scholarly monograph treating pre-C.T.M. developments 
continues to be the standard work on the Mexican labor movement.
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CHAPTER II
EARLY CAREER AND PRE-CROM PERIOD 
BIRTH
Ignacio Morones and Rafaela Negrete, two weavers in the 
cotton factory of Atemajac near Guadalajara, Jalisco, were 
married in La Capilla de Jesus in the state capital in 1888.
Since there was little opportunity for economic advancement in 
Guadalajara, Morones, his wife, and other textile workers quit 
their jobs in the mills of Atemajac, La Experiencia, and El Batan 
and moved to work in the factory of San Fernando de Tlalpan near 
Mexico City. In honor of their abandoned and beloved city, they 
named their neighborhood El Barrio de Guadalajarita. At 10:00 P.M. 
on October 11, 189O, Rafaela gave birth to a son in her home. The 
infant was named Luis Morones Negrete.
EDUCATION
Following the closing of San Fernando in 1895 because of 
economic difficulties, a majority of the workers returned to 
Jalisco. Choosing not to return to his native state, Ignacio 
moved his family to Mexico City where they lived in a small house 
for which he paid eight pesos rent monthly. Since Ignacio's 
earnings were insufficient to support his wife and son, Rafaela 
supplemented the family's income by selling arroz con leche and 
other snacks in the vestibule of their home.
6
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Luis was the only offspring of Ignacio and Rafaela, and his 
nine maternal aunts took special interest in him. They attempted 
to satisfy many of the youth’s material needs hut did not spoil 
him with numerous g i f t s B e c a u s e  of his aunts, Luis was able to 
attend a primary school near his home until he reached the sixth 
grade level. Later he studied shorthand and typing in a nearby 
institute on Las Escalerillas Street. Although Morones disliked 
these skills and never used them during the rest of his life, this 
opportunity enabled him to receive some instruction beyond a rudi­
mentary education.
EARLY LABOR AGITATION 
At age seventeen, despite his father's wishes that he be a 
weaver, Luis was earning wages at an electrician's shop. A fac­
simile of his electrician's card states that Luis N. Morones could
repair "all types of motors and electrical apparatus" in a shop
2
located at Puente de San Antonio, No. 10.
Luis Araiza, Historia del moviini ento obrero mexicano vols. 
Mexico, D.F., 196^-1965), III, 190? Jose Ortiz Petricioli, El 
companero Morones: biografia de un gran lxder (Mexico, D.F., 1968),
is, 29.
^Beginning in 1907 Luis Morones Negrete began using the 
initial "N" between his Christian name and his surname. Jose 
Petricioli, Morones' private secretary for 27 years, states that 
this practice caused numerous writers and politicians to err about 
the motivation for the change. Some did it in good faith, some 
from ignorance, others deliberately^to attack Morones. Petricioli, 
El companero Morones, 37* Felipe Lopez Rosado, for example, in his 
El hombre y la economxa states, "Luis Napoleon Morones era visto 
con deslumbrantes joyas y se hablaba de orgxas en su quinta de 
Tlalpan." Ibid., 38-39- Victor Alba in his Historia del movimiento 
obrero en America Latina (Mexico, D.F., 196*0, likewise erred 
about Morones' name. Alba writes, "La C.R.O.M. esta dirigida en
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8Morones' early years were ones of self-education in the school 
of hard knocks and trial and error. In his youth he devoted much 
attention to listening and learning and developed an interest'in 
social and labor problems. Morones joined the Casa in 1913- At
realidad, por el Grupo Accion, congregado en tomo a Luis Napoleon 
Morones." Alba's Politics and the Labor Movement (Stanford, 1968), 
contains this and other minor errors about Morones, 307- In 
Morones' obituary in Tiempo: semanario de la vida y la verdad,
his name is given as "Luis Napoleon Morones Negrete," (April 13,
196^), 3 3; and the labor leader is listed in the Diccionario 
enciclopedia, U.T.E.H.A. as "Morones, (Luis Napoleon) , ' 1 (Mexico,
D.F., 1952), 7^7- Others have interpreted the initial "N" as 
meaning Nepomuceno, Nicandro, or since Morones was born on October 11 
as Nicasio, the saint's name for that date. Inigo Medina in Morones' 
obituary wrote of "Luis Nicasio Morones," Las Novedades, April 6 , 
I96U. One prominent American Mexicanist accidently listed the labor 
leader as "Luis G. Morones." Howard F. Cline, The United States 
and Mexico (Cambridge, 1963), 193j -^79- This mistake was probably 
a typographical error because although Professor Cline never met 
Morones, he knew his name was Luis N. Morones. Howard F. Cline to 
Nick Buford, February If, March 10, 1970, L.S.U. Archives. Petricioli 
explains that this confusion began because Morones, for caprice, 
euphony, or perhaps some other reason placed the "N" from Negrete 
between his Christian name and his surname. Petricioli, El 
companero Morones, bo. Morones was once referred to as "Luis Eliseo 
Morones" by an opposition deputy. Diario de los Debates de la 
Camara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
XXX Legislatura, tomo III, No. 1, September 21, 1923» 3• Even 
though this name confusion is in itself trivial, it illustrates tbe 
difficulty of obtaining objective facts about Morones. Petricioli 
even claims that the name controversy is an example of one of the 
many "legends" surrounding Morones: one which is "filled with
passion." Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico City 19> 1968. In 
1968 Petricioli published El companero Morones, a rambling, partisan 
attempt at a biography based mainly on conversations with Morones 
instead of sound historical records. He devoted a brief chapter to 
the name problem, and as Petricioli explained about his sources,
"La mayor parte de los datos que doy a conocer, me fueron platicados 
en diversas ocasiones por el propio companero cuya biografia trato 
de hacer, y es posible que falten muchos aspectos que otros com- 
paneros conocen, omitidos por mi al no conocerlos." El companero 
Morones, preface; interviews, Mexico City, June 19, 25, 30, 19^8.
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the age of twenty-two, the youngest member in that organization, he 
was very active and spent time attempting to organize workers. By 
speaking to his fellow workers, he became popular and gradually 
worked himself through the ranks of the Sindicato Mexicano de 
Electricistas. Morones represented the S.M.E. in various labor 
federations. An ambitious man, he saw these union activities as 
a means to advance his political career.
VENUSTIANO CARRANZA AND LABOR 
In January, 1913> President Francisco Madero was assassinated 
and General Victoriano Huerta seized the presidency in order to re­
establish order. Huerta was obliged to employ violent methods —  
methods which involved the execution and incarceration of many 
leaders of the trade and labor unions and the closing of the Casa 
in 191^. His successful coup d1 etat and ruthless practices united 
various conflicting elements in a struggle against his dictatorship. 
Huerta’s three principal opponents were Venustiano Carranza, who 
was strongest in northeastern Mexico; Francisco Villa, in the 
Northwest; and Emiliano Zapata, in the Southwest.
By the last months of 191 ,^ the anti-Huerta forces were vic­
torious and occupied the capital. Temporarily all the major forces 
recognized the supremacy of Carranza, "a big, white-bearded man
behind blue spectacles —  a calm iceberg of a man," as "First Chief" 
3
of the revolution. This victory was only the prelude to continued 
3
Carleton Beals, Glass Houses: Ten Years of Free-Lancing
(Philadelphia, 1938), 22.
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hostilities and Carranza soon faced further problems. The forces of 
Villa and Zapata aligned themselves against the president. These 
circumstances compelled the conservative Carranza to evolve a social 
program which would attract workers to his banner.
Carranza, in need of all the forces he could muster to break 
the power of Villa, delegated General Alvaro Obregon, principal 
leader of the Carranza forces, to negotiate with the labor unions 
of the Federal District for their help. A pact was drawn up in 
February, 1915, between the Casa, then the most powerful labor body 
in the country, and the government. It was agreed that the Casa 
would have governmental assurance of full freedom to carry on its 
organizational activities and establish unions among workers within 
the areas controlled by the carrancistas. In return, the labor 
leaders would recruit thousands of laborers from the capital to 
furnish "red batallions" to fight in the ranks of Carranza's troops. 
These contingents made an important contribution to the eventual 
military victory of the carrancistas. General Celestino Gasca,
Samuel Yudico and Salvador Alvarez, who were later important 
cromistas, fought with these red batallions.
Morones opposed the S.M.E. representative on a Casa steering
1+
committee who supported the formation of these units to aid Carranza. 
Morones did not trust Carranza and was not sure if he would win. 
Therefore, Morones avoided irrevocable commitment to the Constitution­
alists .
k
La Prensa, February 21, 1915-
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In 1915 when Obregon, Carranza's general, arrived in Mexico 
City, the S.M.E. was having a conflict with the Telegraph and 
Telephone Company. Inflation caused the telephone workers to grow 
more insistent in their demands for higher wages. After weeks of 
discussion with management about a wage increase, the union 
suddenly cut off all power in the Federal District on the morning 
of August 13, 1915* Five hours after the strike began, Morones 
met with a member of the government to discuss union demands. An 
offer from General Pablo Gongalez, senior military commander in the 
area, to pay a wage increase for a month pending further negotiations 
was rejected by the S.M.E. leadership.
The company was taken over by the government, and Morones was 
appointed to head the Telegraph and Telephone Company.^ He remained 
in the office only a few months and left under the charge of mis- 
appropriation of funds, which was never proved. This allegation 
was not the last time Morones was accused of corruption while 
serving in a public office; such complaints became commonplace in 
his later career.
Carranza, who had little conception of labor's potential, did 
not wish to create the impression that he was antagonistic to
^Jose Petricioli in El Excelsior, April 6 , I96U; Luis N. Morones 
in Petricioli, El conrpanero Morones, lh; Confederacion Regional Obrera 
Mexicana, Memoria de los trabajos realizados por el H. Comite Central, 
durante el e,1ercicio comprendido del 1°. de agosto de 1963 a .iulio de 
196$ (Mexico, D.F., 1965), 21. Hereinafter this CROM publication will 
be cited as "C.R.O.M. Memoria" and the appropriate year given.
g
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 58, 170.
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capital, or rather, too friendly to organized labor. His flirtation 
•with the latter was brief. After Obregon's military victories over 
Villa at Leon, Agua Prieta, Hermosillo, and Celaya, Carranza no 
longer needed labor's support and discouraged its development. With 
the Constitutionalist cause triumphant, the workers expected pro­
gressive changes. Not only did these fail to materialize, but with 
soaring costs resulting from the huge volume of paper money issued 
by the Constitutionalists, the workers found their economic condition 
worse than ever. Because of the consequent decline in real wages,
■7
labor called a general strike for higher wages in May, 1916. When 
this strike (which suspended telephone service, electric power, 
and streetcar operation) paralyzed Mexico City, Carranza pronounced 
the strike an act of aggression and treason against his government 
and made a half-century-old law decreeing capital punishment of 
highwaymen applicable to the strikers. Carranza also closed the 
Casa, which he had earlier endowed with lavish quarters, arrested 
many of its prominent leaders, and condemned them to death. One 
of the victims of his wrath was Morones. Obregon interceded and, 
by a timely reprieve, managed to obtain a commutation of the death 
sentence to a term in a military prison. Some leaders were forced 
to leave Mexico. Others like Jose Barragan Hernandez, a typographer
fj
Ernest Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage (New York, 1928), 
338; Victor Alba, The Mexicans; the Making of a Nation (New York, 
1987), 1^5; Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (3rd ed. 
rev.; Boston, i960), 3 6 3.
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and one of the ablest labor chiefs, were gunned down by government
. 8 agents.
Following his near fatal encounter with Carranza, Morones spent 
a brief time in Pachuca, Hidalgo. In 1916 the labor leader Pedro • 
Rivera Flores was elected presidente municipal of this small silver- 
mining town. Remembering his old friend, Rivera appointed Morones 
secretary of the ayuntamiento. For a year Morones lived in this
9
provincial community and continued his efforts to organize labor.
SAMUEL GOMFERS AND MEXICAN LABOR 
Morones' future ally, Samuel Gonrpers, first became cognizant 
of Mexican labor problems in 1883 when he worked at Stachelberg' s 
making cigars with three Mexican cigarmakers. Through them he 
learned of the Mexican laborers' misfortunes, lack of material 
possessions, and "poorness of spirit," all of which appealed to 
his sympathy. 10
g
Alba, The Mexicans, 1^5, Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 
338; Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, 187; Nathaniel 
and Sylvania Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico: the Years of Lazaro
Cardenas (London, 1939)-. 60; J. H. Retinger, Morones of Mexico: a 
History of the Labour Movement in that Country (London, 1926), 9-3-0- 
According to Retinger, the fact that Carranza relented was not due 
to any sudden sentimental change on his part, "but to the fact that 
even at that early date Morones and his friends were outstanding 
figures in Mexico and that Carranza feared the consequences of 
killing them." 9 . He fails to substantiate this assertion.
9
Retinger, Morones of Mexico, 10.
10Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor; an 
Autobiography (2 vols.; New York, 19^8 ), II, 303-30^-
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Gompers wired Mexican labor organizations asking that they 
send delegates to El Paso for a labor conference. Twenty delegates 
were selected to meet with Gompers, Morones, and the impressionist 
painter Gerardo Murillo, or "Dr. Atl," were among them. On June 21,
1916, twelve American soldiers were killed and twenty-three cap­
tured in the skirmish with Carranza forces at El Carrizal. President 
Wilson issued an ultimatum calling for the release of the imprisoned 
American soldiers. Wilson called up the National Guard, and war 
seemed imminent. Morones and other delegates arrived in El Paso 
two days after the Carrizal clash for their conference with 
Gompers.
No reply from Carranza was received, so to avoid war these 
Mexican labor representatives telegraphed Gompers to wire an 
appeal to Carranza for the prisoners' release.^ Gompers sent 
Mexico's president the following telegram on June 28:
In the name of common justice and humanity, 
in the interest of a better understanding between 
the peoples and the governments of the U.S. and 
Mexico, for the purpose of giving the opportunity 
to maintain peace and avoid the horrors of war, 
upon the grounds of highest patriotism and love,
I appeal to you to release the American soldiers 
held by your officers in Chihuahua.^
The following day Gompers received a telegram from Carranza informing
him that the Mexican government had ordered the freeing of the
^ American Federationist, August, 1966, 633-63 8.
"^‘^William C. Roberts, comp., American Federation of Labor:
History, Encyclopedia and Reference 3ook (2 vols.; Washington,
1919), I, 287-
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Americans whom the Mexicans had taken captive at El Carrizal.
Carranza's release of the prisoners and a deluge of anti-war mail
sent to the White House diverted Wilson from his warlike path; and,
instead of the "war message" he had prepared to deliver to Congress,
13Wilson read a moving, conciliatory address.
Because of the conditions along the border and the fact that
the executive council of the A.F.L. was scheduled to meet in
Washington, Gompers suggested that twenty Mexican delegates select
\ two of their number to proceed to Washington as a sub-delegation
to meet with the A.F.L. executive council for the purpose of
establishing closer relations between the labor movements of the
14neighboring republics. Before departing for the American 
capital, a communication was signed by Morones, Edmundo Martinez, 
Carlos Loveira, and Salvador Gongalez Garcia, and sent in the name 
of Mexican organized workers to the A.F.L. urging it to use its 
influence to secure the withdrawal of the Pershing Expedition.^ 
Upon their arrival in Washington, Morones and Gongalez 
Garcia found two labor representatives of Governor Salvador 
Alvarado of Yucatan awaiting them as well. Thus, a reasonable 
semblance of a joint Mexican-American labor conference could be
^Arthur Link, Wilson, IV, 31^-318 in Levenstein, "The 
United States Labor Movement and Mexico, 1910-1951," 55-
lUGompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, II, 313;
Morones’ speech in "La C.R.O.M. ni se muere ni se rinde," C.R.O.M., 
November, 1920, 13.
15Carleton Beals, Mexico; an Interpretation (New York,
1923), 137.
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held. The violation of Mexican sovereignty by United States troops 
served as the catalyst win oh prompted Gompers to suggest meetings 
between the two labor movements.
According to cromistas (who ignore President Wilson's role), 
Morones entered into relations with Gompers and with the help of 
the American labor movement, Gompers and Morones were able to 
obtain withdrawal of the American soldiers. This reunion was 
also important because it was a forerunner of the Pan-American 
Federation of Labor.
Morones returned to Mexico after the joint meeting, and 
later that year Gompers wrote him and other leaders recommending 
that they follow the organizational scheme of the A.F.L. This 
would include organizing skilled and unskilled labor into trade 
unions, not industrial unions. Gompers was anxious to form a 
Pan-American federation of labor. Progress in this field was 
retarded, however, by World War I, and it was not until the war 
was over that the long-anticipated organizing convention occurred.
SOCIALIST WOEKERS’ PARTY 
After the failure of the general strike in May, 1916, many 
leaders of the labor movement, including a number of S.M.E. 
members, were convinced that vigorous political action was the 
only way to assure labor that the fiasco of 1916 would not be
*
Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico City, June 25, 1968;
Luis Enrique Morones Pena, interview, Mexico City, August 2k , 1968;
C.R.O.M. Memoria, 196^-1965. 27; Rogelio de la Selva in Las 
Novedades, April 1 , 196 .^
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repeated. Thus they organized the Partido Socialista Obrero to
advocate political activity as a supplement to economic actions
by unions. The candidacy of Morones and eight other leaders for
congressional seats was put forth on February 20, 1917» to
compete against Carranza's Liberal Constitutional Party. All
were defeated and the Socialist Workers' Party made few note-
17worthy gains in the election. Nevertheless, this cadre 
coalesced in 1918 and provided the leadership for what became 
Mexico's most powerful trade union. Furthermore, no Mexican 
union or political party has since really denied the P.S.O.'s 
principle of supplementing economic activity with political 
action.
ABORTIVE EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A NATION-WIDE LABOR ORGANIZATION
An attempt was made at Tampico to create a labor organization
when unions of the Casa convoked a national assembly there in
October, 1917* The delegation from the Federal District consisted
of Morones, Reynaldo Cervantes Torres, Amado Ortiz, Rodolfo
18
Aguirre, Gabriel Hidalgo, and Francisco Cervantes Lopez.
L7Araiza, Historia del movimi.ento obrero mexicano, III, 3 6; 
Rosendo Salazar and Jose G. Escobedo, Las pugnas de la~gleba 
(Mexico, D.F., 1923)j 236; Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 71*
18Cervantes Torres represented the Federacion de Sindicatos 
Obreros del Distrito Federal y Sindicatos de Carpinteros y Costureras 
Morones, the Sindicato de Electricistas; Amado Ortiz, the Sindicato 
de Sastres de Mexico, D.F.; Aguirre and Hidalgo, the Federacion 
de Obreros y Empleados de Tranvias de Mexico, D.F.; and Cervantes 
Lopez, the Partido Socialista Obrero de Mexico, D.F. Salazar and 
Escobedo, Las pugnas de la gleba, 2k3-2kk .
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During the conference labor leaders from different areas fought for
control. The conference quickly split into two opposing groups.
The trade unionists from the Federal District, headed by Morones,
were opposed by the anarchists, mostly from Tampico, and led by
Ricardo Trevino. Opponents of the Federal District delegates
accused them of attending the congress to act as informants for
the government -which was subsidizing them. Some from the Federal
District were arrested, but none of these were moronistas whom
19competitors alleged had the protection of the secret police.
Because of such discord, a nation-wide labor organization did not 
materialize until the following year.
Ricardo Trevino, El movimiento obrero en Mexico. Su evolucion 
ideologica (Mexico, D.F., 19^ +8), 48. Trevino is vague in his one 
brief paragraph describing this incident. He neither identifies the 
"opponents," the specific group arrested, nor who apprehended them.
One assumes government agents seized them since Trevino mentions 
secret police. He does, however, praise Morones' cleverness for 
pretending to be a government instrument. In reality, according 
to Trevino, Morones outwitted the administration and used its 
generosity to finance his delegation.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER I I I
CROM, P.A.F.L., AND P.L.M. FOUNDINGS 
CROM FOUNDING
CRCM was founded as a result of a split -which took place among 
the laborers in Mexico, as some (the most radical, called "reds") 
believed that they should always go against the government, while 
others, (less radical, called the "yellows") thought that, on the 
contrary, to give greater protection to the workers they should 
enter into politics and endeavor to get as many legislative posts 
as they could.
In January, 1918, Licenciado Gustavo Espinosa Mireles, 
governor of Coahuila, called a convention to meet in Saltillo to 
form a nation-wide labor organization which President Carranza 
hoped to dominate.^" Morones was one of the first to know the 
governor's intentions, because Juan Lozano, a member of the 
organizational committee, explained the situation to him. Since 
travelling expenses and lodging were paid by the Coahuila govern­
ment, Morones received 150 pesos to journey to Saltillo from
Mexico City; he unsuccessfully asked for more, alleging that
2
this was a paltry sum for a leader of his caliber.
^Trevino, El movimiento obrero en Mexico, 7^5 Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano, Teoria y nractica del movimiento sindical mexicano 
(Mexico, D.F., 1961), 53-5^.
2
Carlos Tresguerras in La Prensa, May 315 1939*
19
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The congress -which opened May 1 in Saltillo's Teatro Obrero 
included 121 representatives from all the Mexican states. In this 
meeting Morones1 fiery orations and behind-the-scenes maneuvering 
pushed him rapidly to the front as the obvious leader of the new 
organization. Morones' national reputation was based largely on 
the Mexicans' believing that he had ended U.S. military presence 
in Mexico. This, added to the following he gained at the Veracruz 
and Tampico congresses, made Morones the most prominent man in the 
Mexican labor movement at Saltillo. Through sheer energy and a 
sense of political direction which other leaders lacked, Morones 
and Ezequiel Salcedo, leader of a small group from the Federal 
District, manipulated the convention and imposed their will upon 
the congress.
Fernando Rodarte, in the name of the assembly, declared the 
Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana to be in existence, with 
the following selected as the provisional executive committee: 
Jacinto Huitron, Secretary General; Luis N. Morones, Secretary 
of Interior; Teodoro Ramirez, Secretary of Exterior; and Ricardo
O
Trevino, Secretary of Acuerdos. At the 8:00 F.M. session of 
May 11 the central committee was elected by the assembly for the
^C.R.O.M. Memoria, 19^1 -19^ -3, xix; Atlas, June 15, 1968. 
Huitron was an anarchist; Morones, a trade unionist; Ramirez, a 
syndicalist; and Trevino, an adherent of the Industrial Workers 
of the World. Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 6l. The founders 
chose the word "Regional" because it conveyed the concept that the 
syndical organization of Mexico was a fraction of the international 
labor movement. Lombardo Toledano, Teoria y practica, 5^.
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corning year. Morones was chosen secretary general by a vote of 
85 to 6 and Trevino and J. Marcos Tristan corresponding secretaries.
Morones demonstrated his intelligence by maneuvering the 
Saltillo convention in a form to his liking. Carranza intended 
that the new labor organization would give him unquestioned 
support; in fact, it turned out to be one of his strongest 
opponents.
CROM STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION 
CROM was a loose federation of autonomous national, state, 
and local unions organized much on the pattern of the American 
Federation of Labor. It was composed of trade, labor, and 
directly affiliated workers' syndicates. The sindicato, or 
syndicate (single unit), combined laborers either of similar 
occupations, like the United States trade unions, or of the 
same establishment, like the United States industrial unions.
The terms union, liga, and sociedad were also used, generally
C.R.O.M. Memoria, 19^1-19^-3, xxxviii-xl; John W. F. Dulles, 
Yesterday in Mexico (Austin, 19ol), 2T(b. The committee was to have 
its headquarters at Aguascalientes, but in 1921 the central committee 
was permanently transferred to the Federal District, the center of 
the Mexican labor movement. According to Retinger, Morones was,
"Born when the process of the invasion of Mexico by foreign 
capitalism was at its height, his life is the unique story of a 
boy who, from being an electrician's apprentice, became in less 
than ten years the greatest moral leader of his country, the 
founder of an important labour movement and the object of hero 
worship of multitudes of his fellow countrymen." Morones of 
Mexico, xv-xvi. That Morones was "the greatest moral leader of 
his country" is as questionable as is the statement "the object 
of hero worship of multitudes of his fellow countrymen." These 
panegyric remarks incorporate more propaganda than concrete fact.
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indiscriminately, to designate these organizations. In addition to 
the state and federal federations, CROM in the 1920's included four- 
national industrial federations: those of printing trades, port
and harbor workers, railroad workers, and theater employees.
In a country filled with impoverished laborers, CROM was 
not confined to the industrial population. While industrial 
workers, such as miners, railwaymen, textile workers, electricians, 
and petroleum workers joined, CROM included non-industrial vocations 
also. Especially strong in Mexico City and among factory and farm 
workers, CROM organized a multiplicity of elements comprising, 
among others, gravediggers, bullfighters, domestic servants, 
fruit vendors, government employees, department-store workers, 
newsboys, and a union of Mexico City prostitutes.^ CROM even 
dominated the entertainment industry, shouting down theatrical 
performances in which non-unionized actors were employed; and, 
by controlling the printers, CROM was able to exercise unofficial 
censorship over the Mexican press.
Despite its federative framework, CROM was centralized. The 
central committee, (composed of three general secretaries together 
with a variable number of secretaries for agriculture, transporta­
tion, treasury, and heads of the national federations), was the
^Clark, Organized labor in Mexico, 108; Edward Alsworth Ross, 
The Social Revolution in Mexico (New York, 1923), 103; Parkes, A 
History of Mexico, 382.
£
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico. 119s Parkes, A History of 
Mexico, 382.
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executive of tlie ■whole federation. It carried out agreements of the 
annual national conventions, enforced the confederation's constitu­
tion, and handled emergency situations of national importance.
GRUPO ACCION
Although elected delegates from each union acting in assemblies 
gave CROM a democratic appearance, internal politics were actually 
managed by a small inner clique called the Grupo Accion which dic­
tated pre-convention policies. Before the formation of CROM, when 
the Casa was leading the Mexican labor movement, a number of young 
men met frequently in Mexico City to plan and direct union activity. 
From these meetings Morones got the idea of the Grupo Accion which 
he formed in 1918. The purpose of this cadre was to study important 
problems, prepare plans, and present a united front to the labor 
organization. Although this body was unmentioned in the CROM con­
stitution, it became the policy-making and chief governing body
7
conducting day-to-day affairs.
The hierarchical structure of CROM and the fact that a cadre 
which met in secret, perpetuated itself in office, and exercised an 
influence out of proportion to its size, ensured that no refbrm
7
At first the Grupo Accion consisted of eighteen members, two- 
thiras of whom were from the Federal District and all of whom had 
played an active part in Mexico's incipient organized labor movement. 
Original members included Morones, Salcedo, Celestino Gasca, Juan 
Rico, Ricardo TreviSo, J. Marcos Tristan, Eduardo Moneda, Juan B. 
Fonseca, Fernando Rodarte, Juan Lozano, Jose Lopez Cortes, Reynaldo 
Cervantes Torres, Adalberto Polo, Pedro Suarez, Pedro Rivera Flores, 
Salvador Alvarez, Samuel Yudico, and Jose Gutierrez. From time to 
time new members would be added, but at no time were there more 
than twenty in the select group.
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could "be made except from the top downwards. Morones was the 
acknowledged leader and most authoritative member of the Grupo, 
in spite of the fact that forty years later he attempted to 
underplay his commanding position when he stated, "I, like any 
other member of the Grupo Accion, was subject to the determination
g
of the majority." Although C-rupo members were not figureheads, 
they were subordinate to Morones; he was the dominant figure and 
more than anyone else shaped policy.
CROM IDEOLOGY
With CROM's foundation, an elite of the organized working 
class began to formulate, clarify, and build its program. In its 
early years CROM was militant, because its ranks contained many 
elements that had formed the Casa. Nevertheless, it adopted a 
platform less radical and less influenced by Russian thought than 
that of the Casa. Although CROM utilized the anarcho-syndicalist 
"salud y revolucion" as its official motto, adopted the Casa's 
organizational flag, (a red banner crossed by a black stripe) and 
freely used anarchist jargon, it abandoned syndicalism and gene­
rally followed the United States labor movement.
Through ideological eclecticism, CROM combined elements of 
diverse systems to form a new unit. The constitution abandoned 
the anarcho-syndicalist doctrine and accepted the theory of class 
conflict, the breaking up of large estates and land distribution,
g
Luis N. Morones in Petricioli, El companero Morones, lU.
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ownership of industry by workers, and the reform of the conciliation
g
and arbitration labor boards. Although advocating ultimate owner­
ship and management of industry by the workers, CROM leadership 
stressed immediate economic and social improvements such as agrarian 
reform and enforcement of the newly-adopted labor laws of the 1917 
Mexican Constitution. Broadly stated, two goals of CROM were 
(l) the legitimate defense and execution of the workers' interests 
guaranteed under the Mexican Constitution, and (2) the solution of 
economic problems that confronted the country.^ In achieving its 
goals CROM used both economic and political means. It replaced 
anarchism's direct action with multiple action. This meant com­
bining the use of strikes to extract better working conditions from 
the employers with direct political action; and, thus in the manner 
of British unions, it would change the socio-economic system.^
P.A.F.L. FOUNDING 
John Murray, correspondent for the New York Call, and Santiago 
Iglesias, Puerto Rican organizer for the A.F.L. and a man. who was 
familiar with Mexican affairs, became convinced of the necessity
%eals, Mexico: an Interpretation, 136; Joe C. Ashby,
Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Lazaro Cardenas 
(Chapel Hill, 1963), 1^; William P. Tucker, The Mexican Govern­
ment Today (Minneapolis, 1957)? 5^- Morones had earlier observed 
trade unions in France, Germany, England, and the United States 
and decided to adapt these principles to the Mexican environment 
and conditions.
■^Luis N. Morones in El Universal, August 27, 195^ -j Ashby, 
Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution Tinder Lazaro Cardenas,
Tk.
^Lombardo Toledano, Teoria y practica, 55*
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for a formal Pan-American labor organization. These two men aided 
by various other factors helped convince President of the A.F.L. 
Samuel Gompers that the A.F.L. should enter into some kind of a 
formal alliance with CROM. There was, for example, a strong 
current of opinion in Mexico favorable to Germany during World 
War I. A Pan-American federation, as Gompers saw it, could 
counteract Germanophile tendencies and create favorable opinion 
for the Allied cause. With this in mind, Gompers continued to 
urge Mexican labor leaders to push for the joint meeting. Gompers' 
hopes were fulfilled by events of autumn, 1918.
The Pan-American Federation of Labor, which the CROM joined 
for opportunist reasons, was founded in November, 1918, in Laredo, 
Texas. November 13, the first day of the conference, was devoted 
to welcoming the deputies, speech-making, and ceremonial activities. 
W. B. Wilson, United States Secretary of Labor, attended the con­
ference as President Woodrow Wilson's emissary, and General Pablo 
de la Garza represented and spoke in behalf of President Carranza. 
Following addresses by Wilson and Ricardo de Leon, the Guatemalan 
delegate, Morones spoke emphasizing the fact that Mexican delegates 
came to the conference not as subordinates to A.F.L. members but 
as their equals. He said:
Let it not be supposed that, lacking respect, 
we have crossed the boundary line which divides 
the two countries to render vassalage to a 
powerful labor organization. No, that is not 
our mission. With due regard to the American 
Federation of Labor, we have come to deal with 
it as one organization deals with another
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organization, and discuss the far-reaching 
problems that directly affect the workers 12
of Mexico and the workers of the United States.
Morones terminated his speech by appealing for Pan-American-working-
class solidarity which brought prolonged applause from the audience.
Following Gompers' address, the meeting adjourned until that 
afternoon. The conference reconvened in Laredo's Latin-American 
Club, where the remainder of its s e s s io n s  were held. Morones had 
several important demands: (l) the appointment by the A..F.L. and
CROM of resident representatives in the border cities who would try 
to secure proper treatment of Mexican immigrants, (2) the extension 
to Mexicans of facilities for joining American unions with full 
privileges, (3 ) agreement to secure justice for workers imprisoned 
in the United States, and, (h) the exclusion from the conference 
of questions bearing on Mexican neutrality in World War I, and on 
the internal policies of either country. The first two points were 
referred to the A.F.L. executive council for investigation and 
action.
Point 3 developed into a debate between Gompers and Morones 
over the Industrial Workers of the World. Their disagreement was 
occasioned by CROM's demand that the A.F.L. exert influence to 
secure justice and protection for I.W.W. members imprisoned in the 
United States. Gompers, impatient and angry, answered that they 
were not incarcerated for their socialist theories, but for criminal
T ’an American Labor Press, December U, 1918, in Sinclair Snow, 
"Samuel Gompers and the Pan-American Federation" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Virginia, i960), 80.
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reasons; that is, they were "American Bolsheviks" and had sought to 
hinder the progress of the Great War by their propaganda activities 
against the recruitment of soldiers. Gompers assumed a hard line 
and warned against I.W.W. activities in Mexico. Disputing this 
view, Morones asserted that the A.F.L. should allow the I.W.W. to 
disseminate propaganda without any interference. Gompers called 
Morones1 bluff, and the Mexican was quick to capitulate by deliver­
ing a conciliatory speech. Later, he remarked to Gompers that the 
discussion on the I.W.W. issue had been staged to satisfy "the 
people back home" who had heard that the A.F.L. had encouraged the 
jailing of these American workers.
Despite point Gompers introduced a resolution endorsing 
the Treaty of Versailles, League of Nations, and the International 
Labor Organization. John Alpine, a member of the A.F.L. executive . 
council, moved that the resolution be adopted. Morones, however, 
instantly objected to its consideration because it was extraneous 
to the convention's objects. Realizing that Mexicans would interpret 
discussion of peace terms as a violation of Mexican neutrality, 
Morones demurred, and the ensuing dispute was more heated than the 
one concerning the I.W.W. Citing the fact that these proposals had 
already been adopted by the labor movements of the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian 
countries assembled at the recent Interallied Labor Conference in 
London, Gompers insisted that this resolution definitely treated 
labor's concern. Reynaldo Cervantes Torres of the Grupo Accion 
supported Morones’ contention that, while they as individuals
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understood and approved the resolution, they were unauthorized to 
discuss political problems. Gompers then challenged the Mexican 
delegation to go on record as opposing the peace terms, but follow­
ing a strenuous objection, Morones declared that the Mexican 
delegates would each sign the resolution, but only in a personal, 
and not an official, capacity. Finally, Morones and his adherents
supported the controversial resolution "subject to ratification by
13their Mexican co-workers." Morones had been confronted by a 
dilemma, since he did not want to vote for any measure pertaining 
to United States foreign policy. Voting for some parts of the 
resolution and against others would have probably been the worst 
thing he could have done, because it would have exposed him to 
attacks from all sides. Morones and Cervantes Torres knew that 
their action would be rejected by other cromistas; nevertheless, 
they signed the resolution in order to maintain harmonious relations 
with Gompers.
Shortly before the conference closed, it discussed the exchange 
of union cards. A Mexican delegate from the Mine, Mill, and Smelter 
Workers' Union directed three questions to the chairman of the 
Resolutions Committee; "Will the American unions agree to admit 
Mexican workers into their ranks? Will Mexican members have the 
same rights and privileges as American members? Will the antagonism 
of races continue within (labor) organizations?"^ William Green 
answered the first question by stating that each component union of
I3Ibid., 86-87.
Xl|Ibid., 8 9.
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the A.F.L. had its own regulations covering admission. Since an 
agreement on the exchange of uni on cards had been one of the major 
reasons the Mexican trade unionists had supported the idea of a 
federation of Pan-American labor, Morones was dissatisfied with 
Green's reply. Gompers ended the discussion by emphasizing that 
the A.F.L. had no authority to compel its unions to exchange cards 
The election of officers of the new Pan-American Federation 
of Labor was accomplished without difficulty. Gompers was chosen 
president; John Murray, English-Language secretary; and Canuto 
Vargas, a Mexican member of the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers' 
Union of Arizona, Spanish-Language secretary.
Disagreement arose over the site of the first congress, but 
the conference finally decided to hold it in Panama, beginning in 
July, 1919* After some Mexican representatives objected to Panama 
this problem was reconsidered at a joint meeting of Mexican dele­
gates and the A.F.L. executive council, held in San Antonio, Texas 
a few days after the Laredo conference had adjourned. Morones 
suggested that the meeting be held in Havana, but when James 
Duncan of the A.F.L. executive council suggested that New York 
City was more convenient because it was a center of information 
and publicity, New York was unanimously selected.
P.L.M. FOUNDING 
Although CROM's development was influenced through the 
proximity and frequent intercourse with the A.F.L., in one very 
noticeable aspect it was the antithesis of the A.F.L.; it utilized
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direct political party intervention. The Grupo Accion was convinced 
that if“ a trade unionist movement were to succeed, it must do so by 
political, as well as by union, organization. Realizing that as long 
as the government remained free from labor control it was useless 
to expect the creation of a new social order, Morones employed poli­
tical power by founding the Partido Laborista Mexicano or Mexican 
Labor Party.
Following Eduardo Moneda's invitation, more than seventy 
cromistas met in Mexico City on December 21, 1919> to found the 
P.L.M. Following Morones' and Gasca's speeches about the need of 
worker participation in politics to hasten desired revolutionary 
achievements, the founders decided that the party should consist 
entirely of workers and exclude professional politicians.
Morones claimed that the P.L.M. was founded to create a force
of socio-political character and place it at the service of CROM to
15make the CROM program viable. According to him, the P.L.M's only 
program was that of CROM; it was to be the "loudspeaker" of the 
CROM's social platform.
Nominally an entity separate from the CROM, the P.L.M. actually 
was its political wing. Morones' transformation of direct action 
into multiple action necessitated participation in politics as a 
means and not as an end. The P.L.M. planned to "carry class war
15"Discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Luis N. Morones en la velada 
por el Partido Laborista Mexicano la noche del 21 de diciembre de 
1931? para conmemorar el XII aniversario de su fundacion." C.R.O.M., 
January 1, 1932, 3 1.
^"Discurso por el c. Luis N. Morones en el mi tin que tuvo 
lugar en el Teatro Hidalgo, la noche del 8 de enero de 1938."
C.R.O.M., February, 1938, 7.
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into the field of politics," and at the same time to put the Grupo
* 17
Accion in lino for political jobs. At the height of CROM's power,
Ricardo Trevino, secretary general, explained that CROM was itself
no more in politics than was the A.F.L., but "Mexican wage earners
function politically through the Labor Party, organized specifically
10
to keep the unions as unions out of the political arena." Leaders 
of CROM became leaders of the P.L.M.; and these leaders subordinated 
P.L.M. to CROM, whose instructions it executed. Trevino's assertion, 
therefore, is misleading. Morones' critics charged that he founded 
the Partido Laborista to serve instead as the "Partido Moronista," 
and in lieu of serving the masses it served as a stairway for his 
ambition.^
A chief reason for forming the Labor Party was to support 
Alvaro Obregon's candidacy for the Mexican presidency against that 
of Carranza’s protege, Ignacio Bonillas. Cromistas held their first 
annual convention of the P.L.M. in Zacatecas, where the governor, 
General Enrique Estrada, was an obregonista. Among the forty-four 
delegates who met at Calderon Theater in Ciudad Zacatecas March 1-9, 
1920, to endorse Obregon were Morones, who was elected secretary 
general of the party. General Francisco Serrano, Licenciado Emilio
^Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 70; Jose 0. Petricioli, 
et_al., Estudio's proletarios (2 vols.; Mexico, D.F., 1959), I, 182, 
describes P.L.M. as "a political class party."
1 Q
Chester Wright, "Mexico's Peaceful Revolution under Calles," 
Current History, XXTV (July, 1926), 506.
1%iguel Gil in La Prensa, January 26 , 28, 1938 .
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Portes Gil, and Felipe Carrillo Puerto, Yucatan's reformist 
20governor.
The union's support of Obregon was promised after the future 
president and CROM leaders formed a secret pact on August 6, 1919*
The following are some of provisions of that clandestine agreement:
1. A ministry of labor should be created, and placed in 
charge of a person closely identified with labor interests.
2. Until the creation of such a special ministry, the 
existing Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor should 
be in charge of a person closely identified with labor.
3- The Ministry of Agriculture should be entrusted to 
a person well qualified for the position, and recommen­
dations of the labor groups in matters of agriculture 
should receive attention.
4. In appointing the persons mentioned in clauses 1, 2 
and 3, the recommendations of the labor party that was 
to be created should be taken into consideration.
5. As soon as a labor law could be approved, it should 
be promulgated and put into immediate effect.
6 . The Central Committee of the Mexican Federation of 
Labor should be granted legal personality, so that it 
might deal directly with the Secretary of Industry,
Commerce and Labor, and with the President.
7- On at least one day each week the Central Committee 
should be given opportunity to consult with the President 
on labor problems.
20
Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 275; Clark, Organized Labor in 
Mexico, 71; Moises Poblete Troncoso, El movimiento obrero latino- 
americano (Mexico, D.F., 19^ +6), 223; Jose Petricioli in El Excelsior, 
April 6, 196^; Miguel Gil in La Prensa, January 26, 1938. It would 
have been necessary for Carranza to have chosen a candidate of 
eminent qualities with a long record of distinguished service, a 
man of immense popularity. He did just the opposite and selected 
the little-known ambassador to Washington, Ignacio Bonillas, a man 
who had spent most of his life away from his native land.
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8 . Every facility should he given the Mexican Federation 
of Labor to aid it in putting its plans and resolutions 
into effect.
9- The opinion of the labor organizations of the country 
should be given consideration in any reforms or changes 
of general interest in the country.
10. Facilities for propaganda and labor organization 
throughout the country should be given the Mexican 
Federation of Labor and the Labor Party. ^
This arrangement, •which was made public on August 21, 1930, was
signed by Morones and ten members of the Grupo Accion.
In the political sphere Morones proved to be just as astute
as he was in the union organizing arena. By doing what was
politically expedient, Obregon secured the support of Morones*
CROM, at that time the predominant Mexican labor organization.
Morones, with political foresight, allied with Obregon during
Carranza's administration. He thus joined the future of the
organized labor movement with the possible incoming government
in order to strengthen the workers' movement. This alliance
proved most profitable for Morones' when Obregon became president
of Mexico.
21
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 72-73.
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CHAPTER IV
MORONES AND CROM DURING OBEEGON'S PRESIDENCY, 1920-24
Relations between President Carranza and CROM bad always been 
at best tenuous, so when be showed signs of planning to perpetuate 
himself in office, Morones allied with Obregon. The general, partly 
because of Morones' aid, escaped from Mexico City and led the 
rebellion that overthrew Carranza. Morones and various cromistas 
were rewarded with political patronage, money, and special privi­
leges, and Morones continued his rise to the apogee of his power.
PLAN OF AGUA PRIETA
Carranza's agents harassed Obregon as he directed his 
presidential campaign from Mexico City. One day he received word 
that Carranza planned to jail him on charges of conspiracy and 
treason. Morones, having heard these rumors, urged Obregon to flee 
the capital. Obregon departed from the home of Miguel Alessio 
Robles on the evening of April 11, 1920. Obregon, Licenciado Rafael 
Zubaran, and Alessio Robles sat in the back seat of the automobile; 
Morones and the driver sat in the front. Noting that their car was 
being followed by government motorcyclists, the presidential candi­
date exchanged his prominent straw hat for Zubaran's hat. When 
their vehicle reached the Plaza de Orizaba, Obregon leaped from the 
slow-moving car and hid among the trees. He then entered a Ford 
which had been placed in readiness by two friends. Obregon's swift 
departure had been unnoticed by the police because of the straw hat 
change.
36
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When the others arrived at the Cafe Colon on the Paseo de la
Reforma to drink cognac, they were interrupted by the officers
seeking Obregon. After the police departed, Morones, Zubaran, and
Alessio left the restaurant, each going in a different direction
to confuse the carranci sta s.
Before leaving his companions, Obregon gave Morones a 500 peso
check which he was to cash at Comision Monetaria. Morones was to
use the money to purchase Obregon some medicine for his respiratory
ailment. Obregon told Morones that he could use the remainder for
his family. Morones was warned that he might have difficulty
cashing the check and was informed to meet Obregon in Margarito
2
Ramirez's home which he did.
Having been told by Obregon to join him somewhere between
Mexico City and Chilpancingo, Morones went to Iguala on April 13.
Not finding Obregon there, he journeyed to Mexcala where he succeeded
in linking up with the general. They continued southward to
Chilpancingo, where various pronouncements were issued on April 20.
In their manifesto to Labor Party members, Morones, Alvarez, and
Trevino stated that the Party's Directive Committee would work to
further Obregon1s cause. All working class members were advised 
3
to do likewise.
"^Luis N. Morones to J.W.F. Dulles, February 16, 1957, photocopy, 
L.S.U. Archives.
2Ibid.
3
Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 32.
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The Sonora rebellion against Carranza began April 11, the same 
day that Obregon had fled the capital. Carranza dispatched troops 
to Sonora where the governor, Adolfo de la Huerta, considering this 
action an attack on his sovereignty, pronounced against the president. 
By the fifteenth,General Enrique Estrada, governor of Zacatecas, and 
General Pascual Ortiz Rubio, governor of Michoacan, endorsed the 
revolt.
Morones sailed from Acapulco north to Sonora but activities
which he had planned, such as conferences at Cananea, were curtailed
by de la Huerta. While Morones was in Sonora, opponents defying
Carranza's efforts to control their state issued the Plan of Agua
Prieta on April 23, 1920. This plan was largely the work of de
kla Huerta and generals Plutarco Calles and Salvador Alvarado.
On May 7 Carranza and his entourage fled Mexico City and on 
May 9 Obregon entered the capital. Two days later Obregon's forces 
routed the carrancistas at San Marcos. The "First Chief" fled to
U
Ibid., 33* According to Ariel Ramos, Morones left Sonora 
and "participated in the Plan of Agua Prieta" with Yudico, Gracidas, 
Juan Rico, Rafael Quintero, Moneda, and Celestino Gasca. El 
Universal, April 6 , I96I. Unfortunately, Ramos fails to specify 
Morones' exact role in the insurrection. Cline in The United States 
and Mexico writes that "Obregon was assisted in his displacement of 
the 'First Chief' by a great many people, the most notable of whom 
were Luis G. (sic) Morones, a labor leader of the Core, and northern 
henchmen of Obregon, Plutarco Elias Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta," 
193. In forming this evaluation, Cline had no access to any classi­
fied information and used only published material. Cline to Buford, 
November 6, 1970* L* Vincent Padgett also states that "When Carranza 
attempted to name Ignacio Bonillas his successor, Obregon, Calles, 
Morones, and Adolfo de la Huerta rebelled and brought him down."
The Mexican Political System (Boston, 1966), 25.
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the hills where he was assassinated May 21 in San Antonio 
Tlaxcalantongo, Veracruz. Dr. Carlos Sanchez Perez, •who performed 
an autopsy the following day, revealed that the victim had five 
wounds inflicted by firearms.^
Obregon, elected president in July, 1920, assumed office 
in December of that year. The newly-elected president, full of 
quips and yarns, jokingly described his "itchy palm" to Blasco 
Ibanez, the noted Spanish novelist whom the government had invited 
to Mexico. "I have only one hand," Obregon said, "while the others 
have two. That's why people prefer me. I can't steal so much or
g
so iast." Typical of campaign promises in all countries, many of 
Obregon's were never fulfilled. Although Obregon displayed more 
willingness than his predecessor to enforce the labor provisions 
of the Mexican Constitution, no general labor law was enacted 
during his presidency.
UNOFFICIAL ENVOY TO WASHINGTON 
Shortly after taking power Obregon sent Morones to Washington 
as his special representative to deliver an oral message to President 
Wilson. Morones went first to Gompers, who arranged interviews for
Francisco L. Urquiza, Carranza: el hombre« el polxtico, el
caudillo, el patriota (6a ed.; Mexico, D.F., n.d.), 71.
6 ~  ,
Blasco Ibanez, Mexico in Revolution, 60. Obregon was
referring to his left hand, his right arm having been amputated 
as a result of a wound sustained at the Battle of Celaya, his 
significant victory over Pancho Villa in 1915.
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him with Wilson and Secretary of State Bairibridge Colby. It appears 
that Morones' task was to assure Wilson that Obregon did not intend 
to harm American financial interests in Mexico; Obregon's pride and 
nationalism prevented him from putting this in writing before the 
United States granted recognition. In addition, Morones brought a 
letter from Obregon to Gompers in which Obregon asked the American 
labor leader to lend Morones any possible assistance in this important 
mission. The fact that Morones was one of the first men dispatched 
by the new Mexican government to smooth things over in the capital 
of the United States shows that Obregon was aware of the role which 
CROM could play in Mexican-American diplomatic relations and partly 
explains the privileged position which Morones' CROM achieved.
CROM PATRONAGE
CROM had supported a winner and the winner began to support it 
with various concessions. Although Morones wanted a ministry which 
the newly-elected president did not give him, he was named superin­
tendent of the Departamento de Establecimientos Fabriles y Militares 
(Department of Military and Manufacturing Establishments) and of the 
army purchasing department. This office, created in 1917 to manufacture
rj
Memo by R. Lee Guard, May 24-25, 1920, Gompers Papers, in 
Levenstein, "The United States Labor Movement and Mexico, 1910-1951," 
136. According to El Excelsior, "Informally and in his character 
as socialist workers' leader,...Morones, has in fact, gone to the 
United States to confer with workmen's organizations in that country, 
including the American Federation of Labor, in order to urge American 
labor to exercise its collective influence upon the Government of 
President Harding, to the end that diplomatic relations with Mexico 
might be resumed." March 13, 1920.
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and repair war materials, was abolished by the decree of December 29,
I93U, which made it a dependency of the Secretary of War and Navy on
0
.Ta.TYHfl.-ry l, 1935- It had been an important bureau ranking just below 
a cabinet position. The Department of Military and Manufacturing 
Establishments consisted of eighteen factories which produced 
uniforms, saddlery, rifles, ammunition, and repaired larger military 
pieces obtained from abroad. With a combined budget of 30>000j000
g
pesos its head had one of the most lucrative posts in the government.
Charges of maladministration and malfeasance were soon levelled 
against Morones. In 1921, Vito Alessio Robles, director of El 
Democrata, accused Morones of having stolen at least 700 ,000 pesos 
from the Military Factories.3-^  In August, 192*+, General Jose Marxa 
Sanchez denounced Morones in the Senate for "exploiting" the Depart­
ment to help support the Labor Party. For this purpose he had used 
deductions from salaries of employees of the Military Establishments 
and Mexico City municipal employees in 1922 and 1923. When the 
issue was revived in 1936, thirteen years after his resignation,
Morones, in an attempt to vindicate himself of charges of graft 
while serving in this office, cited a letter dated in the early 
1920's in which Plutarco Calles, Minister of Gobernacion, stated 
his satisfaction with the efficiency with which Morones had dis­
charged his duties. Morones contended that Calles praised him for
g
Diario Oficial, LXXXVII, December 31, 193 .^
^Beals, Glass Houses, 70-71.
10Vito Alessio Robles, Desfile sangriento (Mexico, D.F., 1936),
70.
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his "unquestionable honesty, zeal, and energy"; this, Morones claimed,
endorsed his conduct as a public functionary.^" Morones had been
charged with graft during his tenure as director of the telephone
company, and similar accusations recurred as long as he held this
position. Criticism of his concessionary view of public office and
of his dishonesty became commonplace during his later term as
Secretary of Industry, Commerce, and Labor.
During Obregon's administration other CROM chieftains were also
rewarded with political patronage: Celestino Gasca, the labor leader
who had commanded workers' battalions, became Governor of the 
12Federal District, and through his patronage many positions were 
filled with cromistas. Two of Obregon's other appointments were 
Ezequiel Salcedo, head of the Graphic Shops, and Eduardo Moneda, 
Director of the newly-created Department of Social Prevision.
Luis E. Morones in El Universal, August 23, 1936; Luis E. 
Morones in El Universal, August 2k , 1956. CROM also propagandized 
that Morones organized and converted the Military Establishments 
into "a dignified model." "El festival en honor del companero 
Luis E. Morones," C.R.O.M., 1926, 3 6. Miguel Gil, on the other 
hand, alleges Morones divided his time between "Fabriles y las 
parrandas" (factories and sprees), La Prensa, January 26, 1938. 
Gil, one of Morones' most vocal critics, asserts that Morones 
wanted to be a powerful labor leader and was unconcerned about 
the methods he used to fulfill his limitless ambition. Morones, 
disappointed about his not being named to a ministry, accepted 
the Military Factories post to acquire more prestige in political 
spheres. La Prensa, February 21, 1938.
12Obregon had more confidence in Gasca than in Morones. 
Miguel Gil in La Prensa, January 26, 1938.
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COUNTERBAIANCE TO CROM 
Although CROM chiefs were rewarded with political patronage, 
money, and special privileges, Obregon was too clever to allow the 
concentration of excessive power in the hands of the ambitious 
Morones. The president encouraged CROM, but attempted to counter­
balance its power by allowing campesinos to organize in the 
Confederacion Nacional Campesina (C.R.C.) under Antonio Diaz Soto 
y Gama, an intellectual lawyer from San Luis Potosi. Soto y Gama, 
who had been Emiliano Zapata’s advisor and orator, was now an 
obregonista. Since the peasants outnumbered the industrial 
workers, Obregon pinned his hopes largely on the agrarian move­
ment. Facing the obstacles of isolation, illiteracy, and Indianism, 
the campesinos were difficult to mobilize and by far the most 
successful early mobilization turned out to be that undertaken by 
the cromistas.
Leaders of the Labor Party and the Agrarian Party became 
bitter enemies and frequent clashes occurred between the two 
factions in the Chamber of Deputies. Soto y Gama, for example, 
openly attacked Morones for implanting gomperismo with its "bastard" 
cooperation between labor and capital in Mexico, "...C.R.O.M. is 
sacred because it is a MAFIA of ex-workers converted into bureau-
TO ^
crats." Morones openly broke with Obregon's agrarian supporters,
Soto y Gama and the bearded Aurelio Manrique in I923.
QO ^
Diario de los debates de la Camara de Diputados, September 
30, 1925, 13, 19.
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Although CROM was repaid with political favors and aid in 
crushing rival unions, Morones was not as strong under Obregon 
as he would he under the next president, Plutarco Calles. Hubert 
Herring overestimated Morones’ power during Obregon's administra­
tion when he wrote:
Morones, buttressed by the CROM's inner council 
(Grupo Accion) and defended by his private 
guards, exercised a power second only to that 
of the president. Armed with Article 123 of 
the Constitution and supported by Obregon1s 
courts and police, Morones1 CROM exercised 
the power of life or death over every factory, 
mill, and shop.
Under Calles' presidency, when Morones was at the apogee of his 
influence, he did not have much success in enforcing Article 123.
ih.
Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the 
Beginnings to the Present (3rd ed.; New York, 1968), 3^9* Among 
other things Article 123 declares an eight-hour day; a seven-hour 
night; one day's rest in seven, equal pay for equal work; legal 
strikes; legal lock-outs; no labor for children under twelve; 
double wage rates for overtime and limitation on hours of over­
time; wages to be paid in currency; employer liability for accidents 
and occupational diseases; maximum wages; profit sharing; and 
vacations with full pay for pregnant women in industry, both before 
and after the birth of the child. One interesting incident illus­
trating Morones' power was the one-man El Universal strike of 1922. 
Felix Palavicini, founder of this metropolitan daily in 1916, had 
signed individual contracts with all its workers. One man, Moreno 
Irrazabal, through an oversight had no contract. He presented 
himself to Palavicini, saying he represented an organization 
affiliated with CROM and demanded recognition for it. It was 
explained to him that the rest of the newspaper's staff was satis­
fied with their conditions of employment, and that there was no 
reason why a special and different contract should be made in this 
case. He insisted, however, and was asked to leave. On the night 
of September 1 , 1922, a group of armed men, cromistas from the 
military factories then under Morones' direction, invaded the plant, 
placed the CROM red and black banner in the doorway, and stationed 
workers and police on guard. At the end of a week, Morones per­
mitted Palavicini to reopen after agreeing to pay the wages of all 
his men during that week. Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 355-357-
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The extent of enforcement depended upon the strength of the local 
labor organizations, and in each state the extent of organization 
depended on -whether or not the local governor was favorable to the 
trade-union movement and its leaders. The geographical remoteness 
of the state and local governments from the central authorities 
meant that these units could formulate interim policy. In addition, 
Morones could not intimidate strong governors who exerted indepen­
dence and vitality. To opine that Morones "exercised his power of 
life or death over every factory, mill, and shop," is to overstate 
his authority.
CROM GROWTH
CROM experienced a tremendous growth, one without precedence 
and equal in the history of Mexican organized labor. Without 
precise data concerning the rank and file cromistas who were 
inarticulate, it is impossible to determine accurately the con­
federation's membership totals. Limits that defined formal member­
ship were nebulous. No sharp barriers separated dues-paying members 
from non-dues-paying members. Large numbers of campesinos' names 
remained on the rolls without their paying union dues, and the 
central committee kept no exact count of individual membership.
Data often conflict, are deliberately overestimated, inaccurate, 
and untrustworthy. Sources state numbers, obviously wild guesses, 
rather than calculated estimates. Furthermore, exaggerations of 
membership claims and strength reached an all-time high in the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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1 9 2 0 1 s.^ From its founding, in 1918 to 192*+, Obregon's last year as
president, CROM claimed the following, obviously overestimated,
figures as its membership: 1918, 7 ,000; 1919» 10,000; 1920, 50,0 0 0;
16
1921, 150,000; 1922, h00,000; 1923, 800,000; and 192U, 1 ,200,000.
P.L .M . PLATFORM
At its first a.nnua l  convention in 1 9 2 0 , the P .L .M . adopted a 
platform which articulated its interests. The party pledged itself 
to support CROM and to carry out that organization's program in the 
political field. The party advocated the subdivision of large 
estates among laborers as a basic welfare measure for farm workers 
and society in general. The platform also called for effective
15For a brief discussion of the complications involved in 
ascertaining exact membership figures in Mexican trade unions, see 
Horace B. Davis, "Numerical Strength of Mexican Unions," South­
western Social Science Quarterly, XXXV (June, 195*+), 1+8-55- 
According to Davis there are several reasons why unions habitually 
overstate their membership. First, many unions pay no benefits and 
collect dues irregularly or not at all, so that there is an unsatis­
factory definition of what constitutes a union member. Second, 
the strongly political nature of the organized labor movement makes 
it appear to the union desirable that it should claim a large 
membership for the sake of the influence that a large membership 
brings. Third, dual unionism is a serious problem in the Mexican 
labor movement, and a union is reluctant to admit that is has less 
members than its rivals. Fourth, bookkeeping is so casual that 
officials do not know themselves the extent of membership.
^C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1 9 2 U -1 9 2 6 , 1 9 -2 0 ;  Poblete, El movimiento 
obrero latinoamericano, 226; Edward Ross, citing no source, gives 
the 1 9 2 0  figure as 1+00,000 and that of 1 9 2 2  as 6 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,  The Social 
Revolution in Mexico, 1 0 3 . The American Labor Year Book gives the 
1 9 2 2  total as 5 0 0 ,0 0 0  and cites 6 0 0 ,0 0 0  for 1 9 2 3 - Arthur P.
Whitaker gives the 192*+ membership as "over 1 million." Arthur P. 
Whitaker and David G. Jordan, Nationalism in Contemporary Latin 
America (New York, 1966) ,  1+2.
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enforcement of labor laws, the establishment of experimental granges, 
irrigation projects, and mechanical and vocational schools; dissemi­
nation of primary education especially among adults, men and women 
alike; autonomy for state and municipal government; and regulation
of the manufacture, sale and use of alcoholic beverages in order to 
17curb drunkenness. Leaders of P.L.M. sought to picture it as the 
true advocate of social change in Mexico and as the only valid 
defender of the organized working class and marginal workers.
C.G.T.
One year after founding its political party, P.L.M., CROM; 
now two years old, underwent a major change. The Morones faction 
continued to control CROM, but not without a major struggle.
Complete harmony within any interest group is a fiction. Large 
or small, organizations experience altercations over policies 
involving both means and ends. These disputes, which CROM also 
experienced, both produced and reflected struggles for leadership. 
Within CROM, a splinter movement sprang up. The ultra-radical 
elements ■which were in considerable force at the first CROM con­
vention and were still recalcitrant at the second convention held 
in Aguascalientes in July, 1920, left CROM after the communists,
socialists, and radical agrarians led by Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama
l8clashed with the rightists headed by Morones. Soto y Gama
■^"The Mexican Labor Party," Survey, XLIV (May 8, 1920), 
202-203. The P.L.M. also half-heartedly attempted to incorporate 
Indians into the nation by granting them land and education.
-*-®Poblete Troncoso, El movimiento obrero latinnnmericano, 22b; 
Ashby, Organized Labor and~the Mexican Revolution under Lazaro 
Cardenas, 13; Beals, Mexico: an Interpretation, 1M-0; Clark, Organized 
Labor in Mexico, 6 7.
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attempted to wrest control from Morones and emphasized agrarian 
rather -urban problems in CROM. Defeated in his abortive attempt 
to unseat Morones, Soto y Gama withdrew to found a rival organiza­
tion.
This seceding group plus other organizers not admitted to or 
expelled from CROM, convened a number of workmen in Mexico City 
on February 15? 1921 to form the Confederacion General de 
Trabajadores. The C.G.T. claimed loyalty to anarcho-syndicalist 
and non-political ideas that had originally animated many CROM 
leaders. Rosendo Salazar, Jose Escobedo, and Luis Araiza led 
this movement against politicalism and favored a returning to 
the direct action policy of 1921. The C.G.T., which became 
strongest in the textile factories in and near the Federal Dis­
trict, never grew much beyond its original strength and its
importance was that it enabled CROM to clarify its goals and
19adopt a more conservative outlook.
In January, 1923? the streetcar workers struck. Obregon, 
declaring that the government had to protect society, advised 
immediate arbitration. Morones knew this was the propitious 
moment to destroy the C.G.T. because the majority of the tranviarios 
(streetcar conductors) belonged to that organization. Instead of 
complying with Obregon’s wishes, the strikers went instead to their
19CROM emerged from the turmoil of 1919~21 stronger economically 
and politically plus opposed to the communists and syndicalists.
Lewis L. Lorwin, The International Labor Movement: History,
Policies, Outlook (New York, 1953), 293-29*+.
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headquarters and held a tumultuous meeting. Some of Morones' scabs
drove a streetcar with troops of the Sixteenth Batallion to the
C.G.T. offices. Results of the attack were U dead (3 tranviarios
and 1 soldier); 3 wounded soldiers and 5 wounded workers, and over
20100 C.G.T. members arrested and sent to prison.
CROM RELATIONS WITH THE A.F.T.U.
CROM followed the example of the A.F.L. in refraining from
opening official relationships with European labor movements;
however, Morones kept CROM's position from being one of steadfast 
21
aloofhess. He went to Europe and participated in the Hague 
Congress which the Amsterdam Federation of Trade Unions convened 
in 1922 to protest militarism and war and suggested that the 
Amsterdam executive bureau send leaders of the European labor 
movement as CROM's guests to study Mexican conditions. The 
invitation was accepted and a date fixed for the committee' s 
departure, but it was twice postponed and the mission was finally 
abandoned. CROM probably would have joined the Amsterdam Inter­
national had the A.F.L. favored such a policy. To prove CROM-A.F.L.
20La Prensa, February 21, 1938; Alessio Robles, Desfile 
sangriento, 15-23; Records of Department of State Relating to the 
Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. Washington, 1959. Micro- 
film, 2^3 rolls. Summerlin to Secretary of State, February 2,
1923, 812.50U/451. Hereinafter cited as "Records Relating to the 
Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929."
21
"Morones has always been a champion of close contact...with 
all workers' organizations, national or international, irrespective 
of their individual policies as long as they genuinely represent 
the labour elements of their respective countries and work within 
the general principles of labour organization." Retinger, Morones 
of Mexico, 35.
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solidarity, leaders of both organizations met in the fall of 1923
in El Paso to announce the "Monroe Doctrine of Labor," a joint
declaration of hostility to any efforts on the part of European
22labor in the Western Hemisphere.
THE DE IA HUERTA REBELLION
On December 6, I923, Adolfo de la Huerta began his rebellion 
to topple Obregon. De la Huerta wanted to be president, but 
because of the "no re-election principle" was ineligible since he 
had served as provisional president after Carranza's death. Two 
days after the revolt started, CROM secretary general Ricardo 
Trevino appealed to Gompers for aid, requesting that Gompers use 
his influence as head of the A.F.L. and P.A.F.L. to prevent 
assistance from reaching de la Huerta from his followers in the 
United States. Morones made a similar appeal and immediately 
sent Robert Haberman to the United States as his personal agent 
and general representative of the Mexican government. After con­
ferring with Haberman, Gompers wrote Secretary of State Charles 
Evans Hughes that he had been "reliably informed" that de la 
Huerta was receiving arms illegally from the United States and 
that Hughes should enforce the law against transporting weapons 
to Mexico. Gompers suggested in his communication that such 
action violated the wishes of the United States government. He
^^Bernard Mandel, Samuel Gompers; a Biography (Yellow 
Springs, 1963)> ^ 2*
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intimated that the Secretary of State should support Obregon when 
he said: "I take it that all citizens of our country will wish not
only to observe International law in this case but will hope for
the triumph in Mexico of government based upon law and upon the
23
free suffrage of the people."
Although the December uprising was primarily military, 
important civilian elements participated. A large element of
labor had become disenchanted with the government, particularly
2kof Morones and Gasca. Morones' CROM, one of many pro-Obregon 
organs, supported him with propaganda, political activities, and 
armed battalions formed of workers serving in the field with 
Obregon's regular troops. Morones influenced policy during 
Obregon's administration when he personally persuaded his close 
friend, Samuel Gompers, to issue an official statement asking 
American unions engaged in transportation at border ports to 
assist in the detection of gun-running and smuggling of illegal 
supplies destined for de la Huerta forces. This boycott added 
to the effectiveness of the embargo already established at the 
Mexican border by President Calvin Coolidge, and aided Obregon
^Report of the Proceedings of the Fourth Congress of the 
Pan-American Federation of Labor, 37-
2k
Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: the Political Rise and
Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-19^-0 (Albuquerque, 1968), 73-
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25to suppress the attempted golpe de estado. Juan Rico, president
of the sixth CROM convention, sent a telegram to President Coolidge
congratulating him for "the just and righteous attitude" he had
assumed during the rebellion and expressed hope for continued good
26relations between the two countries.
THE FEURE CARRILLO PUERTO MURDER 
Another aspect of the de la Huerta rebellion was the Felipe 
Carrillo Puerto assassination and its aftermath. Carrillo Puerto,
OC
Jose Petricioli in El Excelsior, April 6 , 196^; Petricioli, 
interview, Mexico City, June 25, I9 6 8. Coolidge on January 7, 192U 
placed an embargo on the shipment of arms or munitions of war from 
the United States to Mexico, excepting "such exportations of arms 
or munitions of war as are approved by the Government of the United 
States for shipment to the Government of Mexico which has been 
recognized by the Government of the United States, and such arms 
and munitions for industrial or commercial uses as may from time 
to time be exported with the consent of the Secretary of State." 
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 192b (Washington, 1925), II, 42#.
The telegram was as follows: "THE SIXTY (SIC) ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE MEXICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR CONFEDERACION 
REGIONAL OBKERA MEXICANA REFLECTING THE SENTIMENTS OF THE WORKERS 
OF MEXICO HAS UNANIMOUSLY RESOLVED TO EXPRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE 
UNITED STATES WHOSE GOVERNMENT YOU SO NOBLY REPRESENT FOR THE JUST 
AND RIGHTEOUS ATTITUDE YOU ASSUMED DURING THE RECENT MILITARY 
TREACHERY HEADED BY ADOLFO DE LA HUERTA THUS HELPING THE WORKERS 
AND GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO NOBLY REPRESENTED BY PRESIDENT OBREGON TO 
DEFEND THE RULE OF DEMOCRACY AND UBERTY PRINCIPLES WHICH REORGANIZED 
WORKERS OF MEXICO ARE SUSTAINING AND DEFENDING THE WORKERS OF 
MEXICO FEEL AND HOPE THAT THE RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP EXISTING 
AT PRESENT BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL ENDURE ETERNALLY TO 
OUR MUTUAL HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY." Department of State,
Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations 
Between the United States and Mexico, 1910-1929 (Washington, 1959), 
Microfilm. 29 rolls. November 22, 1924, 711.12/53^-. Hereinafter 
cited as "U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929."
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a cromista and governor of Yucatan, was loyal to the government of 
P7
Alvaro Obregon. He and several others fled the de la huertistas,
but were captured after their small boat landed in Lerma. Carrillo
Puerto, three of his brothers, and nine other civilians, were taken
to Merida where they were "judged," condemned to death by orders
28of de la Huerta, and shot by Colonel Richardez Broca. In an
excited meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on January 15, 192*+,
Deputy Morones threatened drastic action and "tremendous vengeance"
29
against cooperatista deputies. He accused the deputies of direct­
ing the execution of Carrillo Puerto, opposing labor at every 
opportunity and threatened:
The Cooperatistas may rest assured the time is 
coming with greater rapidity than they believe 
when they will meet punishment for their crimes.
They are greatly mistaken in believing that 
their immunity will be respected, because labor 
takes no heed of it, not even if the Government 
affords them protection.3^
Reprisals began that day; cooperatistas Juan Pastoriza and Mariano
Castello were fired upon on their way home.
P7
Alba, Historia del movimiento obrero en America Latina,
177j Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico City, June 3 0, 1968.
28 +"Galeria de honor: el crimen cometido por Richardez Broca,
inmortalizo al lider yucateco," C.R.O.M., January 1, 1938, 3*
The A.F.L. headquarters sent a telegram to de la Huerta to protest 
the executions.
2% e w  York Times, January 17, 192*+.
3°Ibid.
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BUCAHELI CONFERENCES AND FIELD JURADO ASSASSINATION
An important aftereffect of the Carrillo Puerto murder was 
tiie accord known as the Bucareli agreement. This was occasioned 
by the assassination of Senator Francisco Field Jurado, a de la 
huertista leader.
On May 2, 1923, President Harding appointed Charles Beecher 
Warren, former Ambassador to Japan, and John Barton Payne, former 
Secretary of Interior, as American commissioners to meet two 
Mexican commissioners, Ramon Ross and Fernando Gongalez Roa.
Two unsettled issues to be considered were (l) the confiscation 
of American-owned lands to provide e,jidos or communal lands for 
villages, and (2) the dispute regarding possible nationalization 
of the sub-soil deposits whereby rights possessed by American 
property owners would be confiscated. The preliminaries were 
known as the Bucareli Conferences and named for its meeting 
place, No. 85 Bucareli Street, in Mexico City. Consultations 
from May lU to August 13 > 1923 involved what was fundamentally 
a "horse trade." President Harding granted diplomatic recogni­
tion and support of Obregon in return for a settlement of the 
claims of American proprietors and a verbal understanding that 
the Mexican Government would not apply the 1917 Constitution 
retroactively against American-owned petroleum companies.
The Special Claims Convention, formulated at the Bucareli 
discussions, was approved by the necessary two-thirds of the 
Mexican Senate in December, 1923> shortly before the end of the
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regular legislative session. It became necessary in January, 192b 
to call a special session of tbe Senate to approve the General Claims 
Convention. Official action by tbe Senate on the General Claims 
Convention required a two-thirds quorum, or the presence of thirty- 
eight senators. Senator Field Jurado led the opposition against 
approving the Bucareli agreements because they would be the price 
for United States recognition of the Obregon regime, and the "key" 
to open United States arsenals for the suppression of the de la 
Huerta uprising. Under Field Jurado’s direction,the de la huertista 
senators boycotted the Senate so that no quorum could be obtained.
The majority demanded that substitute senators replace those who 
absented themselves, but Field Jurado managed his men skilfully 
and none of them avoided the ten consecutive sessions necessary 
to permit their replacement.
In the Chamber of Deputies on January 14, 192b, Morones 
orating with his usual vigor, referred to the recent Carrillo 
Puerto assassination and threatened cooperatistas in the legisla­
ture. The atmosphere was tense, everyone except Morones was 
silent. He gave a long vindictive speech in which he warned,
"For each one who falls like Carrillo Puerto, at least five
31who serve the reaction will fall." He threatened direct action 
against the cooperatista deputies and senators supporting de la
31E1 Universal, January 15, 192^; Dulles, Yesterday in 
Mexico, 237; Alessio Robles, Desfile sangriento, 37-38.
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Huerta, unless the President ordered their immediate removal from 
Mexico City. 32
One week later Morones addressed a workers’ meeting at the 
Venecia Movie Theater, and was applauded deliriously when he 
advocated revenge for the slain governor saying, "The war is
without quarter, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life
33
for a life." In response to this menacing language, Field 
Jurado sent Morones the following strongly-worded telegram the 
next day:
Francisco Field Jurado, a Campeche senator, 
has the pleasure of advising you that he has 
learned of the ’enlightening’ speech which 
you pronounced yesterday, Sunday, "before 
your simpletons, and is at your disposition 
in his home, No. 13^ - Fourth Colima Street 
in this capital, where he awaits you and 
your agents with attentions which are 
merited.
Also he advises that morning and after­
noon he goes to the Senate to protect the 
interests of the nation which traitors wish 
to violate, and he will vote against the 
antipatriotic conventions and he will not 
leave this capital hut will await here the 
triumph of the liberating army.
Your agent, Colonel Preve, has sent me 
warnings... 3^
32Piario de los debates de la Camara de Diputados, January 14, 
I92U; El Universal, January 15, 192k; El Democrat a, January 2b , 192h; 
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 102. Referring to the Yucatan 
governor's death, Morones openly stated that the "Cooperatist 
deputies are responsible, cowards, lade virility, and we must 
punish them with vengence." Emilio Portes Gil, Autobiograf£a de la 
Revolucion Mexicana: un tratado de interpretacion historica
(Mexico, D.F., 1964), 366-367.
33E1_ Democrat a, January 21, 1924; Alfonso Romandia Ferreira 
in El Universal, July t, 1956; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 237*
3I4.
Alessio Robles, Desfile sangriento, 58-59; Dulles, Yesterday 
in Mexico, 237-238.
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Morones intensified his efforts, and the senator's challenge
was answered two days later. Leaving the Senate, Field Jurado was
followed by two men who were quickly joined by three others waiting
in a Dodge outside the Palacio Nacional. The senator boarded a
streetcar, rode to the corner of Cordoba Street where he descended
at 3:30 P.M. The unknown individuals awaiting him in the Dodge were
joined by others in a Ford. When Field Jurado was on Tabasco Street,
the assailants began shooting at him from their automobiles. Eight
35bullets were fired into his soon lifeless body.
At approximately the same time that Field Jurado was gunned 
down, cromistas, under orders from Morones, kidnapped Senators 
Ildefonso Vazquez, Francisco Trejo, and Enrique del Castillo, who 
were later released unharmed. Senators Federico Gongalez, Garza, 
Gerzayn Ugarte and other cooperatesbas had left the capital several 
days earlier to avoid being victims of Morones1 thugs. Others 
hired bodyguards to protect them, and several armed encounters 
occurred between the rival pistoleros.
Vito Alessio Robles arose in the Senate to declare that, 
although he never belonged to the cooperatistas, he severely con­
demned Morones' recent strong-arm tactics and crimes. He accused
El Excelsior, January 2b, l$ 2 b ; Miguel Gil in La Prensa, 
March 11, 1938; El Democrata, January 2b , l$ 2 b ; Dulles, Yesterday 
in Mexico, 238; Mario Mena, Alvaro Obregon. historia militar y 
politica, 1912-1929 (Mexico, D.F., i960), 6 9.
■^Miguel Gil in La Prensa, March 15, 1938; Alfonso Romandia 
Ferreira in El Universal, July 5 , 1926; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 
238; Parkes, A History of Mexico, 380.
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Morones of “being the intellectual author of Field Jurado's assassina
tion, of kidnapping three senators, and proposed that all senators
•37
vote for Morones' arrest. The resulting motion relating to the 
arrest was toned down so that it was meaningless, and CROM renewed 
its attacks on Alessio Robles, Morones' most consistent accuser of 
the crime, reviving the old charge that Alessio sought to control 
the Military Manufacturing Establishments.
Jose Vasconcelos, Minister of Public Education, after being
informed that Morones had one of Field's murderers hiding in his
office, disgustedly wired his resignation to Obregon. The President
who was in Celaya, quickly issued a statement that:
...if the labor organizations exercise reprisals 
against political parties which have assassinated 
their leaders like Carrillo Puerto and others, 
this is an affair which I am not called upon to 
resolve; but in my character as President I am 
called upon to attempt to prevent such acts or 
to consign their authors to the respective 
authorities when such acts are committed; and 
when such an act is attempted to give the 
appearance of a defense of the Public Adminis­
tration, that I shall neither accept nor 
tolerate.38
Although Obregon did not mention Morones by name, this amounted to 
a direct public accusation of CROM as the senator's murderer.
Miguel Gil in La Prensa, March 15, 1938; Dulles, Yesterday 
in Mexico, 238. As early as 1920 Alessio Robles accused Morones 
of being the "omnipotent deceiver of the workers." Desfile 
sangriento, 7 .
q Q
^ The President's message was given front page coverage in 
El Universal, January 29, 192^.
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After Obregon pointed an accusing finger, Morones was called to
testify about his possible role in the crime. In a court appearance
on February 7 before the judge of the Superior Tribunal, Morones
went through the formality of explaining that he neither knew who
killed the senator, nor could explain the recent kidnappings. Both
he and Colonel Jose Preve, an intimate friend and gunman of CROM,
pointed out that considering Field Jurado had supported union
activities it was illogical to blame the labor organization for 
39his assassination. After Morones' preliminary explanation,
Obregon made no attempt to fasten guilt on CROM leaders. Justice 
proved ineffectual, the senator’s murder went unpunished.
Morones always publicly claimed his innocence of the crime. 
According to him, CROM was disinterested in the Bucareli discussions 
and Field Jurado represented no danger to labor. He explained that 
his threat of "direct action" meant strikes, boycotts, and other 
recourses, not murder. Morones alleged that the Campeche senator
4o
had numerous enemies such as Sotel de Regil, a known political foe. 
Morones claims that Jose Vasconcelos launched the rumor that Morones 
was the intellectual author of the homicide.
■Whether Morones was guilty or not, and circumstantial evidence 
points that way, he tactlessly placed himself in a politically 
indiscreet position. His threats exposed him to these accusations,
39Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 2k0.
1^ 0
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, August 27, 1956; Alessio 
Robles, Desfile sangriento, 110.
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as did his noticeable lack of scruples concerning the matter; and
the candidacy of Jose Preve, Field Jurado's accused assassin, as
Laborista candidate for the governorship of Campeche, Field Jurado’s
former position.
In 1957 Morones was asked, "Could you tell me something about
the career and personality of Colonel Jose G. Preve"? In Morones'
written reply to Professor J.W.F. Dulles, who had interviewed him
one week earlier in Morones' home, the 67 year old labor leader
briefly described Preve as: "un elemento de valxa y que presto sus
servicios a la Revolucion en Tabasco, en el campo militar; que
abrazo la causa obrera en Campeche y que se distinguio por su
1|_1
actividad en ese terrano." Morones omitted Preve's alleged
role in Field Jurado's assassination.
Carleton Beals, a free-lance correspondent whom Morones
"trusted for some reason," was an eye witness to some unusual
1+2
events concerning Field Jurado's murder. Hired by the New York 
Nation to write an article about the worker and peasant volunteers 
the Mexican government was mobilizing in special battalions, Beals 
visited Morones seeking this information. During Beals' interview 
with Morones, Morones' secretary handed the labor leader a message 
from Field Jurado. Morones said something to this person, and
"Ttorones to Dulles, February 16, 1957j photocopy, L.S.U. 
Archives.
1*2Beals to Buford, February 19, 1970, L.S.U. Archives. 
Morones had "looked over" Beals' chapter "Labor and Reconstruction" 
in that author's 1923 Mexico: an Interpretation and aided him to
secure data.
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shortly two of the "hardest boiled thugs" Beals bad ever seen, entered. 
After showing the telegram to the American correspondent, Morones 
asked the gunmen, "Do you know what to do?" "Then do it," he 
commanded.
Beals departed, called the Senate, and discovered that Field 
Jurado had not yet arrived. He then called the senator's home. As 
an anonymous caller, Beals spoke with a lady and warned her saying,
"His life is in grave danger. If you value his life, do not permit 
him to go to the Senate tomorrow. If he does he will be shot down.
He may be killed anyway."
The American journalist had another appointment later that
day with Morones who had promised to give him full details,
photographs, and a pass to the training camps. Once again the
secretary entered and whispered something to Morones. Morones
gave Beals "a sharp glance," and ordered, "Send them in." The
same gunmen came to Morones' side and the three calmly discussed
where the two should hide until "the matter blew over." One was
given money to go to Yucatan via Tampico. Beals does not state
where the other accomplice went after Morones paid them for
k3
assassinating Field Jurado.
“Ibid.; Beals, Glass Houses, 195-197; interview, Baton Rouge, 
April 1 3 ,  1970* Both Morones' widow and son asserted Morones' 
innocence when this writer interviewed them in Mexico City in 1968. 
Alfonso Sanchez Madariaga, prominent official in the Confederacion 
de Trabajadores de Mexico, stated Morones' guilt is hearsay and 
cannot be proven, interview, Mexico City, August 2 6 ,  1968. The 
following are a few persons who have charged that Morones was guilty 
of the political crime: Agustxn Zapata Casasola, interview, Mexico
City, July 1 6 ,  1968; Emilio Portes Gil, Autobiografxa de la Revolucion
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During the de la Huerta rebellion in the early months of 19 2U, 
Morones invited Beals and government and labor officials to a 
barbecue given in an orchard near Mexico City. Beals was amazed 
at the display of nonchalance shown by almost everyone there. The 
de la huertista enemies were close to Mexico City, yet the 
obregonistas calmly ate, drank, and played cards. Beals reported 
that Morones "was friendly to everybody, and they were nearly all 
his close followers, but somehow never seemed quite to unbend.
He sat rigidly in a chair and scarcely circulated. He did not take
) i  ) i
off his coat."
As Secretary of Public Education, Jose Vasconcelos expelled 
several students for violating rules against defacing school walls. 
Encouraged by Morones' agents, students violently rioted in the 
streets. Shots were fired; several students and a police leader 
were killed. Beals who was again an eye witness when Morones 
dispatched his thugs, remembered that:
Mexicana, interview, Mexico City, July 26, 1968; Miguel Gil in 
La Prensa, February 5, 1938; General Amulfo R. Gomez according to 
his personal secretary Fernando Lopez Portillo in La Prensa, 
February 5, 1938; Romandia Ferreira in El Universal, July 5, 1956; 
Ernest Gruening, "The News from Mexico," Nation, CXXXVTI (September 
5, 1928), 223; Valente Quintana in El Universal, September 11, 1956; 
K. Flores Sanchez^in El Universal, November 3j 1956; and Roberto 
Blanco Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana (5a ed.; Mexico,
D.F., 1966), III, 11. Liewin, not specifically mentioning Morones 
by name, states, "The CROM...even assassinated opposition Senator 
Francisco Field Jurado." Mexican Militarism, 60.
I4I1
Beals to Buford, February 19, 1970; interview, Baton Rouge, 
April li+, 1970.
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During a revolt -when the government was hard- 
pressed and the rebels had taken nearby Puebla,
I was present when he ordered his strong-arm 
gang to take over the patio of the Ministry of 
Education to terrorize Minister Vasconselos (sic) 
who had come out in favor of the rebels .^5
Vasconcelos charged that Morones intended to win over the students
for the 192U election in which Calles was a presidential candidate.
Vasconcelos, who disliked cromistas in general and Morones in
particular, told his Education employees not to pay the ten per
cent of their salaries Morones attempted to deduct to support
Calles' candidacy.
TWO HUNDRED BULLETS 
The P.L.M. had disputes with President Obregon toward the 
end of his term. Obregon refused to appoint its members to such
L6important posts as labor attaches at Mexican embassies. When
during the last days of Obregon's administration an assassination
attempt was made on Morones' life by a man who was one of the
president’s closest followers, CROM leaders considered it another
!+7
proof that Obregon was determined to destroy them. The events 
of November 12, I92U, help illustrate the Spanish novelist Blasco 
Ibanez's observation of Mexican mores at this time. "Revolvers,"
k-5Ibid.
h6 s
Vicent Fuentes Diaz, Los partidos politicos en Mexico, II,
23 in Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 278.
I4.7
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 103; Mazy Margaret Harker, 
"Organization of Labor in Mexico since 1910" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Southern California, 193?)>
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he said, "are as indispensable as neckties to a gentleman’s 
2+8
wardrobe." Insulting dehates in the Chamber of Deputies fre­
quently resulted in shooting affrays where legislators engaged 
in bitter controversies and their heated verbal attacks occasionally 
led to personal encounters involving physical violence. Gunfights 
between politicians were so common in the twenties that newspapers
llQ
often had cartoons satirizing the incidents.
During a routine discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on 
November 12, 1.92b, a vigorous argument arose between Deputy Pavon 
Silva, a member of the majority group, and Deputy Manlio Fabio 
Altamirano, a Labor!te. Insults were exchanged and both men left 
the Chamber, pistol in hand, and headed for the corridor. Colleagues 
followed, some with the purpose of keeping the disputants apart.
Cooler counsel prevailed and the two were dissuaded from fighting.
In this tense atmosphere General Jose Maria Sanchez, former 
governor of Puebla, took the speaker's stand and unequivocally 
demanded that Morones retract charges he had delivered against 
Sanchez earlier in the Iris Theatre. The general violently 
objected to Morones' having made these accusations "behind M s  
back" rather than in a straightforward manner, and warned that
lj-8 ~
Biasco Ibanez, Mexico in Revolution, 160.
i+g
El UMversal, on June 19, 192k, printed a cartoon of a robot. 
The caption read, "Masculine Fashion-Model especially designed for 
wear in the next session of the Chamber of Deputies." A similar 
drawing showed a smoking cannon barrel mounted on four wheels as a 
"1928 Model Roadster especially designed for deputies and politicians. 
El UMversal, April 20, 1927.
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unless the charges were immediately withdrawn he would name seconds 
to arrange a settlement "on the field of honor." Deputy Morones, with 
his machismo openly challenged, adamantly refused and touted, "I am 
more of a man than you. You are' a coward." He yelled that the matter 
between Sanchez and himself could be settled instantly. In the con­
fusion which followed, the presiding officer, quickly withdrew from 
the panic-stricken scene; bis place was taken by Colonel Filiberto 
Gomez, whose ringing of a small bell to quiet the pandemonium was 
ineffective. During the heated verbal exchange, some of Morones' 
and Sanchez's foresighted adherents brandished their pistols and 
rushed to the outside corridor. While Morones and Sanchez were 
screaming hostile and provocative words at each other, another 
deputy, Jesus Ponce, started shooting. The Chamber adjourned 
immediately. Deputies fled into the hall and street. Not only 
did angry words fly, but 200 bullets did also. When the shooting 
ended, an aged deputy, Leocadio Guerrero who had taken no part in 
the wild affair lay dying, shot twice through the chest. Morones 
was shot through his left side, the bullet grazing his left lung.^
A sign placed in the Chamber of Deputies later that day said
that in view of the seriousness of Morones1 wound, and the possibility
of complications, doctors had forbidden visits.^"
50El Universal, November 16, 192^; Gustavo Casasola, Historia 
grafiea de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1900-1960 vols.; Mexico, D.F.), 
III, 1696; New York Times, November 1?, 14. 192^: Dulles, Yesterday 
in Mexico, 366; Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 47*+.
^Casasola, Historia grafiea de la Revolucion Mexicana, III,
1697.
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Laborites contended tliat it had been a premeditated attempt to
52
assassinate their leader. In an inquiry conducted before Licenciado 
Vazquez Santaella, agent of the Public Ministry on November 16,
Morones declared that the day of the attempted assassination his 
servant received several anonymous telephone calls advising him 
that his employer must not miss that day’s session which "would 
deal with matters of great importance and require his presence."^
If these calls were placed, it does not necessarily prove that 
obregonistas made them. A cromista could have wished to inform 
Morones of the importance of that session's agenda. As was 
expected, the prosecuting attorney decided it was impossible to 
determine blame for Guerrero's death; the elderly politician had 
been caught in the gunfire from both sides.
GOMPERS LAUDS MORONES
Because of his convalescence, Morones was unable to attend 
the forty-fourth annual convention of the A.F.L., which coincided 
with the sixth CROM meeting held in Ciudad Juarez November 17-26,
1924. Gompers, the day following Morones' being wounded, telegramed 
CROM offices. The American referred to "the valiant, brilliant 
leader and defender of the salaried and great mass of the Mexican
^^El Universal, November 16, 1924; El Democrata, November 16, 
1924; New York Times, November 14, 1924; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 
268; Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 4?4; Ernest Gruening,
"Emerging Mexico," Nation, CXXI (July 1, 1925), 28. One year earlier 
Morones had challenged another opposition congressman to "enter the 
street" with him. Diario de los debates de la C”™ r a  de Diput ados, 
October 29, 1923, 11.
53ei. Democrata, November 14, 16, 1924; El Universal, November 
16, 1924.
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nation," adding that "the working class of Mexico cannot he deprived
5I4.
of the great defender of its rights, liberties and interests."
Upon the Mexican delegation's arrival in El Paso, Gompers proclaimed,
"It is true that Morones is the genuine representative of laborism 
55in Mexico." He told CROM representatives that the bullet "which
found lodgment in the body of that great Mexican labor leader,
Luis N. Morones, was a blow aimed at the democratic Republic of
Mexico." His remark was also embodied in a formal public statement
issued at the A.F.L. headquarters in Washington.
On November 1 7 ,  1 9 2 4 , both conventions were officially
inaugurated; CROM’s in Ciudad Juarez, and the A.F.L. 's in El Paso.
That afternoon delegates to the CROM conference led by a Mexican
army band playing martial music marched en masse across the bridge
to meet the American delegates. Since Morones was unable to attend,
Eduardo Moneda, member of the CROM executive council, and Juan Rico,
Grupo Accion member and close personal advisor of Morones, headed
57CROM representatives. During the opening conference Gompers again 
praised Morones when he said, "Obregon, Calles, Morones, and Trevino
58
are all perfectly united for the benefit and well-being of Mexico."
^ E1 Democrata, November 14, 1924.
^Ibid., November 1 7 ,  1 9 2 4 .
56
New York Times, November 1 6 ,  18,  1 9 2 4 .
^Ibid., November 16, 1924.
crQ
El Universal, November 1 9 ,  1 9 2 4 . Ricardo Trevino was the 
current CROM secretary general.
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His remarks, translated by C.N. Idar, were applauded enthusiastically.
Juan Rico read a salutation from Morones which expressed his regret
at missing the joint labor meeting, and congratulated Gompers for
59his accomplishments. The congress terminated with the unanimous 
election of Gompers, Morones, Wright, and Vargas as president, vice- 
president, English-Language secretary and Spanish-Language secretary 
respectively.
MEXICAN EMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
An important issue dealt with in the Second P.A.F.L. Congress 
in 1919 was Mexican emigration to the United States for a given 
number of years; Mexico was not excepted. Morones, who was present 
at this convocation as a fraternal delegate, believed that the 
A.F.L. was making a serious mistake. He broached the subject in 
the Second P.A.F.L. Congress by introducing a resolution, -which 
was adopted, requiring that the A.F.L. justify its action to the 
congress. Gompers, in a brief history of immigration into his 
country, argued his nation's case. Morones accepted his explana­
tion and replied that he sought clarification primarily to set a 
precedent by which any member union acting contrary to the spirit 
of the founding conference's principles, must defend its action to
60
other P.A.F.L. members. This second congress set the pattern 
for later ones, and demonstrated a working alliance between Morones
5^E1_ Democrata, November 20, I92U.
60
Proceedings of the Second P.A.F.L. Congress, 36 in Snow,
"Samuel Gompers and the Pan-American Federation," 101.
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and Gompers which was strengthened in following years.
Gompers' views on immigration are well known. His first 
concern was the protection of American workers, and as a surplus 
of labor tended to lower wages, he opposed any measure that would 
augment the labor reservoir beyond that which was needed. Although 
he believed that persons had the right to live, work, and travel 
anywhere they chose, he knew from practical experience that it was 
better for the world's workers to strive for higher wages and 
better conditions in their own country rather than emigrate to 
do so.
Mexican labor problems were not new in the United States; 
however, the influx did not reach alarming proportions before the 
1920's. This is not to say Mexicans were not causing racial, 
economic, social and political difficulties before that decade. 
During 1913-1^ when there was much unemployment in Los Angeles, 
American laborers vented their wrath against the railroads for 
using Mexican labor brought in from south of the border for con­
struction projects. When these projects were completed, the 
Mexicans, having become accustomed to the United States, did not 
return to Mexico,but migrated instead to -urban areas. Unskilled 
for the most part, they were the first to feel the impact of 
unemployment and constituted the heaviest encumbrance on the relief
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rolls of charitable organizations. The A.F.L.'s fears about the 
effect of the Mexicans on the postwar labor situation appeared to be 
confirmed during the Steel Strike of 1919 when large numbers of 
Mexican strike-breakers were brought from the Southwest to operate 
plants in the Chicago area. Another A.F.L. criticism was that some 
Mexican workers joined the I.W.W. They either believed in the 
principles and politics of that organization, or joined expecting 
that this affiliation would better their wages and position.
Before the 1920's the A.F.L's attention was concentrated 
primarily on Oriental and European immigrants. Oriental immigra­
tion was effectively diminished early in the century, and that from 
Europe was curtailed by the promulgation of restrictive legislation, 
beginning with a literacy test in 1917 and culminating with the 
National Origins Act of I92U. At the time when it appeared that 
the A.F.L. had closed the front door on cheap labor the back door 
was wide open. Approximately 9OO3OOO Canadians crossed the northern 
border, and half a million Mexicans were counted legally crossing 
the southern border.
Agrarian, socio-political, and economic factors in the Mexican 
background were the chief causes of emigration. Better economic
Tiouis B. Perry and Richard S. Perry, A History of the Los 
Angeles Labor Movement, 1911-19^-1 (Berkeley, 1963), 11. Mexicans 
being used to undermine American labor struck at one of Gompers' 
basic fears. In 1916,  some employers either brought in Mexican 
strikebreakers or threatened to do so. "There must be understand­
ing and cooperation between the workers of Mexico and the U.S.," 
Gompers wrote, "in order that neither may permit themselves to be 
used for the undoing of all." American Federationist, July, 1916,  
575.
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conditions in the United States attracted Mexican workers, as did 
the postwar "boom in the United States in 1919 and 1920. Moreover, 
disturbed political and social conditions in Mexico encouraged the 
exodus of workers. Males of military age who refused to enlist 
in the revolutionary armies found it advantageous to leave Mexico.
In Mexico in 1920 when the presidential succession occasioned 
political disorders, in 1923, during the de la Huerta rebellion, 
and in 1926 when the political uprising had religious overtones, 
the number of Mexican emigrants to the United States increased 
considerably over pre-1919 figures. A majority of those departing
in 1926 originated in the regions where religious insurrections
* 62 had developed, namely: Guanajuato, Michoacan, and Jalisco.
The fact that most A.F.L. unions were international with 
substantial membership in Canada complicated restricting immigration 
from that region. Immigration from Mexico, however, was different, 
and throughout the 1920's the A.F.L. attempted to limit it. After 
Gompers failed to include Mexico among the countries subject to 
the National Origins Act of 192U, William Green, Gompers' successor 
as president, tried another procedure.
Realizing that Mexican immigration into the United States was 
stimulated by the selective immigration law which exempted native-born
in California, New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, and Colorado. They worked 
where employment was available for non-skilled and semi-skilled 
laborers —  railroad construction, repair, and maintenance; agriculture, 
and other related activities.
Mexicans flowed into the American Southwest mainly living
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Mexicans from quota restrictions, Green proposed that CROM participate 
in a joint conference on immigration. CROM accepted the proposal, 
the meeting was set for July 23, 1925, but Morones became ill, and 
the conference was postponed until August 27, 1925*
Morones, Eduardo Moneda, and Robert Haberman constituted the 
Mexican delegation; Green and Matthew Woll headed the A.F.L. repre­
sentatives. In dealing with the problem Morones recommended that 
the participants be tactful, practical, and consider two guidelines: 
first, the development of those principles upon which immigration 
should take place; and second, how to regulate immigration in accord 
with these precepts. Morones concurred with Green that the labor
movement of one country should not seek to settle the issue through
6k
a special advantage to itself over the other country.
The conference revealed that the Mexicans were concerned about 
the questions created by Mexican immigration into the United States, 
but for different reasons than those that disturbed the A.F.L. 
Cromistas were worried about the economic and social plight of the 
Mexican emigrants, and the discrimination they encountered in the 
United States, often at the hands of A.F.L. unions. Morones and 
his delegates were intent upon securing guarantees from the A.F.L. 
that Mexicans in the United States would receive the same treatment 
from A.F.L. unions that native-born Americans received. Morones sug­
gested two ways the labor organizations could end this discrimination:
Library of Congress. William Green Letterbooks. Microfilm. 
Green to Moneda, June 12, 15, 1925.
6k
American Federationist, September, 1925, 921.
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first, they could establish a system of international union cards 
■which would guarantee a union member full rights in the counterpart 
to his union if he moved across the border; second, they could mate 
an effort to organize emigrating workers before they left their 
native lands.^
Green and the A.F.L. delegates, on the other hand, were 
determined to cut off Mexican immigration at its source. They 
proposed the acceptance of voluntary restraint. In effect, this 
meant that CROM would pressure the Mexican government into cur­
tailing emigration to the United States. It was believed that 
Morones, being President Calles' "right-hand man" would be able 
to affect emigration; thus it would be easier for the Mexicans 
to prevent departures more easily than the United States could 
restrict arrivals.
The conference ended with a compromise declaration. The 
A.F.L. succeeded in having the final declaration call for the 
two organizations to press their respective government for the 
"adoption and enforcement of this new principle of voluntary self- 
restraint." To satisfy CROM, a statement affirming that immigrants 
should be guaranteed equal opportunity to join unions and equal
C.R.O.M., October 1, 1925, 1. The following enumeration 
of Mexican immigrants legally entering the United States in the 
1920's reveals the increase which prompted attempts at voluntary 
restraint: 1920, 52,3 6 1; 1921, 30,758; 1922, 19,551; 1923, 63,768;
192U, 89,336; 1925, 32,96^; 1926, *6,316; 1927, 67,721; 1928, 59,016; 
and 1929, ^0,15^. United States, Bureau of the Census, Historical 
Statistics of the.United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, 
i960), 58.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
75
status within them was written into the terminal agreement. However,
there was no compact to establish the most important means of
66facilitating this —  the international union card. The conference 
also recommended the creation of a joint committee consisting of 
two members from each organization, said committee to work through 
the P.A.F.L. for the continuous study of immigration and emigration 
and the problems arising therefrom.
Upon his return to Mexico, Morones emphasized that he in no 
way interpreted the agreement to mean diminished Mexican emigration. 
He construed the section dealing with equal rights for alien workers 
to apply to Americans working in Mexico, and announced that this 
meant that they should not be entitled to higher wages and better 
working conditions than their Latin counterparts. Concerning 
voluntary self-restraint, Morones asserted that CROM had always 
advised Mexican laborers not to leave Mexico and would continue to 
do so. Those who chose to migrate, however, would be instructed 
not to depress wage levels in the United States, an empty, meaning-
67less gesture.
The policy of self-restraint did not succeed and its failure 
resulted in an attempt to arrange a second plan urging the same
C.R.O.M., October 1, 1925, 1.
67
Ibid., U-7- Morones made declarations to the Mexican press 
in which he showed himself extremely pleased with the results 
reached in that meeting. Among other things, Morones said that one 
of the resolutions adopted was that Mexican workers would have the 
same rights in the American Union as nationals of that country.
El Excelsior, October 13, 1925*
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concept. Green convinced cromista leaders that the joint committee
should meet in Washington concurrently with the fifth congress of
the nearly defunct P.A.F.L. Morones, Moneda, Yudico, Canuto Vargas,
68and Robert Haberman represented CROM in the 1927 meeting. The
A.F.L. promised not to press for inclusion of Mexico under the
official American quota and CROM agreed to pressure the Mexican
government to enact emigration legislation, to dissuade workers
from emigrating to the United States and Canada, and to encourage
69Mexicans who emigrated to join the relevant unions.
Despite attacks by delegates from the Southwest and the 
Pacific coast, the agreement was ratified in the Los Angeles 
A.F.L. convention later that year. Green, convinced that Morones 
was sincerely trying to restrict immigration to the United States, 
tried to maintain his goodwill.
68 *"Los delegados de la C.R.O.M. a la convencion Pan-Americana,"
C.R.O.M., July 15, 1927, 35.
69CROM and A.F.L. were actively engaged in promoting the 
organization of Mexican workers in the United States. Bulletin of 
the Pan American Union, September, 1926, 938. A.F.L. leaders 
believed Morones able to influence Calles' labor policy. Comment­
ing on CROM's position in October, 1927, Green stated: "Some have
said there is an inseparable relationship between the Mexican 
Federation of Labor and the Calles government; some have said that 
the Mexican Federation of Labor dictates the policies of the 
Mexican government. Wo man can go to Mexico without coming from there 
with a deep impression that the Mexican Federation of Labor exercises 
a tremendous influence in the legislative and governmental affairs 
of Mexico." A.F.L. Proceedings, 1927, 95-98 in Harvey Levenstein,
"The AFL and Mexican Immigration in the 1920s: an Experiment in
Labor Diplomacy," Hispanic American Historical Review (May, 1968),
217.
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After American organized labor made an unsuccessful attempt 
to urge Mexico to restrain her nationals from emigrating to the 
United States, this small yet powerful section of the general public 
actively joined in demanding legislation to limit it. The 1928 
A.F.L. New Orleans convention reversed the decision of the previous 
year, voted to abandon the policy of self-restraint, and to bring 
Mexico under the quota provisions of the immigration law. Thus, 
the organization finally removed its influence from opposing 
restrictions on Mexican labor and instructed its lobby in the 
United States Congress to demand that it curtail such entries.
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CHAPTER V
HEIGHT OF POWER, 192^-28
In evaluating Morones* role in Mexico and in trying to determine 
to -what extent he was a part of the ruling sector, a number of factors 
should be considered: (l) the changing pattern of CROM both while it
was outside the political system and later when it operated from 
within that system; (2) the influence of CROM ideologies, (have CROM 
ideologies served as an aggregating factor or have they disrupted 
the unity of the labor movement?); (3) and the position of Morones* 
CROM in the political structure; that is, the significance of 
cromistas and their quantitative weight in influencing national 
decisions. This will require a look at the position taken by CROM 
in times of crises and in times of relative prosperity when social 
tensions may have augmented or relaxed. The Calles administration, 
1921-28, offers an excellent case study for this appraisal.
CALLES-CROM PACT 
Calles appeared as the rising political personage on the 
Mexican scene and Morones and his political party switched their 
support from Obregon to him. In September, 1923> Morones resigned 
as the head of the government military factories to take charge of 
Calles* presidential campaign. The following month, Morones was 
one of the leaders in a "radical" Calles parade which resulted in 
a series of clashes and five deaths, but from which Morones emerged
78
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unhurt.'*' Not unexpectedly, Obregon's marked preference for agrarian 
interests during 1923 diverted Labor Party support into the welcome 
arms of Calles who needed the party as a prop for his future admin­
istration. Having seen labor emerge as a stabilizing force after 
a decade of revolution, its strength in helping to crush the de la 
Huerta rebellion, and Morones' valuable friendship with the A.F.L., 
Calles was convinced of the Labor Party's importance.
At a labor meeting in the Iris Theatre, Calles boasted: "I
am frankly a Laborite and an ardent defender of the rights guaranteed
to labor by Article 123 of the Constitution of 1917. I have never
2
made a secret of this." In April, 1921+ when asked by reporters 
"■What is your opinion of your partisans in the Labor Party?" Calles 
responded:
The action of the men who direct the Labor Party, 
like that of all the leaders who are affiliated 
with the Calles cause, has demonstrated that they 
possess a proper conception of their duty and 
that they are conscientiously moved more by the 
necessities of the Republic than by their own 
persoral or group ambitions.3
Subsequent events during Calles' administration revealed the falsity
of his statement.
Realizing that he could not capture agrarian support from any 
Obregon candidate, and that labor was more conservative than the 
agraristas who had already committed excesses attempting to gain a
~*~New York Times, November 13, 192k.
2E1_ Democrata, September 20, 1923.
^Plutarco Elias Calles in El Democrata, April 18, 192k .
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more rapid land division, Calles entered into a written agreement 
with Morones. The secret pact stipulated that Calles would grant 
funds and facilities to help sustain CROM, and that he would gradually 
dissolve the Mexican Army beginning within one year after becoming 
president. Replacement of army with workers' batallions, if it 
was actually considered, did not happen. One explanation why Calles 
failed to dissolve the military is that the English seized the arms 
he had bought as contraband in Germany, a mission carried out by 
his intimate friend, General Francisco Serrano.^
Following Calles' election, Morones, addressing the Mexican 
Chamber of Deputies, asserted that "the cause triumphed rather than 
the man." During Calles' visit to Washington before assuming the 
presidency, Gompers referred to him as "Mexico's Man of Destiny."
Ij. + / . /
Fernando Medina Ruiz, Calles, un destino melancolico (Mexico,
D.F., i9 6 0), 95-96; Aquiles P. Moctezuma, El conflicto religioso de 
1926: sus origenes, su desarrollo, su solucion (2da ed.; Mexico,
D.F., 196O), II, 307-308; Joaquin Marquez Monti el, La doctrina 
social de la iglesia y la legislacion obrera mexicana (2da ed.; 
Mexico., D.F., 1956), 89; Johnson, Heroic Mexico, 3&7T Supreme 
Council,Knights of Columbus, Mexico, Bolshevism the Menace, ll+-l8 
in Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1&57-1929 (Stanford, 
193l)» 3^- Naturally CROM denied the pact claiming the "revolution­
ary army has always held our respect, defended the ideals of the 
workers, and moreover is formed of elements originated from the 
proletarian class." "Una compana de ignominia pura," C.R.O.M., 
January 15> 1936, 12.
'Moctezuma, El conflicto religioso de 1926, H ,  308. According 
to the American Consul in Mexico City, the military watched Morones 
closely, and feared that his agricultural farm-labor units might be 
a step toward disbanding the army which they "would bitterly oppose 
by violence." Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 
1910-1929, Weddell to Secretary of State, May 5, 1925, 812.504/63^.
6Diario de los debates de la Camara de Diputados, September 27,
1924, 1 3.
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His observation was partly correct; two men would determine the 
future of Mexico, Calles and Morones. Calles was the general; 
Morones, the civilian general.
CALLES’ INAUGURATION
For Calles' inauguration two special trains provided by the
Mexican government conveyed CROM and A.F.L. delegates from their
7
conventions and joint meetings in El Paso to Mexico City. Soldiers 
rode in the cars; an attempt to assassinate Morones had recently 
been made and it was feared that subversives might attack, the 
train conveying the labor leaders from the two countries.
Calles was inaugurated November 30? 1924 amidst colorful 
ceremonies in which 50 ,000 persons, among -whom were many industrial 
workers, peasants, and sandaled or barefoot Indians transported at 
public expense from various sections of Mexico. Confetti filled 
the air. Balloons were released and airplanes circled overhead.
In a brief ceremony Calles took the oath of office from Colonel 
Filiberto Gomez, President of the Mexican Congress. Thereupon 
hundreds of doves were released and this graceful gesture was 
followed by singing, shouting, cheering, bands playing, and cannons 
firing. During the ceremonies, cabinet appointments were handed out 
by Romeo Ortega, and later the appointees, including Ministry of
American Federation!st, December, 1924, 985. Gompers in 
November, 1923 opined that the CROM was backing Calles, the exponent 
of "the principles of freedom, democracy, and human progress." A.F.L. 
news release to the New York Times, November 8, 1923. The elderly 
labor leader died too early to see the harsh realities of Calles' 
iron rule.
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PRESIDENT CALLES AND HIS CABINET
Seated: General Joaquin Amaro (War and Navy), Dr. J. M. Puig
Casauranc (Public Education), Ing. Luis L. Leon (Agriculture and 
Development), General and Lie. Aaron Saenz (Foreign Affairs), 
President Plutarco Elias Calles, Ing. Alberto J. Pani (Finance 
and Public Credit), Sr. Luis N. Morones ^Industry, Commerce, 
and Labor), Lie. Romeo Ortega (Gobernacion).
814-
Industry, Commerce, and Labor, Luis N. Morones, paraded from the 
stadium to the National Palace in ornate horse-drawn open carriages. 
Morones had kept labor satisfied with Calles during the presidential 
election, and Calles’ obligation to CROM forces led to the labor 
czar's appointment to the cabinet position.
DEATH OF SAMUEL GOMPERS 
Gompers, before leaving El Paso for Mexico City, was examined 
by a physician who warned him not to take the trip because his 
heart would be unable to stand it. On December 2, Gompers and 
other A.F.L. delegates were taken to the Floating Gardens of 
Xochimilco for a luncheon attended by Obregon, Calles, Morones, 
and other Mexican officials. The following day Gompers called 
to order the Fourth Congress of the P.A.F.L. meeting in Mexico 
City. He was re-elected president by acclamation. Morones was 
elected to the new honorary office of vice-president; Matthew Woll, 
treasurer; and Chester Wright and Canuto Vargas, English and 
Spanish secretaries. The following Wednesday Morones and Calles, 
accompanied by government and labor officials, bid farewell to 
Gompers at the Mexico City train station. Three days later 
Samuel Gompers, veteran labor leader, great admirer of Morones 
and CROM's staunchest American supporter died in San Antonio,
Texas. President Calles and Morones immediately sent messages 
of condolence to the deceased's widow, and CROM suspended activities 
December 13 as a token of mourning.
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No pro-vision had been made in the P .A.F.L. constitution for 
succession in case of death, so although Morones was vice-president, 
he could not claim the presidency. Instead the A.F.L. executive 
council offered the office to William Green, the new president of 
the A.F.L. Morones sent him a congratulatory telegram in December, 
1924. 8
ZENITH OF P.L.M.
Calles announced that he had made no campaign promise to any
party; he had only "accepted the support" of those organizations
whose platforms coincided with his political principles when he
9claimed his presidency, but with Calles in the presidential chair, 
the Labor Party reached the apex of its power. Morones was not the 
only CROM leader to receive a high government post. Eduardo Moneda, 
CROM secretary general took over the Government Printing Shops,
Jose Lopez Cortes became head of the Mexico City Council, and 
Celestino Gasca continued as Governor of the Federal District.
Calles also named Laborites to embassies: Carlos Gracidas,
Argentina; Juan Fonseca, France; Eulalio Martinez, Hungary; and 
Ezequiel Salcedo, Germany. With the president's "decisive aid," 
de la Pena and Vicente Lombardo Toledano became interim governors
g
R. Lee Guard to Morones, William Green Letterbooks, December 24, 
1924; Green to Morones, William Green Letterbooks, January 9, 1925- 
On the first anniversary of Gompers' death, Morones praised Gompers' 
part in getting Pershing's troops withdrawn, and added, "Gompers' 
death was the motive of mourning, not only for North American 
workers but for all wage earners of the world." "El primer 
aniversario de la muerte de Samuel Gompers," C.R.O.M., January 1,
1926, 59*
9New York Times, November 30, 1924.
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governors in Queretaro and Puebla.
One of the aspects of the CROM's multiple action program was 
its success in elections. Cromistas were elected to the 31st 
Legislature and served from December, 1924 to July, 1928.^® Morones 
had earlier served as Federal Deputy from Tacubaya, but did little 
noteworthy.
The P.L.M. and cromistas were thoroughly entrenched in the 
federal administration, and the zenith of their power came in 1927  
when they had 1 of the 7 cabinet members, 11 of the 48 senators,
40 of the 272 deputies in the national chambers, 2 of the 29 state 
governors, and controlled the municipal government of Mexico City 
and a number of surrounding towns in the State of Mexico.^ Of the 
three constitutional governors "who were out-and-out cromistas, 
Rodriguez of Hidalgo was an excellent governor, Fernando Rodarte of 
Zacatecas was above average, and Elizalde of Aguascalientes was 
below par.
The strength of the P.L.M. was in its control of the City 
and State of Mexico, which were not only the political and strategic 
center of the country but contained a large part of its urban popu­
lation. Another advantage was the division of CROM opponents —  
parties, blocs, and political conglomerations dissolved and reformed
^Trevino, El movimiento obrero en Mexico, 22; Trevino, El 
espionage comunista, 166.
^Stuart Chase and Marian Tyler, Mexico: a study of two
Americas (New York, 1935) , 24-3; Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 
3 ^
^^Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution: an Interpretation of
Mexico (New York, 1933), 24-7; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 273~
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from year to year so that no other single party had CROM's continuity, 
discipline, or cohesiveness. In addition, Laborites resorted to 
election trickery typical of Mexico; ballots were stuffed, voters 
bribed or intimidated, and decisions often decided before the polls 
opened.
MORONES' POWER
During the duumvirate period, 1924-28, CROM was strongly
entrenched in the federal administration, and organized labor
supported Calles with votes, political pressure, and manpower for
police and military operations whenever necessary; the government
furnished CROM with buildings, money, and favorable treatment.
Morones served as head of CROM, Minister of Industry,
Commerce, and Labor, the cabinet minister closest to Calles, the
president's confidential advisor, and P.A.F.L. vice-president.
One historian says that Morones enjoyed: "absolute liberty to
determine the worker policy of the government, and always counted
on the unlimited aid of Calles, and Calles knew that in case of
national emergency he could count on the organized force of the 
13CROM." Buttressed by the courts, army, and the police, Morones 
became the virtually unchecked master of Mexican Labor. A ruthless
^George S. Wise, El Mexico de Aleman (Mexico, D.F., 1952), 39* 
Hudson Strode opines that Morones was the chief dynamo in the labor 
movement for sixteen years. Timeless Mexico (New York, 1944), 287.
If one applies Strode:s statement to the years, 1918-35, (the CROM's 
founding to the eve of the creation of the Confederacion de 
Trabajadores de Mexico), there is some validity in his assertion.
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man, Morones augmented his power through threats, coercion, and 
strong-arm methods. According to one American student of Latin-Americ&n 
history: "Any businessman, shop manager, or factory owner who chal­
lenged his power was promptly subjected to a strike, the closing of
his plant, interminable delays before official boards of arbitration,
lUand bankruptcy —  unless he reached understanding with Morones,". ■
Another comment on Morones’ was allegedly given by Alberto Pafii, 
Minister of Finance and Public Credit. The dialogue was supplied 
to Ambassador James Sheffield and the American Embassy in Mexico City 
by one of the Ambassador's often-mentioned "secret reliable informants." 
According to this dubious source, Pani, walking with an "unnamed 
friend" confided: "I am entirely alone in the Cabinet. No one aids
me in any way. There is a Mafia of Tejeda, Morones, Leon, against 
me and everything I do or advise."1^ Speaking of revoking the 
Tramways Company's permit to lower fares, Pani continued: "I and
Communications were for it, and the matter was settled, but Morones 
interfered and the agreement was cancelled."
Pani, a hold-over from the Obregon administration, served ably 
in his office until he was forced out of Calles' cabinet as a result 
of mounting rivalry with Morones. He had never been sympathetic to
lU
Herring, A History of Latin America. 353-
^ U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. Sheffield to 
Kellogg, January 5, 1927, 711.12/65^. Colonel Adalberto Tejeda was 
Minister of Communications and Public Works; Luis Leon, Minister 
of Agriculture and Development.
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the activities of organized labor, least of all that element connected 
■with Morones. According to Pani, Calles wished to keep him in his 
cabinet, but Pani refused to continue because Morones formed the 
pillar of the government and Pani was powerless. Morones almost 
had a free hand and the withdrawal of two cabinet ministers, Pani 
and Valenzuela, was due in part to Morones' hostility.
An incident in 1925» while resulting in no permanent benefits
for labor, illustrates the Mexican president's support of Morones.
Workers in the various phases of the petroleum industry had remained
fairly free of government and union control. This was partly due
to the political power of that industry and partly to the companies'
ability to hire their own private militia. Calles sought to assist
Morones in his effort to control oil field labor, a turbulent
element, and at the same time to assert the government's power over
this industry. On this occasion he sent federal troops to close
bordels, saloons, and gambling houses which flourished in Veracruz
17because of the lucrative petroleum industry.
MORONES' STRIKE POLICY
It was a source of pride to CROM that strikes during Morones' 
tenure as Minister of Labor diminished both in intensity and number 
from 125 in 192i+ to 15 in 1927. A key factor in understanding this 
decrease is that Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution specified that 
differences or disputes between capital and labor must be submitted
17
El Universal, February 15, 1925.
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to boards of conciliation or arbitration. Tbe boards based their
decisions upon definitions of "lawfulness" as set forth in sections
18 and 19 of Article 123. According to Article 123, a strike was
legal unless the strikers had broken a contract or committed wanton
violence. Here one notices a great difference between the ideal of
the law and the reality of practice. CROM strikes were announced
legal and employers were forced to compensate striking cromistas.
Morones branded strikes called by independent or rival federations
illegal; CROM strikebreakers would then take possession of the
factory and display the red and black CROM banner; government troops
l8would protect them from scabbing.
By 192^ the Supreme Court, no doubt influenced by the storm 
of protest emanating from labor sources, reversed its decision and 
gave the boards much power at a time when such a condition was 
especially favorable to the working classes. There is little doubt 
that Morones1 influence was behind the move to bring about such a 
change.
To declare a strike legal was tantamount to granting the 
laborers their demands; to declare the strike illegal meant the 
workingmen lost their contract if they persisted in the strike.
18
Parkes, A History of Mexico, 375. Retinger's 1926 statement: 
"The C.R.O.M. is bound by its statutes and its now eight years of 
tradition to go deeply into labour trouble and advise impartially 
on the individual case, in questions of strikes and labour struggles," 
is more propaganda meant to acquaint an English-reading audience 
with Morones and his labor movement than it is concrete fact.
Morones was not "impartial" in his decisions. Morones of Mexico, 28.
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Tlaese hoards consisted of equal numbers of ■workmen and employers 
pins a government representative; but the deciding vote, especially 
in all important conflicts, belonged to this latter person. Morones, 
who was this emissary, thus had the key ballot and held unlimited 
sway.
Morones was eager to control railway workers who antedated 
CROM and were jealous of their own autonomy. Several big strikes, 
especially on the railways, were called without governmental 
authority. In the early part of 1925, Calles began to intervene 
when all efforts at settling the difficulties failed. He federalized 
the railroad service, declared illegal a strike called by the Tampico 
Federation of Labor Unions because it arose out of differences 
between the unions themselves, and prevented a general strike.
In 1926, when a strike occurred in southern Mexico on the 
small Isthmus Railway, it appeared that the opportunity Morones had 
been waiting for, had come. This strike had been declared primarily 
to bring about the discharge of an employee who belonged to CROM 
which had little strength in that district. Morones immediately 
declared the strike illegal and ruthlessly crushed it, because it 
was directed at CROM unions and not at the railway company. The 
strikers declared, however, that their action became inter-union, 
and subject to Secretary Morones' intervention only when CROM fur­
nished strikebreakers. In a public statement printed on the front 
page of a large capital daily newspaper, Morones gave this explana­
tion of his decision:
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Four principles guide the Minister of Industry, 
Commerce and Labor in reacting his decisions: to
sustain liberty of association, so that any worker 
might join or leave a union at will; to avoid 
anything that weakens labor organizations, whether 
they are friends or enemies; to ensure that labor 
contracts, although made by the majority, covered 
the minority as well; and to make certain that a 
few so-called leaders did not impose their own 
will on the remainder of their fellow-workers.-*-9
One of the bitterest contests that had been waged until that
time between organized labor and capital in Mexico developed in
May, 1925s when the Union of Bank Clerks endeavored through the
solicited aid of CROM to secure demands that had been made in all
Mexican banks. A crisis in the dispute was reached on May 15,
when the union requested CROM support in its light for demands
which, if accepted, would have transferred control of the banks
from the owners to the union. Morones, however, refused to support
the bank employees on the ground that the granting of their demands
would precipitate the closing of the banks, which in turn would
cause a business collapse. As a result of Morones' failure to
endorse the measure, the Union of Bank Clerks was compelled to
retract its demands.^
In a speech in Mexico City on September 26, 1925, Morones
El Universal, July 21, 1926. The American Charge d* 
Affaires in Mexico City recognized that the situation was due to 
Morones' ceaseless efforts to bring all the unions into one strong 
organization under his control. Records Relating to the Internal 
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, Weddell to Kellogg, March 3 , 1925, 
312.504/610; Weddell to Kellogg, April 1, 1925, 8l2.504/6l6.
20
Charles W. Hackett, "Mexico and Central America," Current 
History, XXII (July, 1926), 636.
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announced his ministry's philosophy which was "hased on the 
cooperation of all those who loyally are interested in the evolu­
tion of our country." Mexican labor, he declared, was organized 
both for the improvement of the Mexican worker and for the develop­
ment of the country; therefore, cooperation between labor and 
capital was highly desirable. He continued, stating that if 
foreign capital adopted "appropriate" attitudes toward Mexico, 
it would have no need to fear organized labor. With reference to 
the alleged apprehension of foreign capital because of numerous 
Mexican strikes, the Minister vaguely answered:
If foreign capital comes to Mexico with a spirit 
of cooperation and in harmony with the needs of 
the laboring classes here, such capital need 
not fear that organized labor in Mexico will 
place any obstacles before it.^b
MORONES AND THE JUDICIARY 
Morones' CROM at times mobilized its strength against the 
judiciary and caused the removal of magistrates whose attitudes ‘it 
disliked. The reality that the executive rather than the judiciary 
or legislative branches was pre-eminent often led to direct inter­
vention by the federal government in the affairs of the judiciary.
“ Cbid-s "Labor Disputes and Agrarian Excesses in Mexico," 
XXIII (November, 1925), 258. See Morones' June 19, 1925 address 
to the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City for a similar 
statement. American Federation!st, August, 1925, 636-637.
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22According to Laborites, Judge Ricardo Couto was granting amparos 
to employers against the labor boards until his anti-labor bias 
became scandalous. CROM organized a protest against tbie official, 
threatening a general strike unless he were removed, and he was
✓ po
removed to Michoacan. The Supreme Court yielded to CROM's power 
and Morones' pressure. The fact that with such attention focused 
on the jurist he was merely transferred instead of impeached may 
prove his innocence of the allegations.
The employment of similar duress compelled the resignation 
of Judge Miguel Mendoza Lopez y Schwertfeger, Federal Judge of 
Tuxpan, Veracruz. On May 20, 1927, he presented his resignation 
to the Supreme Court, charging constant and intolerable pressures 
against him by Minister Morones. These charges were printed in 
the Tampico El Mundo but did not appear in the capitoline press 
because of CROM censorship. Lopez's protests involved the Minister's 
relations with oil concessionaires, and the judge's issuing writs
22A  recurso de amparo xs a writ calling for a stay of govern­
ment action. It combines the characteristics of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, and certiorari and provides judicial protection against 
damage to individual interests or violation of constitutional 
guarantees. Amparo, an interesting innovation in Hispanic law, 
is broader than habeas corpus since it protects men not only against 
illegal arrest but against violation of any human rights. See 
Carlos Sanchez Mejorada, "The Writ of Amparo: Mexican Procedure
to Protect Human Rights," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 2h3 fJanuary, 19^6). 107-111 
for a concise explanation by a Mexican corporation lawyer and 
one-time president of the Mexican Bar Association.
23
Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 510-511.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
of amparo to protect claimants against Morones.
Morones was not omnipotent. The conflict that occurred in 
Tamaulipas between Governor Emilio Portes Gil and Morones, and in 
Jalisco between Governor Jose Zuno and Morones when these two admin­
istrators struggled against Morones' ambition to control labor groups
in their states, exemplify the situations that prevailed during the
25period Morones’ CROM exerted its maximum power. In certain states 
the political party in control, often hostile to CROM, created an 
independent federation of workers, who, in return for administrative 
and judicial backing, were expected to back, it. This situation pre­
vailed in Jalisco from 1923 to 1926 under the governorship of Zuno, 
a leader who knew how to resist Morones' assault. Moronistas in 
his state were weak and Zuno's candidates were popular in their 
districts. Zuno refused to be coerced, openly rejected Morones'
fiat of authority, and threw moronistas out of a building for which
26they had paid no rent for a year. This strong-minded governor 
spent much time delivering anti-CROM and anti-Morones speeches to 
laborers and agrarians.
Pit
On its front page El Mundo (Tampico), June 9> 1927, stated 
that the resignation of the magistrate, who had served an eight month 
tenure, "has been profoundly lamented by all social classes." Gruening 
a contemporary observer, describes Lopez as "notable for his probity, 
his intellectual honesty, and his long devoted record in the revolu­
tionary ranks." Mexico and its Heritage, 511.
pc
Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution. 2^9; Alfonso Romandia 
Ferreira in El Universal, September 21, 1956.
26 ' ,
Jose Guadalupe Zuno, Remiscencias de una vida (Guadalajara,
1956), 1^9- In 1957, Morones defended Calles' memory against Zuno's 
attacks. Morones emphasized the fact that Zuno took advantage of 
Calles because the ex-president, who had died in California in October 
19^5, could no longer defend himself. Morones erroneously claimed 
that "Calles has a solid prestige, even in death that can quiet his 
distractors." Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October U, 1956.
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TEXTILE CONVENTION OF 1925-26
The record of labor legislation and progress -under the Calles- 
Morones regime deserves examination in detail. Perhaps Morones* most 
constructive act as Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor was his 
calling of a textile convention in October, 1925. This particular 
industry suffered from almost continuous industrial -unrest and labor 
strife. It was to be the first of such conferences which the govern­
ment intended to convoke in the interest of industrial peace. In 
this convention employers and employees entered into a collective 
contract or agreement concerning the textile industry. Textiles, 
the nation's leading industry, at this time was a depressed industry, 
characterized by overproduction, outworn and outmoded machinery, 
unemployment, ruinous competition, and unstable prices. The length 
of the working day and labor contracts, and the respective responsi­
bility of employers and employees were the first subjects discussed 
by the mixed committees. Other subjects on the agenda were workers'
education, compensation for lost time, health, social welfare,
27industrial accidents, lockouts, and strikes.
Before the convention ended in December, 1926, the textile 
agreement of 1912 was revised, quotas of production and prices were 
adjusted, hours, wages and working conditions were agreed to as well 
as were reduced working schedules, unions were given representatives 
in the management of the industry, obligations of the two parties
07
Bulletin of the Pan American Union, January, 1926, 93"9^-
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were defined and penalties instituted for their breach, wages were
set at 1 .6 5 pesos to 2 pesos a day for unskilled labor, and 2 to
2.20 pesos for slightly skilled labor. The Minister of Industry,
Commerce, and Labor took upon himself the enforcement of this 
28
contract. While this was only a partial solution of the textile 
problem, conditions were better than those which previously pre­
vailed, and for the first time a reasonable degree of order was 
introduced.
CRCM GROWTH
The position of political influence gained by CROM caused 
that body to become autocratic and arbitrary in its attitude 
toward labor organizations not affiliated with it. Special induce­
ments, such as wage increases and better working conditions, were 
offered to those unions willing to join CROM. If their leadership 
refused, gangster tactics forced the reluctant to reconsider. A 
less publicized, but much dreaded CROM organ was the palanca, 
"lever" or "crowbar." This branch was composed of Morones' 
specially selected goons who worked over unpurchasable competitors 
or persistent foes such as Senator Francisco Field Jurado. As a 
result, when it became apparent to unions unaffiliated with CROM
28
El Universal, September 10, 1927; March 30, 1929. An 
executive resolution of March 15, 1927, required that all disputes 
arising between employers and employees in the textile industry 
be submitted to Morones* Ministry. It was an effort to prevent 
local authorities mediating in disputes from which confusion would 
result.
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that they were courting disaster, many unwillingly entered as a 
realistic means of self-preservation.
Coercion and CROM’s deliberate overestimates of its membership 
explain the organization’s phenomenal growth during the Calles 
period. Just as it is impossible to obtain accurate figures on 
CROM membership under Obregon, the same meaningless maze of numbers 
characterizes Calles' regime. CROM claimed 1,500,000 in 1925 and
2,000,000 in 1926. ^  A CROM document gives the 1927 membership as 
1,862,870.^ 0 Figures given by CROM sources for 1928-30 and 1932
C.R.C.M. Memoria, I92U-I926, 19-21; Poblete Troncoso, El 
movimlento obrero latinoamericano, also cites 1 ,500,000 for 1925.
The American Labor Yearbook, 1926, p. 37 cites 800,000 for 1925. 
Gruening's Mexico and its Heritage, without citing a specific 
source except "The C.R.O.M. declares its growth to be," gives
2,000,000 for 1926. The August 2, 1926 New York Times stated 
CROM claimed 1,500,000 members in 1926. Thomas McEnelly, American 
Consul at Chihuahua, described one example of Morones' palanca.
On November 25, 19255 two individuals named Lazaro Canales and 
Eduardo Moreno appeared at the office of the Confederacion de 
Obreros y Campesinos and informed the secretary of that organization 
they had been commissioned by CROM "to receive the furniture and 
archives." They were told by the secretary that his organization 
had no connection with CROM and would not comply with their demand. 
The two called twelve men to their assistance who promptly threw 
the secretary into the street, took possession of the archives, 
and locked the building's doors. Records Relating to the Internal 
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929a McEnelly to Secretary of State,
December 55 1925} 812.504/74-6 .
^CROM expediente 0/lhl(000)/8 cited in Clark, Organized Labor 
in Mexico, 6 5; a United States diplomatic dispatch also gives member­
ship as 1,800,000. U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929> 
January 13, 1927? 711.12/855* Samuel Yudico, speaking at the Trades 
Union Congress in Edinburgh, Scotland, claimed 2,000,000. The 
Times (London), September 8 , 1927. The Bulletin of the Pan American 
Union stated "over 2,000,000," November, 1927, 1151. Alfonso Lopez 
Aparecio, El movimiento obrero de Mexico, gives the figure as 
2,250,000; cited in Albert Louis Michaels, "Mexican Politics and 
Nationalism from Calles to Cardenas" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1966), 23.
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are the following: 1928, 2,000,000;31 1929, 1 ,800,000;32 1930,
1 ,500,000;33 and 1932, 1 ,000,000.3l+
Every group which could organize did so and CROM assumed a
motley appearance. Under the guidance of Morones, mining, petroleum,
textile, tobacco, fiber, steel, shoe manufacturing, and brewing
industries were organized, to name only a few. Soft drink workers,
writers, actors, gravediggers, bullfighters, domestic servants,
fruit vendors, government employees, department-store workers,
newsboys, lottery ticket sellers, and Mexico City prostitutes
constituted some of the federation’s organized unions. Despite
this last named union, which was patterned after a similar one in
Puebla that petitioned for CROM membership, the number of female
cromista affiliates was minima.1 and insignificant. In Sonora,a
Union and League of Resistance of Fiancees was formed to encourage
matrimony and prevent "superficial affairs" among its members. This
35unique organization was rejected by CROM.
Ironically, CROM never had much strength among the electricians, 
despite the fact that this had been Morones' earlier trade. In 1916 
they almost severed relations with Morones when he, while acting as
31Statement by unnamed CROM officials in Clark, Organized 
Labor in Mexico, 6 5.
32C.R.O.M., September 1, 1929*
33Ibid., August 1, 1930*
3l
Statement by unspecified CROM leaders in Clark, Organized 
Labor in Mexico, 6 5.
35rbid., 108.
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manager of the Mexican Telephone Company, aligned against them. After 
Morones* use of federal troops to prevent one of their strikes in 
Veracruz, the electricians considered him a traitor to their cause 
and organization, "but did not break relations with him since they 
feared his power.
CROM’S AGRARIAN PROGRAM
The difference between country and city created a divergence 
between rural and urban labor making it difficult to unite them 
for purposes of political action or governmental regulation, yet 
CROM had a large agricultural membership. CROM regarded peasants 
as agricultural laborers, a branch of the labor movement, rather 
than as small landowners and attempted to unionize the agrarian 
elements as the following data of the 1926 composition of CROM 
unions illustrates: regional and state federations of agricultural
communities and laborers, 50 j regional and state federations of city 
workers, 35; workers' organizations in the Federal District, 108; 
city -unions in entire Mexico, 1,328; and agrarian communities and
•3*7
laborers* unions, 2 ,063.
The CROM constitution declared that the economic problem, 
where it concerns the campesino, could not be solved until a
See Mark Elliot Thompson, "The Development of Unionism 
Among Mexican Electrical Workers" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Cornell University, 1966), for a detailed monograph on one aspect 
of organized Mexican labor.
37Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (New York,
1929), Ul2.
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"decentralization" in the ownership of the soil and a more equitable 
distribution of the same were achieved. While demanding the con­
tinuation of the division of hacendados* land among the peasantry 
as provided by the Mexican Constitution so that campesinos may be 
largely self-employed, Morones insisted that tools, farm animals, 
and agricultural knowledge were as significant as land, and essen­
tial accompaniments to land distribution if agrarian reform were 
to succeed. These land distributions, CROM leadership believed, 
would prove wasteful and ineffective among a population of untrained 
and pauperized ex-serfs.
To this end, the Banco Cooperative Agrxcola was founded in
May, 1926, to extend credits to help cover the cost of seeds,
fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, livestock, and farm buildings.
Operations began with a deposit of 10,000 pesos made by the CROM
central committee; and a federal government five-year loan of
100,000 pesos. CROM sold shares to cooperative agricultural
39societies as quickly as they could organize. In addition to 
forming workers' cooperatives and the Agrarian Bank, CROM attempted 
to upgrade campesinos by establishing sanitary commissions and 
rural schools.
William English Walling, The Mexican Question: Mexico and
American-Mexican Relations under Calles and Obregon (New York, 1927),
S I !
OQ
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 10, 1956; Mildred 
Maroney, "Organized Labor in Mexico: a History and Delineation,"
(unpublished Master’s thesis, The American University, 1928), 8 6 5 8 7 .
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Morones also prompted the traditional manual occupations among 
Mexicans who had access to other sources of employment. Among these 
vocations were: pottery making, basket making, vegetable-fiber
products, such as hats and sacks, footwear and clothing; furniture; 
lace and needle-work; sarapes and rebozos, and similar commodities 
to promote handicrafts.
CROM'S EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
The Calles administration made considerable progress in 
education because of the public school system which Jose Vasconcelos 
founded during Obregon's term. At the third CROM convention in 
Orizaba in 1921, Vicente Lombardo Toldedano became president of 
CROM's committee of education, a task which Morones considered a 
mere diversion that would keep the workers emotionally satisfied 
while Grupo Accion leaders proceeded to use their positions to 
amass their personal fortunes. Lombardo, however, took his task 
as educator and legal advisor seriously making hundreds of speeches 
throughout Mexico to help supplement Calles' education program. 
Lombardo's duties were to give legal advice to members in conflicts 
with employers and to educate workers in labor law, union rights, 
labor history, Mexican and world history, science, culture; in 
short, "anything that would increase the general knowledge and 
class consciousness of the workers."^
Robert Paul Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano: Mexican
Marxist (Chapel Hill, 1966), 15-16 . He became a university professor 
specializing in labor law. From the university he entered politics 
and succeeded in becoming governor of Puebla, and then congressman 
and senator.
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At the request of the 1923 CROM convention in Guadalajara, the 
committee of education submitted a set of conclusions to the 1924 
CROM national convention meeting in Ciudad Juarez. The following is 
a summary of the salient points: 1 . civilization cannot spread in
Mexico as long as the language is not uniform, 2. the Indian must 
be civilized and at the same time his admirable innate qualities 
must be developed, 3 - teachers must be trained in the principles, 
views of life, and traditions wbich prevail in Mexico, 4. speciali­
zation in the teaching profession is desirable, 5 * the type of 
education most immediately needed in Mexico is technical training,
ll
6 . higher education must cease to be monopolized by one class.
At this convention CROM adopted a platform urging the spread of 
education, particularly vocational and technical training.
Not only did CROM construct schools for workers' children 
and supply them with books, libraries, instructors and medical 
examiners, but passed numerous resolutions designed to improve
the social, educational, and moral conditions of the Mexican
^ 42laboring class at its 1926 and 1927 annual congresses. The
'"*"See the bilingual pamphlet (English-Spanish) publication: 
Confederaeion Regional Obrera Mexicana, Comite de Educacion, El 
problema de la educacion en Mexico. Puntos de vista y proposiciones 
del Comite de Educacion de la C.R.O.M., presentados por el Presidente 
del Comite Vicente Lombardo ante la 6a. Convencion de la Confederacipn 
Regional Obrera Mexicana, celebrada en Ciudad Juarez, CH-nh., en el 
mes de noviembre de 1924 (Mexico, D.F., 1924), passim.
hp
“Tn April, 1925, CROM opened a school whose courses were those 
of the official schools at the primary, grammar, and higher grade 
levels; 248 pupils enrolled in the six primary grades. Tetin of 
the Pan American Union, July, 1925* 744.
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central committee voted to organize a Mexican Labor College (l) for 
the "further instruction and training of members of labor unions who 
have distinguished themselves by their zeal in the labor cause," 
and (2) to promote vocational training. The central committee 
also called a national teachers' congress in 1926, and this resulted 
in the formation of the National Federation of Teachers.
MORONES AND GRAFT 
Deeply rooted in Mexican as -well as Latin American conscious­
ness is the idea that the government is legitimate prey to those 
fortunate enough to have the opportunity to be in office. At first,
CROM leaders espoused a program of practical trade unionism combined 
with what they termed "revolutionary socialism." Though Morones 
called himself a socialist and made speeches proclaiming his comrade­
ship with the Chicago Haymarket Square victims, he began to demonstrate 
that the principles of socialism were compatible with a policy of 
cooperation between workers and capitalists. He built up an extensive 
patronage and bribery machine which collected huge sums of money.
The taking of a percentage of government employees' salaries, payment 
of union dues, contributions to the Labor Party chest, blackmail 
extorted from capitalists to avoid strikes, and funds obtained from
^Ibid. , July, 1926, 729; November, 1927j 1151; American Labor 
Yearbook, 1927, 221.
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labor disputes amounted to millions of pesos. Morones, Gasca, and
Moneda are popularly credited with, having amassed huge fortunes,
while other Grupo Accion members are supposed to have fared well, but
less spectacularly.
Alfonso Roman&ia Ferreira, one of Morones' persistent critics,
tried to find out what had happened to the money collected in 1928
I15
by CROM leaders for an airplane flight around the world. The CROM 
central committee had agreed to organize a transatlantic flight to 
better relations between the Mexican, European, American, and ]>,+■•? n 
American proletariats. By July 1, 1928, Morones had donated 2,500
A quota of two centavos per week was supposed to be paid by 
each member of the CROM, but this did not work in practice. 'When 
CROM claimed a membership of lg million, approximately 13,000 paid 
union dues. The Grupo Accion, which had no official status in the 
CROM constitution, paid the lion's share of the total income.
Figures for 192h and 1925 show that this select group paid 50$-75$: 
of 92,000 pesos collected in the former year the Grupo Accion paid 
78,000; it paid hO,000 pesos of 7^,000 in 1925- These figures are 
cited in Walling, The Mexican Question, 100, who gives no source for 
his data. Since many Grupo members were either government officials 
or Labor Party members of the Senate or Chamber of Deputies, their 
large donations to CROM's treasury became one of the chief bases of 
the accusations that graft was rife in the Grupo; the national 
treasury was available. Jose Petricioli denied that all government 
employees were forced to contribute to CROM during Calles' adminis­
tration; "Nor is it true thau the CROM received any direct grant 
from the government of the time. It did not need it. And in fact, 
it has_never received such a grant." Robert J. Alexander interview 
of Jose Petricioli, Mexico City, August 27, 19^8, photocopy, L.S.U. 
Archives.
Licenciado Eomandaa also questions what happened to the 
funds to start a CROM bank. . El Universal, September 22, 1956. 
Morones' answer to this antagonist was that CROM treasurer Fernando 
Rodarte informed the tenth CROM convention that the transatlantic 
flight had been cancelled because only 8000 pesos had been collected. 
He failed, however, to mention what happened to that sum or funds 
for the bank. Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 9, 1956.
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pesos; more than anyone else listed in the organizational committee 
report. The itinerary of the airplane "C.R.O.M." was to he Mexico 
City to Europe via Washington, B.C. The grandiose scheme called for 
stops in Africa, Central America, South America, and the United States, 
hut the trip never materialized and the donations disappeared.
Instead of aiding the laboring masses more, the members of Grupo 
Accion dominated the union for their own ends and used the organiza-
U6tion as a means to fulfill tneir ambitions and enrich themselves.
They built country houses and travelled in expensive automobiles,
but the shiniest and most costly car of all was the bullet-proof
Cadillac belonging to Morones. With the wealth he pilfered, he
brought estates, apartment houses, hotels, and blatantly exhibited
b l
his newly-acquired diamond rings, tie-pins, and stylish clothing.
Morones openly insulted the misery of the national proletariat 
with the flamboyance and ostentation of his costly diamonds. This 
display had the psychological effect of revealing his lack of a 
paternalistic concern for the lean-bellied men who came from dirt- 
floor shacks to march barefooted in his demonstrations. Beals
^Miguel Gil in La Prensa, January 28, 29, 1938; Emilio Portes 
Gil, interview, Mexico City, July 26, 1968; Agustin Zapata Casasola, 
interview, Mexico City, July 16, 1968; Lieuwin, Mexican Militarism,
92; Lesley Byrd Simpson, Many Mexicos (^th ed. rev.; Berkeley, 1967), 
309-311; Alfonso Romamdia Ferreira in El Universal, September 22,
1956; Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 15; Parkes, A History of 
Mexico, 383; Stokes, Latin American Politics, 240.
hi
Morones' Mancera Hotel was one of Mexico City’s finest during 
this period. His real estate alone was estimated at 1,300,000 pesos. 
Many of these properties were not held in his own name; to avoid sus­
picion he had friends register as the owners. See El Universal, 
December 1 9, 1935 for an enumeration of Morones' alleged real estate.
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described Morones as "a big, pig-like man, lie was always meticulously
bQ
dressed and perfumed, bis bands glittering witb diamonds." Morones 
exclaimed tbat be wore diamonds "to show tbose bastard bourgeois that
I4.Q
we can wear diamonds too." 7
One evidence of Morones* corruption and graft was bis bacienda
in Tlalpan, and tbe many drinking and gambling parties be beld there.
This retreat included a steel-girded fronton court, swimming pool.
bowling alley, tennis court, gardens, orchards, fountains, turkish
steam baths witb massage rooms, and three dwellings for the retinue
50of fifty servants and chaffeurs. Miguel Gil accused Morones of 
taking money for bis Tlalpan estate from tbe municipal treasury and
Beals, Glass Houses, 58. Describing Morones* penchant for 
perfume, one observer commented tbat tbe labor leader "took bis 
baths, reportedly and as far as could be judged superficially, in 
eau de cologne." Frank L. Kluckbobn, Tbe Mexican Challenge (New 
York, 1939)j 230.
b-9
Strode, Timeless Mexico, 288. Morones explained to critics 
that he was keeping the diamonds as a reserve fund which tbe working 
class could use in time of need. Parkes, A History of Mexico, 383- 
For additional comments on Morones* display of diamonds see tbe 
following; El Popular. April 6, I96U; Rosendo Salazar, Historia de 
las luchas proletarias de Mexico, 1923 a 1936 (2 vols.; Mexico,
D.F., 1938), I, 36-37, 8 9; Araiza, Historia del movimiento obrero 
mexicano, IV, 115; Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 390 > Clark, 
Organized Labor in Mexico. 1^5; Padgett, Tbe Mexican Political System, 
30.
^°Migu.el Gil in La Prensa, January 319 February 1, 1938.
Rafael Lopez Malo even alleges that Morones held bullfights there.
El Popular, July 21, 19^5* Although tbe idea is not impossible, it 
seems farfetched. Statements such as these must be taken carefully —  
Carleton Beals, a visitor to Morones' flnca, stated Morones was very 
discreet about bis mistresses, and tbat be remembered neither fronton 
courts nor turkish baths on Morones* estate. Interview, Baton Rouge, 
April 12, 13, 1970.
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of using trucks and machines from the Department of Public Works to 
build roads there. When asked about the lavishly decorated and 
ornate home, Luis Enrique Morones Pena responded that land was 
cheap in the 1920's and that his father had bought the estate 
"little by little in order to have a few friends over for some
CT7
drinks." J‘ One observer said this "pleasure pit" was a Sodom and
52Gomorra" where guests could release their inhibitions. Another
said that chastity was not the most conspicious of Morones’ moral
virtues, and that the rake ruled Tlalpan with the abandon of a
50
"latter-day Nero." This "cesspool of vice and corruption"
attracted groups of Morones' thrill-seeking friends. Miguel Gil
writes that Morones brought numerous politicians, military men,
and others of less importance there to attend his orgies with
5k
attractive prostitutes.
Concerning Morones' moral behavior during this period, his 
secretary Petricioli remarked that Morones "was a man of great 
virtue." In explaining Morones’ alleged corruption to an American 
scholar, Petricioli injected part of his own philosophy of life 
when he said:
^Interview, Mexico City, August 2k, 1968.
52
Araiza, Historia del movimiento obrero mexicano, IV, 1 3 8.
53
J. H. Plenn, Mexico Marches (Indianapolis, 1939)* 267.
5k
They "took all the badness and vices from Morones who pros­
tituted men, women, and the ideal of the C.R.O.M." Miguel Gil in 
La Prensa, January 29, 1938° Gruening asserts Morones indulged in 
the 1 orgies of an Oriental satrap." Gruening, "Emerging Mexico," 
28-3 2.
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And Morones naturally liked the women, liked 
good food and liked a good drink. Indeed, 
without fine women, good food and a good drink, 
life would not really be worth living, would 
it? And so thought Morones, and it is undoubtedly 
true that he had his share of all of these.
However, his enemies liked to exaggerate all of 
this, and to make it much worse than it was,
~ and to say that Morones was thus wasting the
money of the workers. The last is not true,
he never exploited the workers for his own
good. There were terrifically great oppor­
tunities available in those days, and he would 
have been a saint had he not taken advantage 
of some of them. And if he stole a bit to give 
it to the labor movement, was that so bad?55
Thus with a "wine, women, and song" attitude, Petricioli rationalized
and dismissed his boss's actions. Petricioli's last statement is
false. Morones took from the rich, but did not share with the poor.
Corruption and graft in Mexican politics neither began nor 
ended with Morones. He carried to an extreme a long-entertained
notion in Latin-American political life: the possession of poli­
tical power is a concession and the concessionaire manages as large 
a return or "honest graft" as possible. There are too many charges 
of Morones' graft for them to be lightly dismissed. He had an 
unprecedented opportunity to enrich himself and had more to con­
fiscate than did his detractors; not that they necessarily would 
have refrained from enriching themselves had they had the chance. 
Morones was the head of a syndicate and political party receiving 
hundreds of thousands of pesos during an era when there was little
55 *Robert J. Alexander interview of Jose Petricioli, Mexico
City, August 27, 19^8, photocopy, L.S.U. Archives.
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56
or no bookkeeping. It was a temptation and he and other succumbed.
It is interesting to note that in May and June, 196^ -when
some of Morones' possessions were auctioned, a journalist commented
57
that "its almost like opening Pandora's box." In May, 196^, items 
mainly of his historical value" were sold: these included rifles,
desks, ceramics and various other commodities, many of ■which sold 
for more than IC00 pesos each. On June 5s 10^ paintings of the 
European Academy School of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
were auctioned in the Morones family home in Tacubaya, "La Madona y 
el Nino" brought 5s500 pesos, a small part of the 200,000 pesos
Cjg
received for the paintings alone.'
A contemporary pun in the 1920's stated that the initials 
"C.R.O.M.," instead of meaning Confederacion Regional Obrera 
Mexicana, meant "Como Roba Oro Morones" (How Morones Steals Money.
When Jose Petricioli was asked about the veracity of the numerous 
claims of Morones' corruption, he nonchalantly offered a slightly 
different version of the "saint theory" he had given Professor 
Robert J. Alexander twenty years earlier: "What do you expect?
56
According to Morones' widow, her spouse did not pilfer 
CROM's treasury. When queried about his enormous income, she 
stated he "earned a lot" as chief of the telephone company and 
Military Manufacturing Establishments, but failed to specify any 
exact amount. Interview, Mexico City, August 3 s 1968.
^E1 Excelsior, May 17? I96U.
58Ibid., June 5, 7, I96U.
^John Gunther, Inside Latin America (New York, I9LI), 89.
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After all labor -unions in Mexico are not founded by monks and 
saints."^0
Ill
60
Author’s interview, Mexico City, June 25? 1968. Naturally 
Morones denied the charges of graft and claimed "the capital I 
have is mine and not because I have stolen it." "La comision de la
C.R.O.M. que encabeza el companero Luis N. Morones llego a la 
Ciudad de Mexico, despues de un resonado triunfo," C.R.O.M., 
September 15? 1932? b'J. In the winter of 195^? Morones wrote the 
following statement for the introduction of Petricioli’s El 
companero Morones: "Aseguro enfaticamente contra todo lo dicho
que no la he defraudado ni la defraudare." Morones was not the 
only cabinet member to amass a fortune. General Joaquin Amaro? 
Minister of War, had palatial residences in the capital, landed 
estates in the countryside, and the finest stable of polo ponies 
in Mexico.
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CHAPTER V I
THE PETROLEUM CONTROVERSY
The Mexican oil question (1925-28), although constituting 
one phase of Morones' influence, was in itself an important matter 
prominently in the foreground for several years. There followed 
vigorous note-writing between the United States and Mexican 
governments during which the bitterness and intransgency of both 
parties made the situation more tense. This voluminous corres­
pondence and the subsequent proceedings are an excellent source 
for Morones' key role in the controversy.
During the colonial period, the deposits of precious metals 
in the Spanish Empire belonged exclusively to the Castilian monarch. 
Charles Ill's mining code for New Spain, Reales Ordinanzas of 1783> 
remained in force until 188^ 4- when the Mexican Congress passed the 
first mining code which gave up the nation's heritage from Spain; 
that is, Mexico's subsoil wealth. These regulations declared 
deposits of mineral fuels and bitumins, including petroleum, to be 
exclusive property of owners of the surface. Such grants were in 
perpetuity, subject only to the payment of a tax or rental. The 
law exemplified a guiding principle of the Diaz era, namely 
development by means of foreign capital.
The statute of 188^ with some amendments remained in force 
until 1892, when the Mexican Congress promulgated a second general 
mining code. It reaffirmed that the owner of the surface could 
freely exploit the petroleum below his land. This legislation was
112
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in turn superseded in 1909 when an enactment again declared petroleum 
deposits to he the exclusive property of the surface owner.
The code of 1909a with some modification, principally revolu­
tionary decrees, was still on the statute hooks when the Constitution 
of 1917 appeared. Article 27 of this new constitution declared the 
absolute and full ownership of ail sub-soil deposits to he vested in 
the nation. It redefined private property by placing limitations 
not recognized in Anglo-American common law: "social utility" and
"national benefit" rather than timeless, contractual principles were 
enumerated.
PETROLEUM LAW OF 1925 
Three months after assuming his ministry Morones argued that 
American oil companies located within 50 kilometers of the Mexican 
coast were "contrary" to the 1917 Constitution. Stating that the 
Constitution did not specify how foreigners were to he forced to 
give up rights previously acquired, not did it authorize the 
executive to seize these properties, Morones announced that these 
foreigners' rights should he defined by legislative power.'*'
Morones took a hard line in June, 1925> when at a luncheon 
given by the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City, he 
declared:
Mexico has a duty to protect all foreign interests, 
but she has rights as well, and if necessary, in
iew York Times, February 1, 1925•
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defense of those rights Mexico is prepared to 
fight to the last ditch and dig her own grave 
defending those rights. 2
He invited foreigners to invest, but specified that they must come 
with "clean hands," and not with the purpose of exploiting the poor 
masses. He disguised his "get tough" policy by ashing their con­
fidence in the Mexican government, and by promising that his
government would cooperate with foreigners whose capital and
3
energy Mexico needed.
In 1925, a commission composed of Congressman Jesus Solorzano,
Senator Ignacio Rodarte, Engineer Joaquin Santaella of the Department
of Finance, and Licenciado Manuel de la Pena of the Department of
1+
Industry, Commerce, and Labor crafted a petroleum law. It limited 
the possession of oil properties acquired before 1917 to a period 
of fifty years, and foreign owners of oil properties had until 
January 1, 1927 to renew their concessions under penalty of for­
feiture. This law contradicted promises of "perpetual ownership" 
extracted from Obregon in the Bucareli Agreements which the United 
States maintained resembled a treaty. The Mexicans contended 
these had been gentlemens' agreements signed by Alvaro Obregon, 
and as such were not binding on Calles' administration.
^Ibid., June 20, 1925.
O
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, February 17, 195^*
bJesus Silva Herzog, Historia de la expropiacion de los 
empresos petroleros (Mexico, D.F., 1964), 51.
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The oil companies contested the new law for two reasons: 
first, it recognized no petroleum rights which, although acquired 
prior to May 1, 1917, were not before that date dedicated to 
extraction by the performance of certain "positive acts"; second, 
petroleum rights including those recognized by the decisions of 
the Mexican Supreme Court, must be surrendered in exchange for 
concessions emanating from the government.
Morones gave an exclusive statement to the Associated Press
in January, 1926 after he had conferred with representatives of
the oil industry. He said that the indications were favorable for
a mutually agreeable decision between the oil men and the government,
and he welcomed the cooperation of all companies involved. 'When
asked by correspondents if the government would make the new law
retroactive he vaguely answered, "The Mexican Government will do
nothing more than comply and enforce compliance with the laws which
are enacted." He continued:
The study of the regulations of the petroleum 
law has hardly commended. This study will afford 
opportunity to the Mexican Government to show 
clearly its broad judgment and its purpose of 
proceeding with absolute fairness within the 
principles which the law provides.5
An example of this "absolute fairness" came within one week.
On January 21,promulgation of the so-called Alien Land Law increased 
ill-feeling between the Mexican and United States governments. This 
legislation said foreigners could not acquire real estate within
^New York Times, January 17, 1926.
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certain prohibited zones —  100 kilometers in width along each of 
Mexico's borders, and 50 kilometers in width along each of the 
seacoasts; and it required that every foreigner, before acquiring 
any real estate or mineral concessions in Mexico, waive his rights 
by agreeing not to invoke the protection of his government with 
respect to such properties.
On April 8, 1926, the petroleum legislation of December,
1925 was embodied in a series of regulations which empowered the 
Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor to interpret and act.
Morones, therefore, became one of the central figures in the oil 
negotiations. The cabinet, however, was divided on the issue.
Fani and Saenz defended the American companies and wanted to avoid 
a crash at all costs with the oil interests. Morones, on the 
other hand, escalated the controversy, and refused to reach an 
agreement along lines which American companies considered 
"reasonable."
Although some smaller American companies and landowners 
complied with the provisions of the legislation, the more important 
ones refused to do so, appealing instead for United States governmental 
protection. Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, backed by President 
Collidge, was inclined to support them; therefore, Morones declared
6 *
Luis N. Morones in El Excelsior, September 5, 19535 Luis N.
Morones in Las Novedades, September 5, 1953; Luis N. Morones in 
El Universal, October 8 , 1956.
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that the petroleum conflict "began because of the disobedience of
7
high officials in the oil companies.
THE TANNENBAUM LUNCHEON 
Luis Leon, Calles' Minister of Agriculture, asserts that 
Ambassador Sheffield was "a cloaked agent of the oil companies"
■who intrigued from Mexico and misinformed his superiors insulting
g
and disgracing the Mexican government. Morones always considered
Q
Sheffield a stubborn enemy of Mexico.
Sheffield found the Mexicans unattractive, and allowed his 
feelings to influence his diplomacy. His correspondence abounded 
■with invidious comments and remarks about the people to whom he 
was accredited, and his dispatches prejudiced the State Department. 
His opinions of Calles and his cabinet members were colored by 
their morals and "irregular living habits." Sheffield's initial 
inability to gain the friendship and confidence of Mexican 
governmental officials, including Morones, was largely due to 
certain qualities in Sheffield's personality, character, and 
background.
An excellent example of Sheffield's incapacity to evaluate 
all persons judiciously occurred at a February, 1926 luncheon.
"^ Luis N. Morones in El Universal, December 17, 20, 1956. 
Morones declared that the Calles government had violated no agree­
ments and said that since former president Obregon "wholeheartedly" 
supported Calles' policy, it demonstrated that the regime was ful­
filling all commitments legally begun by Obregon. New York Times, 
January 17, 1926.
8 *
Louis L. Leon, "El Presidente Calles," Historia Mexicana, 
(octubre-diciembre, i960), 327.
9Luis N. Morones in El Universal, March 6 , 1956.
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Frank Tannenbaum had "been in Mexico for six months conducting a 
study of Mexican agricultural conditions to be published by the 
Brookings Institute. Upon first meeting Sheffield, Tannenbaum,
■whose sympathy with the Mexican Revolution and with the Mexican 
people pervades his written works, observed: "It became very
clear to me during our first interview, that the Ambassador was 
surprisingly, almost painfully isolated from contact with the 
Mexican government."1^ On Friday, February 11 Sheffield, Counselor 
of the Embassy and interpreter Arthur Schoenfeld, Morones, Secretary 
of Education Puig Casauranc, and Luis Leon attended a luncheon 
arranged by Tannenbaum at San Angel about eight miles from Mexico 
City.
Sheffield broke the ice by drinking to "Viva Mexico" and 
the Mexicans replied with "Viva Los Estados Unidos." As soon as 
they were seated, and without wasting much time in preliminaries, 
Sheffield took the lead by initiating the discussion. Sheffield 
expressed his desire to help Mexico, his deep interest in the 
peon1 s problems, and his sympathy with them. He presented the 
view that the peon had been greatly aided in his scale of living 
and educational advantages wherever foreign companies built schools 
and hospitals for the laborers, housed them under hygenic conditions, 
and raised wages from "the starvation point" of twenty-five centavos 
a day to two to four pesos daily; and that for the benefit of these
1QU.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929, Tannenbaum to 
Kellogg, March 5; 1926, 711.12/752.
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very people which, the Mexican government was pledged to help, it 
should welcome and protect foreign capital.
Morones disagreed with Sheffield’s viewpoint that the masses
had received abundant benefits from foreign capital. Sheffield
wrote in his official dispatch that Morones replied in length giving
from his point of view the history of foreign capital in Mexico, and
charging that under the Daaz regime foreign capital depleted the
wealth of the country, encouraged corruption, and insisted on
privileges without recognizing its obligations. Morones asserted
that the Madero and following revolutions were in part a protest
against the abuses of capital, and that the Constitution of. 1917
embodied the sentiment of the Mexican people concerning the
aggression and wrongdoing of foreign capital. Morones bypassed
Sheffield's point regarding the benefits to the masses wherever
foreign capital was invested and, according to Sheffield,
took the radical view that capital practically 
had no privileges and only such rights as the 
Constitution of 1917 and laws might grant. It 
had come into the country to exploit its wealth 
and must abide by such laws as the Mexican 
people chose to enact.H
Morones stated that Mexico did not oppose foreign capital, that
the restrictions placed upon capital's freedom were irksome only
because they were new, and that Mexican legislation seemed more
radical because it had not had a slow, accumulative growth as in
■*“Tbid., Sheffield to Kellogg, February 16, 1926, 711*12/685; 
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, March 6, 1957.
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other countries. "After all," he said, "it -was its suddeness rather
than its nature that was responsible for the had reputation of the
12Mexican legislation."
After the luncheon Sheffield sent an important dispatch to
the State Department. One particular passage is worth quoting at
some length since it contains a perceptive appraisal of Morones:
It was evident.. .that Morones is the directing 
force behind the present Government and in my 
opinion the strongest man in the Cabinet; that 
he is politically ambitious and expects to be, 
what he now, in effect, is, the head of the 
Government; that he is able, strong and without 
conscience, and while he is not seeking the 
support of the United States, he is hopeful 
that by a show of willingness to treat with 
business interests on the one hand and to 
modify the extreme radical views of the chief 
labor organization on the other, he may prevent 
active opposition on the part of the United 
States to his ambitions and his plans.
Sheffield continued by analyzing the Minister of Education as neither
politically nor otherwise strong and therefore followed Morones;
the sheepish Minister of Agriculture, he described, as incapable
of intelligent initiative and "much afraid of Morones."
Sheffield was harsh in his condemnation of Frank Tannenbaum.
The young scholar had said little at the dinner, but "had been in
entire agreement" with Minister Morones:
He is far more Mexican in sympathy than he 
is American, a dangerous man for American
12U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929, Tannenbaum to 
Kellogg, March 5, 1926, 711-12/752.
13Ibid., Sheffield to Kellogg, February 16, 1926, 711.12/685.
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interests, apparently a believed in the personal 
destiny of Morones. He is a graduate of Columbia, 
a Phi Beta Kappa man, with a distorted view of 
society and government.^
The following month Sheffield wrote Kellogg that Tannenbaum was in 
the service of the Mexican government, though his employment was 
both less continuous and less remunerative than that of Ernest 
Gruening.^ The ambassador, refuting Tannenbaum's account regard­
ing his aloofness and isolation from members of the Mexican 
government, wrote: "I need hardly point out that from the time
of my first arrival here I made all proper advances to members of 
the Government." The key hinges on Sheffield's interpretation 
of all "proper advances."
At the Tannenbaum luncheon, Schoenfeld explained how the 
Americans after their revolution redeemed their bonds and 
established their credit in spite of the fact that the redemption 
led to a number of speculative abuses. Morones replied that the 
comparison did not hold for Mexico, that the international debt 
situation was one of the most important confronting the world, 
that in the adjustments of international debts the ability to pay 
was a more or less recognized and accepted consideration, that 
Mexico was anxious to pay its debts, and that its greatest day of 
national happiness would be the day when it could pay its debts.
li...Ibid.
15Ibid., March 26, 1926, 711.12/732.
16 . 
Ibid.
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However, Morones pointed out:
.. .you cannot do the impossible and the Mexican 
people are so poor, they live so close to the 
margin of mere existence that it is simply out 
of the question to make any attempt to get the 
money from them for the payment of the debt 
when, as a matter of fact, they are barely 
succeeding in living from day to day on a 
little c om and beans; that with patience 
and cooperation, Mexico will discharge all 
its debts.^
In Sheffield's opinion, Morones considered several possibilities
to counterbalance North American pressure exerted because of the
petroleum controversy. These would include support from Europe,
Latin America, and the A.F.L. Sheffield urged stern measures to
"teach the Mexicans," who looked upon the A.F.L. relationship as
assuring a policy of United States non-action towards Mexico, and
upon a steadily maintained propaganda to assure a free hand for the
18
"further despoliation of American citizens." Morones, interviewed
by a New York Times staff correspondent, described CROM's relation
with the A.F.L. as being a reciprocal influence in exchanging
information and data. He mentioned Green, Woll, and Morrison, all
A.F.L. national officials, as being among "the numerous leaders who
19have evidenced their approval of the new land and oil laws."
17Ibid., March 5, 1926 , 711.12/752.
T O
Ibid., February 16, 1926, 711.12/685. 
^New York Times, January 17, 1926.
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AMBIGUOUS PROWOUUCEMEWTS 
In December, 1926, the Association of Producers of Petroleum 
in Mexico telegraphed Morones complaining that the Mexican government 
"has not demonstrated to such of the companies as are foreign cor­
porations how any valid confirmatory concession, whatever its form, 
nan be issued to them." Moreover, the companies maintained that 
they were "justly entitled" to an ample opportunity to consider the 
form and the definite terms of any proposed confirmatory concessions 
■which the government expected them to accept as constituting a
valid recognition and affirmation of their existing definite and
20
legal leasehold rights.
Morones responded that Mexico would not extend the December 31 
deadline, and denied that El Corona, El Aguila, Atlantic, The
2:
Richmond Oil Company, and the Transcontinental were alien companies. 
According to their articles of registration, Morones contended, they 
were Mexican companies; and the shareholders were regarded as being 
Mexicans because they had renounced any right to appeal to their own 
governments from the rulings of the Mexican courts. He denied that 
the delay in granting concessions was attributable to his office, 
but instead to the "inopportune presentation of legal documents by 
the interested companies." Morones pointed out that the companies 
had had sufficient opportunity to familiarize themselves with the
on
Ibid., December 15, 1926.
ZLThe Times (London), December 1 8, 1926.
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rules which the Ministry had explained at various conferences. 
Therefore, he concluded, the government "had again shown its good 
faith in guaranteeing the interests of foreigners in the oil
-  ^ j. «22industry.
Oil men were confused by Morones* reply, and observers were 
perplexed by his apparent ambiguities and inconsistencies; traits 
which he followed throughout the petroleum controversy. Declaring 
that failure to comply with the law by December 21, 1926 meant 
renouncement of rights, Morones at the same time asserted that 
the law did not establish "forfeiture" for violations. Concerning 
the regulations governing oil concessions that were to go into 
effect on January 1, Morones' ordered his department to issue the 
equivocal pronouncement that only "through malice and bad faith
2Q
can the law be considered retroactive."
Foreign oil officials often disagreed with Morones* data. 
George Davison, President of Mexican Gulf Oil Company, refuted 
several of Morones’ charges that had been been printed a few 
days earlier in the New York Times. Davison denied that his company 
had drilled its Salinas wells without a permit. He alleged that 
these offset wells were drilled to prevent drainage of their lease 
through large wells brought in on adjacent railroad rights-of-way 
by the so-called "Control," the board through which the Mexican 
government availed itself of oil rights retained by the railroads.
Tfew York Times, December 17, 1926. 
23Ibid., December 20, 1926.
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Under private title antedating May 1, 1917, the effective date of the 
Mexican Constitution, Davison's company held the oil rights in lands 
contigious to the railroad. Mexican Gulf Oil Company refused to 
surrender such rights by applying before December 31? 1926 for a 
governmental concession of limited term, the form and conditions 
of ■which had not teen prescribed by the Mexican government when 
the time for applying had expired. Davison's company, however, had 
applied for drilling permits months before the "Control" brought 
in producing wells. While Morones' Department did not expressly 
refuse to grant the permits, it did the equivalent by simply 
"sitting on the requests" and delaying to rule on their applications. 
Davison successfully sought injunctions from the proper judge, and 
his company drilled two wells. He disagreed with Morones and wrote, 
"that the wells were 'unscientifically' drilled, or deliberately 
drilled into salt water, which would, primarily, have injured our
2k
own property, are (charges...that refute themselves.
UNITED STATES "IWASION" OF MEXICO 
During the initial decade of the Mexican Revolution, there 
were occasions when American troops were mobilized along the border 
and when war vessels were dispatched to patrol the Gulf coast. In 
two instances, the 191^ Veracruz occupation and the 1916 Pershing 
punitive expedition, American military personnel invaded Mexico. To 
Mexican thinking, then, an impending invasion in 1926, the purpose
2k
New York Times, George S. Davison, editorial, May 23, 1927.
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of •which was to possess forcefully the disputed petroleum zones, was
25
both plausible and expected.
According to Calles, an American employee in the United States
Embassy in Mexico City sold the Mexican government photocopies of
26pilfered documents for 700,000 pesos. This evidence revealed the
proposed American invasion route of Mexico, with maps drawn by
Military Attache Lt. Colonel George Russell and "incriminating"
private correspondence of Ambassador Sheffield and Secretary of 
27
State Kellogg. "Plan Green" would dispatch between 150,000 and
500,000 American troops to dissect Mexico. In addition, Tampico
and Veracruz were to be invaded by the U. S. Atlantic fleet, and
28Manzanillo by the Pacific squadron. Other troops were to attack
25
Luis N. Morones in El Excelsior, September 3> 1953*
26 +
Armando Borrego G. in El Excelsior, September 2b, 1953•
Emilio Portes Gil stated he did net know the exact amount of the 
bribe. Interview, Mexico City, July 25, 1968. Luis Leon alleges 
that Calles set up a counter-espionage system and photocopied 600 
pieces of private correspondence from the U.S. Embassy. Leon,
"El Presidente Calles," 327. Stanley Ross writes, "The Mexicans 
are convinced that armed intervention was a real possibility during 
1926-27 and was forestalled only by Calles' adroit use of purloined 
documents." "The Preferred Revolution," in Joseph Maier and Richard 
W. Weatherhead, eds. Politics of Change in Latin America (New York, 
196M ,  147-148.
27
juas N. Morones in El Universal, February 7, 1957; Armando 
Borrego G. in El Excelsior, September 24, 1953.
28
Armando Borrego G. in El Excelsior, September 2k, 1953* 
Morones states that "Plan Green" was formulated in 1924, and in 
June, 1926 Lt. Colonel Edward Davis, U.S. Military Attache, urged 
its execution. Luis N. Morones in El Universal.. March 6 , 1957. 
Thirty years after the "invasion," Morones played upon his readers' 
emotions. Appealing to Mexican nationalism, he asserted that 
patriotism would have prevented the invasion's success, because 
Mexicans, "are accustomed to every type of holocaust and sacrifice 
in defense of national sovereignty." He remarked that whoever
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through Ciudad Juarez and capture Monterrey to protect the United
States border. Ultimately the invaders would converge on Mexico
City via Queretaro and Veracruz.
Emilio Portes Gil, one of Morones' bitterest enemies, alleges
that Calles defended Mexico's integrity and sent copies of documents
relative to the proposed invasion sites and an ultimatum to
President Coolidge threatening that Calles "would publish these
photocopies in the world's leading newspapers to show how the
29
mighty United States would attack Mexico, a weak nation. Portes 
Gil acknowledged that "it was one of the most brilliant episodes of 
our diplomacy," and that Morones "collaborated with Calles and lent
formulated the plan must not have thought of the I8L7 sacrifice at 
Chapultepec. Morones failed to mention, however, that the Mexicans 
lost that war. Luis N. Morones in El Universal, February 8, 1957*
^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 210. Emilio Portes 
Gil, interview, Mexico City, July 26, I968T According to The 
Times there was said to be 30^ - documents, "surreptitiously photo­
graphed" in the American Embassy, most, if not all were letters 
exchanged between Kellogg and Sheffield. Those of Sheffield were 
understood to be so full of distrust and dislike of Calles that 
there was no hope of sympathy or understanding from the U.S. 
government. Naturally, Kellogg stated that they were forgeries.
The Times (London), May 7, 1927- Nevertheless, Morones claims 
that as a result of threats to use the documents, Coolidge 
recalled Sheffield and the warships from Cayo Hue so. Luis N. 
Morones in El Excelsior. September 5> 19535 Luis N. Morones in 
El Universal, December 17, 1957; El Excelsior, April 6, 19^3 5 
Jose Petricioli in El Excelsior, April 6, 196^5 Jose Petricioli, 
interview, Mexico City, June 30, 1968.
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extraordinary ability and service •which someday ought to be known in
all of its details."^
The "phantom fleet" never arrived. Morones and Calles may have
fabricated the invasion which seemed very real to Mexicans, but as
Howard Cline comments: "Again battleships might hover ominously off
31Tampico and Veracruz. But the smell of Teapot Dome was too strong."
Carleton Beals offers some interesting observations on Morones
and the questionable diplomatic dispatches:
On one May day celebration, when Morones and 
the President reviewed the parading workers, 
the American Ambassador,.. .defied the order 
that no taxicabs or private autos could cir­
culate except with an order from the CROM, 
and persisted in driving the embassy car 
angrily back and forth through the paraders.
A few days later Morones showed me the 
secret confidential letters, marked Top 
Secret, and "Confidential to the Secretary
Emilio Portes Gil, "Como se conjuro en 1927, una intervencion 
armada en Mexico," Manana, August 29, 1953? 2U. The ex-president 
also repeats this thesis in his Autobiografia de la Revolucion 
Mexicana, 397, and on July 26, 1968 when interviewed by this writer. 
Araiza confirms this judgment when he says: "Morones, who heroically
stopped the North American invasion fleet navigating close to 
Mexican coasts, used a diplomacy of great proportions." Historia 
del movimiento obrero mexicano, IV, 202.
31Cline, The United States and Mexico, 210. Standard Oil, 
which had bought 283>000 acres from Edward Doheny a year earlier, 
exerted the strongest pressure on the Coolidge administration to 
sever relations with Mexico on January 1, 1927, the date the legis­
lation was to be enforced. The fact that this dispute coincided 
with a local hearing against Doheny of the National Association for 
the Protection of American Rights in Mexico, and Albert Fall,
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, dissuaded Coolidge from vigorous championship of the 
oil companies and intervention in Mexico on behalf of United States 
petroleum interests. The Times, (London), December 10, 12, 1926.
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of State,"...One of them detailed 'his' 
harrassment on Labor Day and stated that 
Morones was a Bolshevik, so was the President 
of Mexico. He hated the Mexican government.
How he got such documents, Morones would not 
tell me. Much later I happened to discover 
how they were extracted, with the connivance 
of one of the secretaries of the Embassy.
This, however, was long after Morones was 
out, and Morrow was ambassador. Morrow 
never acknowledge (sic) my memorandum about 
the leak. Likely he could not afford to 
admit in any way that there was a traitorous 
leak in the Ambassy (sic). The secretary 
however, left the service and avoided going 
back to the United States.32
In March, 1970, Beals described the clandestine operations more
specifically:
I discovered this leak quite by accindent (sic) 
by overhearing a heated quarrel in an adjoining 
booth in a little restaurant, between the 
secretary and an Italian janitor, who took 
the documents out of the files when quitting 
work, had them photostated, then restored 
them in the morning before other employees 
arrived. The quarrel was over how the 
money received was to be divided.
Though I cannot pin-point it by any 
particular documents, there is little doubt 
that an invasion in 1926 was being planned 
and was imminent. That it did not occur is
32Beals to Buford, February 1 9, 1970, L.S.U. Archives. 
Morones permitted no cars to circulate between 9 A.M. and 3 P»M. 
on May Bay without the identity card issued to diplomatic repre­
sentatives, "C.R.O.M., Auto Oficial, Puede Transitar Libremente." 
According to Sheffield, "This is only one of the many indications 
of the strength of organized labor in this country and the 
inability of the central authorities to successfully cope with the 
labor situation." Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of 
Mexico, 1910-1929* Sheffield to Kellogg, May 6 , 1925} §12.504/630.
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perhaps due to differences in the oil industry 
and between the unsavory oil-owners in Mexico 
and the financial establishment.33
REVERSAL OF POLICY 
During the summer of 1927 several petroleum companies decided 
to reverse their original intention of drilling wells on pre­
constitutional properties without the permits which they sought, 
but which the Mexican government had refused to issue. The initial 
step of this program was taken by the Huasteca Petroleum Company 
as a result of a visit to New York of one of its Mexican counsels 
who argued that the decision to drill without permits amounted to 
conspiracy against the Mexican government. Morones had also 
informed a representative of the Huasteca company that the govern­
ment intended, "come •what may," to prevent, by force of arms if 
necessary, the drilling of wells on preconstitutional lands which 
had not been the subject of petitions for confirmation of rights. 
In view of these facts, and that the onset of the rainy season,
33
Beals to Buford, March 6 , 1970, L.S.U. Archives. The 
janitor and secretary were conversing in English since they figured 
no one in the "lousy little restaurant" understood this language. 
Interview, Baton Rouge, April 13, 1970. Morones seldom arrived at 
his ministry office before 7:00 P.M. Then he had various officials 
report on routine matters he had delegated them. Beals says that 
Morones: "rarely worked except at night, a midnight appointment
with him was no rarity. He began his night's work in a barber's 
chair, with a very beautiful girl doing his nails, and frequently 
had appointments while he was being shaved. I was present once 
when the head of the petroleum industry was reporting to him, first 
from once (sic) side of the chair then the other. The final step in 
the process was to have drops of murine put in his eyes." Beals 
to Buford, March 6 , 1970, L.S.U. Archives.
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which made drilling operations more difficult than usual, the
companies decided to defer continuing with their plan to drill
without permits. The decision was also facilitated by petroleum
overproduction elsewhere than in Mexico; this eased the pressure
3I).
upon various companies to continue maximum production.
To ease the immediate difficulties, Coolidge withdrew
Sheffield from the Embassy and named Dwight Morrow, a former
Amherst classmate, as his new ambassador to Mexico. Morrow was
a partner in the banking house of J. P. Morgan and Company and a
man of wide legal and financial experience. As a partner in the
Morgan firm, Morrow had easy access to factual data on Mexico's
domestic and foreign problems, and was remarkably well-informed
on that country's situation. Carefully, and not unsympathetically,
he studied the interesting, experimental program of the Mexican
35
labor movement, and CROM's theories and actions. After assuming 
his ambassadorial position, Morrow maintained informal relations 
with Calles, Morones, and other cabinet members, and, realizing 
that they were not bolsheviks, Morrow reversed Sheffield's policy 
of hostility.
In dispelling tenseness and suspicion and in stimulating 
confidence, Morrow invited the popular American humorist Will Rogers 
to visit him, meet President Calles, and be his unofficial assistant.
3I1
Schoenfeld to Kellogg, August 8, 1927? 812.6363/2339>
Foreign Relations, 1927. Ill, 185-186.
Off
Harold Nicolson, Dwight Morrow (New York, 1935)? 336.
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Rogers and Calles. toured northern Mexico for a week in the presidential 
train. Later Rogers was given an ambassadorial dinner in the University 
Club, where the speeches of good fellowship were so prolonged that 
"the fellows were ready to fly at each other's throats."
Morrow was also aided by the psychological effect of the visit
of the American aviation idol, Charles Lindbergh. Following the
world enthusiasm resulting from his famous trans-Atlantic flight,
Lindbergh arrived December 1^ by a non-stop flight from Washington,
D.C. The young pilot flew to Mexico in the capacity of a private
citizen (with State Department consent) as the guest of the Mexican
government, and in response to an invitation extended by President 
37Calles. Upon landing, Lindbergh was met by Calles who gave him 
"un faerte abrazo" (a warm bearhug).
The aviator-idol was officially welcomed and feted throughout 
his sojourn. The Chamber of Deputies received him in full session 
formally declaring him to be "an Ambassador of Good-Will to the 
Mexican People." On December 17, Calles called for Ambassador 
Morrow and Colonel Lindbergh at the American Embassy and escorted 
them to a fete at the National Stadium. Later, 80,000 Mexicans 
including the presidential party of Calles, Morones, cabinet 
members, and other functionaries attended the reception held to
^Ibid., 312; Homer Croy, Our Will Rogers (New York, 1953), 
223-22^; Charles W. Hackett, "Success of Lindbergh's Good-Will 
Mission to Mexico," Current History. XXVII (February, 1928),
727-729.
^New York Times, December 3 , 5, 6., 8, 1927; Hackett,
"Success of Lindbergh's Good-Will Mission," 727.
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Og
honor the American pilot. The following morning Lindbergh stood 
with Morones, Morrow and other government officials on the balcony 
of the National Palace where 180,000 paraded in Lindbergh's honor.^ 
Another factor forcing Morones to an amicable settlement of 
the oil dispute was the fear of "external pressure." As Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano explained in a speech delivered February 22, 1938 
to the First General Ordinary Congress of the Confederacion de 
Trabajadores Mexicanos:
One day —  I shall never forget it as long 
as I live —  the then President of the Supreme 
Court was called to the Ministry of Industry,
Commerce, and Labor, and Morones transmitted to 
him the order of General Calles: 'Mr. President
of the Court, the Government is in danger, and 
before external pressure obliges us to submit, 
it is necessary that the Supreme Court declare 
the Petroleum Law unconstitutional and decide 
in favor of the oil companies.
The incident illustrates the legal inconsistencies to which the
Supreme Court was prone. Freedom and equality in this tribunal
were a legal fiction; the judiciary, like the legislature, was
subordinate to the executive.
In the landmark case of the Mexican Petroleum Company, an
appeal was made from a lower court in Veracruz. The Supreme Court
granted an injunction on November 17, 1927 restraining Morones
from enforcing Articles lU and 15 of the Petroleum Law, and from
cancelling the drilling permits granted to the company in Panuco.
38"ei heroe maximo del siglo XX," C.R.O.M., supplement to 
January 1, 1928, 53- After receiving a parchment, Lindbergh posed 
for photographs with Morones and other leading cromistas.
39rbid., 53, 6 2.
UoWeyl, The Reconquest of Mexico, 292.
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The decision did not hold that the entire petroleum law was unconsti­
tutional, or even that the two articles in question were, except in 
the specific case under review. Nevertheless, foreign oil producers 
construed the decision to mean that it would be followed by other 
decisions which would eliminate the worst features of the law, since 
no Act of the Mexican Congress could be finally declared outside the 
Constitution until the Supreme Court rendered five decisions on the 
same legal questions.
Following this reversal, Calles on December 26, after many
informal conferences with Morrow, submitted proposed amendments to
the Mexican Congress designed to bring the laws into accord with
the Supreme Court ruling. A bill to this effect passed unanimously
at its first reading. It was given executive approval by Calles
on January 3j 1928, and eight days later the amendments went into
4l
force when they were published in the Mexican'’Gazette.
The new legislation provided for confirmatory concessions 
(without cost and without limit to time) of certain rights derived 
from lands on which petroleum exploitation had begun prior to 
May 1, 1917, of rights derived from contracts before the same date 
with surface owners for the purpose of oil exploitation, and of 
rights of operators of pipe lines and refineries under concessions 
or authorizations from the Department of Industry, Commerce, and Labor.
^ New York Times, December 27, 28, 30, 1928; The Times (London), 
January 13, 1928. Newspapers attributed this revision of governmental 
policies concerning oil regulations to Morones' having offered his 
resignation. New York Times, December U, 1927- Once again, Morones 
faked a resignation. In this way he could appear to be a disappointed, 
but staunch patriot.
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Early in February, 1928, a committee of American and foreign 
oil companies submitted a draft of proposed amendments from the 
Petroleum Regulations Conferences to Morones' ministry.. Morones 
refused to accept them. As soon as this fact was learned, informal 
conferences were held between Morones, Morrow, and their representa­
tives to frame amendments to the Petroleum Regulations which would 
place them in harmony with the recently amended law. Several weeks
of negotiations followed "which were characterized by the utmost
lf.2
friendliness on both sides." A new draft was prepared by Morrow 
and J. Reuben Clark which was tactfully based, not upon what the 
petroleum companies wanted, but upon various statements made at 
different periods by Mexican ministers. This was eventually 
accepted by the companies and by Morones.
On March 27, on behalf of Morrow, the American Embassy issued
a press release that virtually recognized the termination of the
more than a decade long petroleum controversy. The release said:
President Calles, on the advice of Minister Morones, 
has now issued new Regulations modifying the old 
Regulations in accordance with the decision of the 
Supreme Court and the new act of Congress. These 
new Regulations make clear what Minister Morones 
had already made clear in his letter, that those 
who take confirmatory concessions under the 
amended law get a confirmation of their old 
rights rather than a new grant of rights. The
k2
J. Reuben Clark, Jr., "The Oil Settlement with Mexico," 
Foreign Affairs, VI (July, 1928), 612. Morones did not attend all 
the conferences on the topic. This was done by a Mr. Paredes, his 
representative.
*^Morrow to Kellogg, March 6 , 1928, 812.6363/252U, Foreign 
Relations, 1928, III, 298.
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form of confirmatory concession as set out in 
the new Regulations expressly declares that 
it is 'to operate as recognition of acquired 
rights which continue in force'....In the 
informal conversations which have taken place,
Minister Morones and his official staff have 
approached the whole matter with a disposition 
to frame the Regulations in such a way as to 
meet such essential points as are susceptible 
of adjustment of general provisions.^"
That same day the Department of Industry distributed to the 
press copies of the executive decree signed by Calles. These 
contained the amendments in question, together with the form to 
be used in issuing confirmatory concessions on petroleum lands 
acquired prior to May 1, 1917- These amended regulations, which 
Calles signed on March 27, were promulgated the next day and 
"ended" the oil controversy between the United States and Mexico. 
The contentions of the State Department were accepted on all 
essential points in dispute. American business interests had 
scored another significant victory abroad.
Concerning Calles' motivation in precipitating the quarrel 
with the foreign petroleum companies and their governments, several 
interpretations may be taken into consideration. One of the 
president's 1926 speeches delivered to a labor convention sheds 
some light on his reasoning:
W+
Ibid., Statement Handed to the Press on Behalf of Ambassador 
Morrow, March 27, 1928, 306-307. Morrow discreetly complimented 
Morones when he said: "I can not allow to pass this opportunity of
telling you of my sincere appreciation of the spirit of fairness 
which has characterized the attitude of yourself and of the members 
of your staff in the informal discussions which have taken place 
regarding the amended regulations." Ibid., Morrow to Morones,
March 27, 1928, 300.
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I have endeavored to demonstrate that Mexico 
can, with its own resources alone, be 
developed and win its economic freedom....
My object has been to achieve the economic 
independence of. our country, because 
without economic independence political 
independence is impossible... .You may be 
absolutely assured that this we will do —  l,- 
Mexieo, economically, shall be independent.
According to this discourse, the policy of his administration was 
the achievement of political independence through economic indepen­
dence. Of course Mexico lacked sufficient drilling equipment, 
trained personnel, and finances required to obtain them. In a 
confidential note that Morrow sent to Kellogg, Calles assured
Morrow that the 1925 law resulted from the necessity to satisfy
]+6
the wishes of the radical wing of the revolutionary group.
Morones, wishing to augment his explanations following 
Portes Gil’s 1953 statements in Siempre about "Morones saving 
Mexico from invasion," and Licenciado Isidro Fabela's 1956 series 
"La politica intemacional del Presidente Cardenas" published in 
El Excelsior, in which Fabela alleged the same and urged Morones 
to reveal the details, published his almost daily "Calles obligo 
a las companias petroleras a cumplir las leyes." A rambling, 
biased defense published in El Universal from December, 1956 to 
March, 1957j this article constitutes Morones' major writing, and
1|C
Frederick F. Barker, "New Laws and Nationalism in Mexico," 
Foreign Affairs, V (July, 1927) 5 591-
^^Morrow to Kellogg, November 8 , 1927, 812.6363 in Lorenzo 
Mejrer, Mexico y Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero, 1917-19^-2 
(Mexico, D.F.,1968), 160.
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partly explains M s  role in the petroleum controversy. Taken from 
Morones1 personal archives and written in what he terms "an impartial 
approach," Morones' major thesis is that the "rebellious petroleum 
companies" refused to obey Mexican laws and made an international
1+7issue "out of a purely domestic problem." According to cromistas,
Morones1 role was to issue the December, 1925 regulations which
"combatted the imperialist penetration and served as antecedents
1+8
for the oil expropiation in 1938."
1+7 . ,
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, December 17, 20, 195°;
New York Times, February 2, 1927.
1+8Rogelio de la Selva in El Excelsior, April 7, I96I+;
"Morones, el decano de los lfaeres, "Siempre, April 15, 19^ 1+, 9;
Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico City, June 3 0, 1968. Meyer 
refers to Morones as the "artifice" of the December, 1925 regula­
tions . Mexico y Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero, 1917-191+2. 
161.
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CHAPTER V I I
MORONES AND THE CHURCH
CATHOLIC LABOR GROUPS 
Although the church tried to counterbalance the labor movement 
with Catholic Labor Circles, party organization, and various programs 
of social action, Catholic unions were negligible. By 1925,the 
national organization called the National Catholic Workers' Confedera­
tion falsely claimed 22 ,000 members and close to 1+00 unions; but 
most organized workers, though considering themselves Catholic, were 
affiliated with CROM despite the fact that in opposition to Morones 
the "priests declared from the pulpits that membership in CROM 
constituted a mortal sin."‘L
CRISTERO REBELLION 
Calles' greatest struggles with the Church began in 1926 when 
he enforced Article 3 of the 1917 Constitution which required that 
primary education be secular, and Article 130 which severely limited 
the number of priests in Mexico. Beginning in February, Calles 
deported foreign priests and nuns, confiscated clerical residences, 
church schools and seminaries; required all Mexican priests to 
register with the civil authorities, accused the hierarchy of treason, 
and prohibited criticism of the government by the clergy and clerical 
newspapers. The crisis deepened when the Mexican hierarchy supported
^Alba, The Mexicans, 159* Morones alleged that the National 
Catholic Workers' Confederation was "not national, possibly not 
Catholic, and not a confederation." New York Times, August 23, 1926.
139
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by Rome, refused to accept Calles' regulations. On August 1,
Mexican bishops retaliated by suspending church services throughout
the country. As a result, six members of the upper clergy were
expelled by the government for "seditious activities." Atrocities
on both sides, as well as propaganda issued by the Church and ■
Mexican governmental sources, kept emotions high.
Morones exerted significant influence in the formation and
execution of administration policies even in the enforcement of
2
the anticlerical articles of the Constitution. He was no friend 
of the organized Church, and helped to create social tensions when 
he personally advised Calles to execute constitutional provisions
and establish a Mexican Catholic Church which would be independent
3
of the Vatican. Calles' and Morones' actions helped provoke a
chaotic three-year armed insurrection, 1926-29, known as the
Cristero Rebellion, during which CROM supported him throughout
k
the ruthless, sanguinary crisis.
Morones directed terrorist operations from Mexico City giving 
orders through intermediaries mafia-style. His CROM furnished shock
Eugene Maur Braderman, A Study of Political Parties in Mexico 
since 1890 (Urbana, 1938), 211.
^Medina Ruiz, Calles, un destino melancolico, 96-97.
1+
J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America; a History 
of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations (Rev, ed.; Chapel Hill. 1966),
3 9 8 . Cristeros, self-style warriors for "Christ the King," operated 
mainly in Jalisco and west-central states where they roamed the 
countryside burning public schools, killing teachers, and dynamiting 
trains. Miguel Gil, without specifying any reasons, writes that 
Morones "provoked" the religious conflict. See his vehement 
"Morones al desnudo" series in La Prensa, February 7, 1938.
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troops, political assassinations, demonstrations, and mob actions.
On August 1, 1926, Morones staged a parade of over 50,000 men and 
women to support Calles' religious policy. Among these were 10,000 
employees of the government departments who had been warned to 
attend on threat of losing their jobs. Other CROM members, the 
majority of them Catholics, were also compelled to participate 
under warnings of dismissal, reduction of salary, and the difficulty 
of obtaining future work. Through the silent and almost deserted 
Mexico City streets CROM members, government employees, and several 
thousand farmers from nearby districts carried banners acclaiming 
Calles* position and denouncing the Catholic clergy. Numerous 
placards announced: "Immoral Priests Pervert Society," "The Clergy
are Rich, the People Poor," "Sensible People Applaud Calles," and 
"Calles is a Disciple of Juarez." Rumors of possible violence help 
explain the remarkable absence of spectators. The column took more 
than two and a half hours to pass the reviewing stand in the 
Cathedral Plaza, where Calles stood surrounded by high military 
officials and all the cabinet except Finance Minister Pani who 
disapproved of the religious laws. Morones and Puig Casauranc, who 
addressed the marchers, assailed the Catholic Church which they 
charged started the uprising against the Mexican president.^
^The Times (London), August 3> 1926; New York Times, August 2, 
1926. Morones accused the foreign oil companies and the high clergy 
of combining to provoke and launch the Cristero Rebellion. Luis N. 
Morones in Las Novedades, September 5> 19535 Luis N. Morones in El. 
Excelsior, September 5, 19535 Luis N. Morones in El Universal,
August 13, 1956.
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On August 6, 1926, Morones concluded his public debate with 
Luis Mier y Teran, a Catholic student in the Esperanza Iris Theater. 
Luring the course of their heated discussion, Morones and his opponent 
almost "came to blows." Morones' speech was violent, and gave further 
indications that the government had no intentions of affecting a 
compromise. He accused the American Knights of Columbus at their 
convention held the previous week in Philadelphia of adopting a 
resolution seeking to precipitate immediate intervention by the 
United States government. "Catholics," he shouted, "have resorted 
to the old expedient of providing an international conflict." 
Menacingly, he warned: "The Government of Mexico will not tremble
before the Vatican. The Roman Pontiff does not govern Mexico and, 
if he did, we would have gone tack 100 years."^ Mier y Teran, he 
asserted, was delegated by the Catholics to represent the Church 
because their officials sought to deceive everyone by making it 
appear that Mexican youth supported the Church. Morones made a 
distinction between the deity and organized religion when he said:
"The youth are in the revolutionary ranks. They are with the free 
men who preserve their belief. You believe in God. We all do.
The campaign is not against God, but it is against the pharisees."
6„
nos mismos que vienen a hablamos de patriotismo tracionan 
a su patria, provccando conflictcs internacionales," C.R.O.M.,
1926, h8-51; New York Times, August 11, 1926. For a brief account 
of^the debate, see Antonio Uroz, La cuestion religiosa en Mexico, 
(Mexico, E.F., 1926), 2^6-265.
7
New York Times, August 11, 1926.
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Morones also opined that "The Church has always been the enemy of the
proletariat and this especially is illustrated in Mexico." Replying,
Mier charged that Morones had challenged Catholics to take up arms
0
in defense of the religious cause.
A.F.L. REACTION
William Green and Matthew Woll continued the Gompers tradition
of defending CROM and the Mexican government against attacks in the
United States. At the Detroit A.F.L. convention in 1926, CROM was
attacked on the grounds that it was not a real trade union, hut part
of the Mexican governmental machinery because it was lending its
support to President Calles against the Church. Matthew Woll,
A.F.L. vice-president and a friend of Morones, issued a statement
on April k , 1926 reiterating that the friendship of American and
Mexican labor would continue unchanged because American labor would
not be trapped into any endorsement or condemnation of Mexican
religious policies. Woll said:
We believe in our institutions and we should 
like to see them extended. But we do not 
propose to countenance the use of any force 
to carry our ideas among people, either 
military, economic, diplomatic, political 
or even moral force.9
American capital, Woll asserted, was trying to take advantage of
Mexico's backwardness and of "our moral mission to Mexico," to
deceive the American people into helping it swallow the country.
8 *Ibid., Salazar, Historia de la luchas proletarias en Mexico,
VI, 237.
% e w  York Times, April 1926.
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American, labor -would never allow itself to become the accomplice 
of such an "atrocious international blunder." The A.F.L., Woll 
concluded, hoped that the Mexican government would do all possible 
to improve the situation, if for no other reason than because the 
Church "is being exploited by American jingoes, Imperialists, money- 
grubbers, and other enemies of the Mexican people.. .Anomalies or 
evils in the Mexican Constitution afford no ground whatever for 
intervention or for any diplomatic or Congressional hostility to
»/r • it 10Mexico.
MORONES' CREDO
Compelled by his mother to be an altar boy during his youth,
Morones later opposed the Roman Catholic hierarchical organization, 
not the Roman Catholic religion. Morones stated that there existed 
two Christs, "el Cristo de oro de los ricos y el Cristo de los 
pobres"j11 but this appears to be more of a propaganda appeal than 
a statement of creed. Contrary to Morones1 detractors, he was not 
"godless." He believed in God, "a something big," but believed 
that there were good and bad clerics just as there were good and 
bad lawyers and doctors.
Morones resented the church hierarchy and enjoyed mocking 
their traditions. In September, 1923> for example, a wedding occurred 
which was given a large amount of publicity; this was the theatrical
~*~^ The Times (London), April 6, 1926.
11Petr icioli, et al., Estudios proletarios, I, 239-
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12"First socialist matrimony celebrated in Mexico." Before a crowd
exceeding 3,000 gathered in the Institute of Social Sciences, Eduardo
Moneda, CROM secretary general, married Jose Heredia and Concepcion
Moreno, two workers. Morones acted as the best man. On explanation
for this event, written by a person who was best man in several of
these weddings, is the following:
Morones decreed that all CROM members, who got 
married bad to be married by CROM officials, 
and he presided over several marriage cermonies.
(sic) This was a blow at the Church, but most 
couples went through three marriages, the 
official marriage which alone was legal, then 1 
a Church ceremony, then a Labor Party marriage.
Another confrontation between Morones and church leadership
occurred in October, 1924, when the National Eucharistie Congress
met in the capital’s Olimpia Theatre. The congress wished to
present "El divino Narciso," a one act religious drama written
by Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz. Morones forbad cromistas from
14participating in the function, and the play was cancelled.
12 + *
Casasola, Historia grafica de la Revolucion Mexieana, -III. 1628.
^Beals to Buford, February 1 9, 1970, L.S.U. Archives; Beals, 
interview, Baton Rouge, April 12, 1970.
14
Moetezuma, El conflicto religioso de 1926, I, 296-298; Rius 
Facius, De Don Porfirio a Plutarco: historia de A.C.J.M., (Mejico,
D.F., 19^6), 302; Stokes, Latin American Politics, 240-241.
Licenciado Alfonso Romandia Ferreira blames Morones for ordering 
the assault on Soledad Church, the bombing of the Basilica de 
Guadalupe, and placing the red-black CROM banner on Mexico City 
cathedral's flagpole. Luis N. Morones in El Universal, August 30, 
November 13, 1956. The flag incident occurred May 1, 1921 during 
a CROM parade celebrating "El Dia del Trabajo." Records Relating 
to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, Hanna to Secretary 
of State, May 2, 1921,815.504/311.
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Morones advocated restricting the Church to its strictly 
religious sphere because he regarded it as an obstacle to modern 
progress.^ Morones, when he wrote the introduction to the five 
volume set of La industrial el comercio y el traba.jp en Mexico 
durante le gestion administrativa del Senor Gral. Plutarco Elfas 
Calles in 1928, quoted from and agreed with a segment of Pablo 
Macedo’s La evolucion mercantil, a strong indictment of the clerical 
position:
Ejercio el Clero notario influencia en todas las 
clases socialies. <• Que hizo de ella? Usarla en 
beneficio propio, y absorber las mejores tierras 
y las mejores fincas urbanas, sin devolver a la 
colectividad ni en educacion, ni en instruccion, 
ni siquiera en ejemplo de moralidad y cultura, 
las fuerzas que extraxa el organismo social.
Por el contrario, las comunidades religiosas 
llegaron a ser foco de escandolo corruptor, y 
contra ellas ni prelados podian nada, porque 
estaban sustraxdos a su jurisdiccion.-*-°
Morones wrote that he had "outlined here in a few sentences the
typical action of the influence of a corrupt and ambitious church."
In his opinion,the three most serious obstacles to Mexican economic
development were, "the numerous restrictions on the free exercise of
commerce, the lack of stimulation and protection of industry, and
117failure to liquidate the great interests of the church."
^Luis Enrique Morones Pena, interview, Mexico City, August 2h, 
1968; Berta Pena Viuda de Morones, interview, Mexico City, August 3*
1968.
■^Volume I, 11.
17Ibid., 2 1.
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In later life, the fire-eater mellowed and was not as outspoken
in his criticism of the church. He appreciated its beauty and art,
and enjoyed visiting different churches. Despite his earlier vehement
anticlerical feeling, his coffin was placed between four candles
19and under a crucifix during his capilla ardiente (*wake).
t O
Picture in photograph archive of La Prensa.
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CHAPTER V H I
FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1928 TO THE CROM SPITS OF 1932
CALLES CHANGES HIS MIND
Until 1927 when there were disagreements between Calles and 
CROM leadership, Calles toyed with the notion of having Morones 
succeed him. The high-living labor leader, Calles had believed, 
was sufficiently experienced in government and identified with 
the working class, which, during Calles' administration, had become 
a more important part of the electorate than ever before.
By 1927, Calles no longer found it profitable to be known as 
the "labor" or "bolshevik" president; his government was depending 
more and more upon the support of the right; and Morones had become 
unacceptable to Obregon, the agrarista bloc of deputies and senators 
and, to the military. Not only did the generals feel strongly that 
civilians had no right to the presidency, but opposed Morones 
because they feared he might organize labor militias which would 
ultimately challenge the army's preponderance.'*' Morones' CROM had 
formed military units which held maneuvers in Veracruz. The threat 
of an armed proletariat as a counterbalance to the regular army
1Summerlin to Kellogg, July 30, 1925, ADS, 812.00/27579 in 
Lieuwin, Mexican Militarism, 95* Morones* widow offers an entirely 
different version: Calles offered him the presidency several
times, but Luis did not believe himself capable." Interview,
Mexico City, August 3, 19&8. Little credence can be given to 
her's or to the following opinion: "...he always declined his
friend's desire that he be president." La Prensa, April 6, 1956.
The choice was not Morones* to make in 1928.
ll+8
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deepened the army’s distrust. Red labor hatallions fought for 
Carranza's cause in 1917, and during the de la Huerta rebellion 
armed agrarians and workers had proved invaluable aids to the 
government against military rebels.
Calles added up the power factors. Outside of the presidency 
Obregon continued to wield a great deal of political influence 
because of his close ties with the army and agrarian interests, 
an influence that Cables could not counteract by favoring his labor 
collaborators who, with their discipline and loyalty, were not 
numerous enough. Cables realized that if he failed to support 
Obregon, a repetition of the Agua Prieta movement would occur and 
be backed by a majority of the military. In the face of over­
whelming opposition from the divisionarios (division general, 
highest rank in the Mexican army), he abandoned his idea of having 
Morones succeed him. Realizing that Obregon was the only 
presidenciable (one eligible to be seriously considered as a 
presidential candidate), Calles cooperated with Obregon in 
procuring an amendment to the Constitution allowing the election 
of an ex-president provided his terms were not consecutive.
MYTH OF "SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO, HO REEEECCION"
CROM leadership opposed this "violation of Article 83 of the 
1917 Constitution," not so much on principle, as because they 
wanted Morones to become president. The corpulent leader resented 
Obregon's manipulation of the Constitution because it "cheated" 
him of the top office in the land. Morones' appetite for power
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became insatiable; be wanted to take the big step upward. If one 
conceives tbat the principal function of a national political party 
organization is to elect a president, Morones' P.L.M. failed in the 
1928 election.
Morones' public announcements concerning tbe election were
often contradictory. Early in 1927 be promised tbat CROM would
remain aloof from tbe agitation over tbe presidential candidates.
His sentences were guised in lofty idealism: "For tbe Labor Party,
tbe principal issue is not re-election, but how to conserve tbe
revolutionary ideals." If this involved Obregon's re-election,
labor would support him, even though this would entail a change
in its principles. He urged calmness, and suggested tbat since
Calles' term bad not ended, "revolutionists" should forget future
politics and support Calles. During tbe crucial days of tbe
Cristero Rebellion and petroleum controversy, Morones warned:
"The common enemy, reaction, continues its efforts to divide the
revolution, with tbe hope of again coming into power." If labor
"were forced to be re-electionist by tbe necessities of tbe moment
2
to save revolutionary unity," then CROM would do so. Thirty years
later Morones still insisted this was tbe reason P.L.M. chiefs
backed Obregon:
En el espxritu de mis companeros estaba 
firmemente cimentado el principio de no 
reeleccion, y cuando nos dimos cuenta de 
que no apoyarlo las fuerzas revolucionarias
^New York Times, May 30, 1927; Roberto Quiros Martinez, 
Alvaro Obregon: su vida y su obra (n.p., 1928), 33O.
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podrran sufrir un quebranto en su uni dad, 
decidimos cooperar para su reeleccion.3
■When the P.L.M. held its convention in September, 1927, it 
had not yet endorsed anyone for the presidency. The delegates 
considered the possibility of Morones, Gasca, Obregon, and General 
Francisco Serrano; but eliminated the first two because they still 
held government posts. Some delegates believed re-election en­
croached on the Constitution; others sought to prolong Calles’ 
administration by proposing that the presidential term be lengthened 
to six years. The convention finally endorsed Obregon as the "labor 
candidate," but empowered the directive committee to withdraw its 
support if it so deemed. By including this stipulation, CROM 
leaders hoped to be able to bargain with Obregon.
OPPOSITION OF GENERALS GOMEZ AND SERRANO
Upon its being known that Obregon would again run for 
president, political groups of the antireeleccionista persuasion 
began to form around Generals Araulfo Gomez and Francisco Serrano, 
the latter had once been Obregon's friend and subordinate. The 
1927 campaign was bitter, especially on the gomistas' part. Gomez 
was outspoken in his views and offered his enemies "una parcela de
ktierra de dos metros para estar bajo de ella." Gomez spent the 
early part of Calles' administration officially studying military
^Morones to Dulles, February 16, 1957, photocopy, L.S.U. 
Archives.
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 75 1956.
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methods in the United States and Europe. After compiling a lengthy 
report on his findings he was appointed Chief of Military Operations 
of the important Veracruz zone. John Wood, American Consul at 
Veracruz, described Gomez as "calm and deliberate of speech and 
nonchalent when conversing in English." Gomez informed Wood:
"that he has saved the life of Minister Morones and that they were 
fri ends -as friendship goes in Mexico-but that Morones was a
'son----- ch.'"^ His fiery personality, up-turned mustachios, and
more than a touch of vanity made Gomez a picturesque candidate.
Serrano was different. A short, large-headed man with a 
thin face and bright eyes, he gave an impression of solid strength 
and capacity. Unlike Gomez, he was a doer, not a talker. Obregon 
had earlier considered Serrano, his former War Minister, as Calles' 
successor to the presidency. However, Obregon had been concerned 
about Serrano's whoring, drinking, gambling and addiction to night 
life. He sent him on a study tour in Europe hoping to mature him 
and improve his loose morals. Upon Serrano's return to Mexico, 
Obregon noticed no change, so eliminated the general from any 
further consideration.
^  /
Both Serrano and Gomez avowed their opposition to Obregon on
the ground that he had violated the spirit of the Revolution by 
seeking to establish a permanent dictatorship. Each cooperated 
with the other, but why did one not withdraw? The answer lies in
^U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929, April 5, 1927, 
711.12/1042.
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the reality that individuals or -personalismo, not the alleged issue 
of no re-election, were of primary importance in the campaign.
Neither of the two, even had he wished, could have delivered his 
adherents to the other. True to Gomez's reputation of being out­
spoken, his words made unpleasant hearing and reading for obregonistas. 
Most impolitic of all, Gomez spoke openly of the inevitable appeal to 
arms. On October 3, Serrano and thirteen others were captured, court- 
martialled, and shot in Cuernavaca. Gomez unsuccessfully took to the 
field, was captured, and executed on November 4 near Coatepec,
Veracruz.
WANING OF MORONES1 POWER 
From l$ 2 b to 1928 labor was the most important influence in 
Mexico and Morones, next to Calles, was the most important member 
of the government. The events of 1928 (the presidential election 
and subsequent assassination of Obregon), were major turning points 
for Morones; as Morones discovered, he was not so much the controlling 
element as he was the controlled. Morones, whoa Obregon had earlier 
rescued after Carranza had sentenced him to death, now openly opposed 
his savior's nomination. Campaigning for re-election, Obregon made 
it evident that if elected he would be anti-labor .-(specifically anti- 
Morones and his corrupt associates). Morones also made his position 
unequivocally clear and verbally attacked Obregon during a nocturnal 
meeting held in the Hidalgo Theatre on April 30. However, by that 
time Obregon had gained sufficient support to enable him to snub 
CROM. Furthermore, CROM leaders engaged in personal strife which
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weakened their organization. Lombardo Toledano lea a group in the 
1928 P.L.K. convention which suggested that the party ^aould be 
dissolved because ”it had confused its high mission with that of
g
grasping political parties." This notion was primarily directed 
at the Grupo Accion of which Lombardo had never been a member.
His influence in 1928 was insufficient to force the party's dis­
solution.
Obregon answered Morones’ attacks and accepted his challenge 
declaring the Labor Party was free to withdraw its backing whenever 
it pleased, and announced that he could still count among his 
supporters enough elements to fill all government posts. With 
evidence of the ensuing rift and Obregon's public statement, 
withdrawal notices began to arrive at CBOM headquarters; some were 
politely worded but definite in their decision. Among the most 
important groups to separate immediately was the state federation 
of Coahuila which, in a long communication dated June 8 , informed 
CROM that it could no longer continue its affiliation, since all 
its elements were "identified with the politics of General Alvaro 
Obregon because we consider him one of the strongest supporters of 
the principles of the emancipation of the workers." The Confedera- 
cion de Sindicatos Obreros y Campesinos of the State of Durango sent 
CROM the following message, "Your directors are traitors to the
g
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 135*
7Ibid., 131.
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organized movement and lackeys of yanqui imperialism so we disown
g
C.R.O.M." As subsequent events were to prove, this was the 
"beginning of Morones' and of CROM's decline; they had bucked 
Calles' machine which ordered Obregon restored to the presidency.
The effective elimination of his two most serious rivals left 
Obregon with only the farce of "election" for the presidency. 
However, with Morones' attitude, militant Catholic unrest, 
resentment of the followers of those who had perished in the 
October and November phases of the campaign, and the breaking down 
of the Revolutionary principle of "No Re-election," uneasiness and 
tension hung in the air. On May 23, bombs exploded in the Chamber 
of Deputies. One week later a bomb went off at Obregon's election 
headquarters. Although Obregon was the only presidential candidate 
and the election result was a foregone conclusion, the government 
took elaborate precautions to preserve order. In anticipation of 
possible violence, troops were confined to barracks in readiness 
for riot calls; and licensed premises were closed for three days 
during the election.
OBREGON'S ASSASSINATION AND ITS EFFECTS
Following his election,Obregon attended a luncheon in La 
Bombilla, a restaurant in the fashionable resort of San Angel, 
several miles south of Mexico City. The band played a lively air. 
Obregon was seated between Aaron Saenz, Foreign Minister in both
g
Alfonso Romandia Ferreira in El Universal, September 10, 
1956; Quiros Martinez, Alvaro Obregon, 615.
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bis cabinet and tbat of Calles* and Colonel Bicardo Topete, bis 
campaign manager* and was chatting with friends when a thin youth 
diffidently approached the table. Showing Saenz some caricatures 
he had made during the banquet, he asked permission to sketch 
Obregon. Saenz touched Obregon's shoulder and as the latter turned 
inquiringly, the youth fired five shots from a revolver which was 
concealed by the hat held in his right hand. All the bullets struck 
the president-elect in the chest; he fell forward in agony before 
dying.
Antonio Soto y Gama, a federal deputy and leader of the 
agrarian section of the Obregon bloc, demanded "absolute and radical 
justice." He insisted upon the complete elimination of the Labor 
Party from public power, and openly blamed Morones for the assasina- 
tion;
We consider the head of the Labor Party and 
the directors of his group as the psychological 
authors of the crime for, with the greatest 
treachery they prepared the fanatic for the 
murder. They armed his hand.9
Authorities were especially concerned with Soto's declarations that
"Morones must go or there will be actual war." Although P.L.M.
leaders denied any connection with the crime, the National Agrarian
Party remained unconvinced of their innocence, blamed Morones for
his oratorical onslaughts on Obregon which had, they alleged,
"heated the assassin's weak brain to the point of madness."
Morones was: "psychologically responsible by causing an anti-Obregon
% e w  York Times, July 22, 1928.
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atmosphere -which influenced Jose de Leon Toral, a religious fanatic, 
to kill him."
On Friday night July 20, Soto and Aurelio Manrique, another 
agrarian leader, paraded with 1500 obregonistas carrying the Mexican 
flag draped with black crepe. Their march was a demonstration 
against Morones and CROM. The situation was so tense that Morones 
was forced to utilize armed guards. Carleton Beals found him 
sitting in the Labor Ministry surrounded by machine guns mounted 
on tripods.
Without waiting for any legal investigation, and without 
producing any proof to support his statement, Calles accused the 
whole Mexican church of the crime. Spokesmen of the clergy dis­
claimed all responsibility.
MORONES' RESIGNATION
The Union of Revolutionary Parties passed a resolution demand­
ing that Calles eliminate all Labor Party members from the executive 
branch of government, and called upon the Federal Congress to expel 
Labor deputies and senators. The situation was crucial for Calles, 
his support in large measure was derived from Labor. In order to 
appease the U.R.P. and stave off drastic methods, Calles reluctantly 
gave way and accepted the resignations of Morones, Minister of 
Industry, Commerce, and Labor; Eduardo Moneda, director of the 
government printing shops; Celestino Gasca, Governor of the Federal 
District, and Jose Lopez Cortes of the Mexico City municipal council. 
Instead of admitting that the true reason for his resignation was
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duress, Morones claimed it was, "To assist in maintaining the unity 
of the revolutionary family and to facilitate the investigation of 
the cause of General Obregon's murder."10 Morones disappeared 
following his resignation. Rumors were rife, regarding his where­
abouts. These included that he was hi fling in Mexico City, had flown 
to the United States, had sailed for Havana, had fled to Guatemala, 
and had boohed passage for Europe from Veracruz.
Calles announced that the legal inquiry he had ordered 
instigated against Obregon's assassin demonstrated the lack of 
truth that Morones was the intellectual author of the president­
elect's murder. This investigation was conducted by several of 
Obregon's most intimate and loyal friends; Aaron Saenz, Arturo Orcx, 
and Emilio Portes Gil. Portes Gil informed Calles that he personally 
thought that neither Morones nor other cromistas were guilty, but 
that public opinion pointed to them. 11 Arturo Orel disagreed. He 
never believed that the assassination lay only in religious problems
Ibid., July 23, 1928. Another version Morones offered was 
to say that he and the others resigned to redeem a pledge they had 
made to relinquish their government posts if their positions ever 
showed signs of interfering with CROM effectiveness. El Excelsior, 
August 23, 1928.
^Portes Gil, Autobiografia de la Revolucion Mexicana, U09-U1O. 
In his interview by journalist Zoe Beckley of the Hew York World, 
Calles answered her question about Morones' guilt, "the legal 
investigations against the criminal who assassinated Obregon and his 
accomplices demonstrate the rumor's lack of truth." The president 
blamed the clergy for the death. "La prensa extranjera comenta elo- 
giosamente las declaraciones del c. General Calles," C.R.O.M.,
August 15, 1928, 2; "El Senor General Calles habla de los problemas 
nacionalesC.R.O.M., 2 4 ,  31 j El Excelsior, August 3> 1928;
Fernando Lopez Portillo in El Universal, Hovember 1, 1956.
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but purely in political origins, in short, among persons who enjoyed 
great privileges and feared losing them —  Morones and his Grupo
m . . 12Accion.
MORONES CLAIMS HIS INNOCENCE
Endeavoring to clear himself of complicity in Obregon’s death,
Morones pointed out that he had no personal quarrel with the
president-elect. He claimed that earlier he had a most "satisfactory"
interview with frtm at which time CROM had been assured that its
leaders would again enjoy a position of responsibility in the
Obregon government. Morones' veracity may be doubted in this
instance, Obregon did not need Morones. He had enough support
without him. Rumors persisted about Morones’ guilt. Even if
Morones were innocent, his impolitic moves and vehement anti-Obregon
threats voiced during the 1928 campaign and some of his earlier
strong-arm methods, such as being accused of being the intellectual
author of Field Jurado's murder only four years before, cast doubt
upon his innocence. Naturally Morones claimed he was innocent, and
lh
sought scapegoats in the personages of the higher clergy. Morones
1 P
Arturo H. Orcx in El Universal, September 3, 1936.
13C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1938-19^2, hi-6 3.
^Luis N. Morones in El Universal, September 27, 1956;
"Discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Luis N. Morones en la velada por 
el Partido L'aborista Mexicano la noche de' 21 de diciembre de 1931, 
para conmemorar el XII aniversario de su fiindacion," C.R.O.M.,
January 1, 1932, 32. "The most important Catholic implicated in 
Obregon's murder was Miguel de la Mora, Bishop of San Luis." Luis 
N. Morones in El Universal, October 16, 1956. Until his death, 
Morones claimed he was innocent of the murder. During the author's
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and CROM had "become an embarrassment to the government and had to be 
eliminated. It appears that the Obregon assassination was a useful 
fiction to break the controversial Morones who had fallen from grace 
partially because he had bucked Calles1 machine which ordered Obregon 
restored to the presidency.
On August 8 , 1928, Morones wired Santiago Iglesias to come to 
Mexico. After receiving permission from William Green to make the 
trip, Iglesias departed New York and arrived in Mexico City on 
August 31- Accompanied by Ricardo Trevino, CROM secretary general, 
Iglesias proceeded to Morones' finca in Tlalpan where he found 
numerous CROM leaders assembled. Morones explained the object of 
the accusations was to create a great mass emotional upsurge which 
could be utilized to justify attacks upon and possible assassination 
of CROM leaders and destruction of the Labor Party. Morones asked 
that Iglesias conduct a thorough investigation upon which to base 
a report to William Green which, through the P.A.F.L., could be 
publicized throughout the world. Morones also gave him numerous
interviews with Morones' friends and relatives, this topic was one 
of several touchy themes. Others claiming Morones innocence are 
the following: Sra. Berta Pena "Viuda de Morones, interview,
Mexico City, August 3, 1968; Luis Enrique Morones Pena, interview, 
Mexico City, August 2h, 1968; Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico 
City, June 25, 1968, and Carleton Beals. According to the latter: 
"He was accused of having abetted the Obregon Assassination. This 
was false he was loyal to his friends. It was rumored that he had 
fled from the city. I found him carrying on his work as usual at 
the Ministry, a bank of machine guns in the upstairs corridor." 
Beals to Buford, February 1 9, 1970, L.S.U. Archives. Among those 
asserting that there exists insufficient proof to blame Morones 
are: Emilio Portes Gil, interview, Mexico City, July 26, 1968,
and Agustin Zapata Casasola, interview, Mexico City, July 16, 1968.
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documents supporting the innocence of Laborites in the assassination. 
Among this data was a copy of the hitherto secret agreement of 1919 
made between Obregon and the Labor Party. For a week Iglesias 
questioned laborers, government officials, military leaders, anti- 
reelectionists, agraristas, obregonistas, and others about the current
crisis. His inquiries convinced him that neither the Church nor the
- 15labor movement was responsible for Obregon's murder.
ASSASSIN'S TRIAL AND TESTIMONY
Was Morones psychologically and intellectually responsible for 
the crime? This question was debated by many with more emotion than 
objectivity. Toral's comments and his trial provided important 
insight in attempting to solve this problem. The assassin declared 
on July 30 that "Morones had nothing whatever to do with it." He 
continued,
If I were not telling the truth, I could easily 
take advantage by dragging some intellectual 
author into the affair. Morones is against our 
religion. I prefer to tell the truth. I did 
it alone.
Before the fifty persons —  police and government officials, news­
paper reporters, foreign correspondents, and photographers —  who, 
during the long recitation, relaxed on divans and in big comfortable 
chairs, Toral read his confession at police headquarters: "My soul
will be saved. So will Obregon's, because I offered my life in
^Iglesias to Green, October b , 1928 in Snow, "Samuel Gompers 
and the Pan-American Federation," 220.
~L&
New York Times, July 31> 1928.
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atonement for him." Toral looked quite unperturbed during the
17questioning period -when he repeated, "I did it alone."
His confession diverted attention from an earlier suspect, 
the Mother Superior of the Espiritu Santo Convent, Concepcion Acevedo 
y de Llata or "La Madre Conchita." Several days before Toral's 
confession, Madre Conchita also had been interrogated. She was in 
high spirits and laughed merrily -when reminded of various allegations 
concerning her insanity. She asserted that she had neither attended 
meetings of conspirators, encouraged the manufacture of bombs, nor 
provided poison for the alleged plot of Maria Elena Manzano. Asked 
if she could elucidate the part played by dissatisfied labor leaders, 
she exclaimed: "I have no Labor leaders concealed behind my skirts."
She maintained her complete innocence, and at the end of the inter­
view revealed part of her philosophy: "It is my ideal of life to be
a martyr. In order to be a martyr one must be punished for a crime
•which one has not committed. Therefore I welcome any punishment or
l8suffering that may come my way."
Toral's arraignment began a few days after his confession and 
was held before Alonzo Mendoza, Judge of the Court of First Instance, 
in the municipal building of San Angel within a hundred yards of the 
restaurant which had been the scene of the crime. The most significant 
admission made by the assassin came in answer to the judge’s question
17
The Times (London), August 1, 1928.
1 Q
Ibid., July 27, 1928.
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about who had advised him to commit the crime, to •which Toral replied, 
"Directly no one; indirectly, La Madre Conchita." He testified that 
she told him that religious persecution in Mexico would he prolonged 
unless Obregon, Calles, and Patriarch Perez of the schismatic 
Mexican church were murdered. Toral and Conchita were committed by 
the Court of First Instance.
Bishop Miguel de la Mora, on behalf of the Episcopal Sub­
committee, promptly issued a statement repudiating the charge that 
the Mexican clergy was responsible for Obregon’s murder. In de la 
Mora’s denial of responsibility, he asserted, "...it is common 
knowledge that the nun is mentally deranged, several cases of 
insanity having been reported in her family, and that the com­
plicity of one nun and a priest should not fasten guilt upon the
19 .*whole clerical body." For Obregon's assassination no one would, 
of course, accept moral responsibility. But how could the Mexican 
hierarchy tolerate a person whose mental abnormality has been 
"common knowledge" as the responsible head of a convent?
The trial, which Morones did not attend, was melodramatic.
A large portrait of Obregon hung above the fudge's bench and facing 
the space set aside for the accused. Mother Concepcion asked the 
prosecuting attorney to do his utmost to have her sent to prison,
because "it would enable her to do spiritual work among the women
20convicts." During the process which was broadcast to the whole
^Ibid., August 7, 1928.
20
Ibid., November 3, 1928.
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nation by radio, Deputy Gonzalo Santos, president of the National
Agrarian Party, invaded the court room at the head of other armed
deputies. They threatened to shoot not only the prisoners but also
the judge and jurors, and especially the attorney defending Toral,
if a judgment of guilty were not rapidly rendered. During -this
commotion one of the men attempted to shoot the accused assassin,
21but missed. Court had to be adjourned for the day.
The last day of the trial was equally exciting. Toral
testified that some time before he became acquainted with Conchita
he had convinced himself that he was the "chosen instrument" to
remove Obregon and had never divulged to her his resolution to kill
the president-elect. He admitted, however, that her remark that
the Catholic situation in Mexico could be alleviated by the deaths
of Cailes and Obregon was a deciding factor in what he termed his
"already well-established intention." There was a tense moment when
the nun's counsel put this question to Toral:
As a man possibly on the verge of the tomb and 
in the interests of the peace of your country, 
what responsibility has Mother Concepcion in 
the murder of General Obregon on which the 
prosecutor can rest the charge that she is 
guilty of being the intellectual author of
*f*V> c  «■*
WUVtf O i U  U  •
Toral turned dramatically towards Conchita, paused for emphasis and,
22
with this hand on his heart, said "None whatever."
21
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 133* 
22The Times (London), November 6, 1928.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
165
On November 8 , Toral and Conchita were found guilty of murder. 
The jury voted by eight to one to sustain all the counts in the 
indictment. Toral was sentenced to be shot, and Conchita because 
Mexican law forbad the execution of a female, to serve twenty years 
in prison. Neither had sympathizers inside the court room, and when 
their counsel in his last pleas for Toral referred to the youth’s 
belief that by killing Obregon he would gain the "martyr's palm," 
those present jeered, hissed, and laughed uproariously. The spec­
tators cheered the announcement of the verdict, and officers in 
court saluted the jury with their swords.
The palid Toral met his death shouting "Viva Cristo Hey" in 
front of the Penitenciarxa del Distrito Federal with a large crowd 
of spectators looking on. In July, 193^» Madre Conchita was trans­
ferred to the penal colony of Las Islas Marias where freed from her 
vows she married Carlos Castro Baida who was serving six years for 
having placed dynamite explosives in the washrooms of the Chamber
OO
of Deputies in 1928. The ex-nun wrote her memoirs insisting that 
she never knew Toral was going to assassinate Obregon. Neither she 
nor Toral ever suggested that Morones played a part, even indirectly,
2kin the assassination.
Despite their testimony, many questions surround Toral’s and 
Conchita's statements. Toral admitted that Manuel Trejo,
Jose Bravo Ugarte, Mexico independiente (Barcelona, 1959)*
hoo-toL.
2k
Concepcion Acevedo y de Llata, Memoria de la Madre Conchita 
(2da ed.; Mexico, D.F., 1962)* passim.
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25a labor leader, furnished him with the murder weapon. One is
suspicious of Mateo Podan's statement that Toral was an active
cromista, hut Jose Petricioli candidly admitted that Toral "was a
member of the CRGM of long standing, though at that time he was
inactive." Another perplexing problem is Morones' relationship
with Madre Conchita. H. Flores Sanchez has tried to show that her
activities were financed by Morones and his group. He tells about
the Recamier sisters, Amanda, Margarita, and Adela or "Llaya.'''
Llaya, he alleges, was Morones' "third or fourth wife," and adds
that she and Amanda "were well known" at the wild parties Morones
held at Tlalpan. According to Sanchez, these three girls were
the daughters of a sister of Madre Conchita, whom Llaya introduced 
27
to Morones. If true, and there is sufficient room for doubt,
this would make the nun Morones' mother-in-law's sister, or his
"txa polxtica." Morones, on the other hand, alleges he did not
28know Conchita until 1939 and then "only at sight."
Several persons claim that Maria Elena Manzano once saw a 
fat man speaking with Madre Conchita in her home. This individual
25
Charles W. Hackett and J. Lloyd Mecham, "The Assassination 
of President-Elect Obregon," Current History (September, 1928), 1026.
26
Mateo Podan in La Prensa, December 11, 1936; Robert J. 
Alexander interview of Jose Petricioli, Mexico City, August 27 9 
19 -^8, photocopy, L.S.U. Archives.
2 7  +
H. Flores Sanchez in El Universal, November 3? 1956; Pablo 
Meneses V. in El Universal, November 3, 5, 1956; Dulles, Yesterday 
in Mexico, 377.
28
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 16, 1956.
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was "identified" as Samuel Yudico, one of the principal CROM leaders
29 ^
and "right arm" of Morones. Yudico died suspiciously three months
before Obregonfs death and rumors circulated that Morones had poisoned 
30
him . Moronistas denied foul play and alleged that the thirty-eight 
year-old Grupo Accion member died of a mysterious "painful, tormenting,
on
distressing illness." To divert suspicion, Morones led Yudico's 
funeral march.
It is highly possible that Toral murdered Obregon without 
Morones being the intellectual author. Despite Alfonso Romandia
Ferreira's statement that "numerous Catholics and high clergy knew
*■ 32that Obregon had decided to terminate the religious problem," :.it
is probable that Toral and others disbelieved this propaganda. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that Obregon's speeches did not reveal 
this course of action. Four months before his death, the presidential 
candidate indicated in a campaign speech in Guanajuato that he pro­
posed prohibition for Mexico. Liquor, gambling, and "wicked Roman 
Catholics," he said were the three enemies of the country:
29
Pablo Meneses V. in El Universal, November 3j 5? 1956; Valente 
Quintana in El Universal, September 11, 1956; Alfonso Romandxa 
Ferreira in El Universal, September 17s 20, 1956. Morones denied 
that Yudico was his ' right arm," asserting that all members of the 
Grupo Accion were equal. Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 6 , 
1956:
30
Valente Quintana in El Universal, September 11, 1956; Pablo 
Meneses V. in El Universal, November 3> 5> 1956; Dulles, Yesterday in 
Mexico, 378.
^■"Galerxa de honor," C.R.O.M., October 15, 1937> 5-6; Luis N. 
Morones in El Universal, October 17, 1956; "Otro gran batallador cae 
para no levant arse mas,"" C.R.O.M., supplement to May 1, 1928, 109. 
op
Alfonso Romandfa Ferreira in El Universal, September 18,
1956.
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It may be necessary to spill a little more 
blood in order to eliminate tbe last small 
nuclei of these evil ones —  these false 
Catholics ■who would make of their religion 
a banner for fratricidal strife.
He was speaking of the Roman Catholics, who, he asserted, used
38their religion to propagate anti-governmental activities. 
Furthermore, Obregon had been the attempted victim of an attack 
by bomb-throwing elements of the League of Religious Defense on 
November 13, 1927 in Chapultepec Park. After the two assailants 
who threw dynamite at the car in which he was riding confessed,
Father Miguel Agustin Pro-Juarez, the accused intellectual author 
of the crime, was executed by a firing squad.
If CROM leaders could have foreseen that Obregon would never 
live to become president, it is possible that Morones would have 
never entered into open conflict with him. Furthermore the Morones- 
Obregon antagonism differed from that which impelled Toral to 
assassinate the president-elect, "so Christ could be wholly King 
of Mexico." Morones' verbal attacks were dictated from a Laborite 
angle; they implied not errors of commission on Obregon's part, but 
that from Morones* Revolutionist view point Obregon had not gone 
far enough. Such attacks, if they were noted by Toral at all, 
would have been deemed by him favorable to Obregon, rather than 
condemnatory.
^ The Times (London), March 28, 1928.
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CONTINUISMO
With. Obregon's murder, Calles* term expiring, and the amended 
Constitution requiring a full term lapse before a president could 
return to office, Calles faced a dilemma* He viewed his only 
resort as eontinuismo —  to impose a weaker politician in the 
presidency while Calles remained in power behind his puppet. To 
satisfy the disappointed obregonistas, Calles chose one of their 
number, Emilio Portes Gil, civilian political boss from Tamaulipas. 
Portes Gil was "selected and duly elected" provisional president of 
Mexico by unanimous vote of the national congress. Calles managed 
to surmount a major obstacle by convincing military leaders that 
the balance of power was so evenly distributed among them that any
attempt to choose an army candidate would result in deadlock and
- 3^civil war.
A few days before leaving the presidency Calles, in an effort 
to achieve peace between CROM leaders and the president-elect, called 
a meeting at the home of Puig Casauranc, the new Minister of Industry, 
Commerce, and Labor. Portes Gil attended as did Eduardo Moneda and 
Ricardo Trevino, two prominent cromistas. Morones was conspicious 
by his absence. After an interval of complaints from each side —  
particularly regarding the conflicts in Tamaulipas —  CROM and the 
incoming governmental head "agreed" to peace and cooperation. J
3^Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, (Urbana,
1959), 121.
vc:
-'''Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 410.
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One can argue that CROM and Portes Gil could have accomplished 
a reproachement except for one factor. Probably there vas no more 
determined enemy of Morones in all Mexico than Portes Gil, and enmity 
toward Morones meant hostility toward CROM and the P.L.M. As governor 
of Tamaulipas (1925-28), Portes Gil substituted other labor organiza­
tions for CROM unions, and through a series of conflicts between the 
two groups, he upheld his own unions. CROM combined a maximum of 
trouble with a minimum of result; it emerged "on the short end" in 
its clashes with the strong-willed, anti-Morones governor.
FOUNDING OF TEE P.N.R.
With the split between CROM leadership and Calles, the 
organization’s functional ability broke down and the Labor Party's 
role declined. Calles organized a new party, the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party), as the basis for his 
control. P.N.R. was a relatively simple coalition of local political 
machines, farm organizations, and labor organizations bound together 
by Calles’ personal!smo and power. The party brought together the 
Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and Aaron Saenz groups, and Calles 
hoped to play one off against the other and thus remain in power 
behind the scenes. With the aid of plenty of government money for 
mordidas (bribes), Calles managed to split the Agrarian Party, buy 
off or purge opponents of his P.N.R. such as Soto y Gama, and to add 
the agraristas to his coalition.
It is not difficult to determine why Morones vacillated on 
joining the P.N.R. Partly because of his hatred of Portes Gil, 
personal ambition, suspicions of Calles1 motives, lack of encouragement
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
171
Courtesy Emilio Portes Gil 
PRESIDENT EMILIO PORTES GIL
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from Calles, public opinion connecting cromistas with Obregon's 
murder, and reasons best known to himself, Morones and his CROM 
remained recalcitrant and aloof from the P.N.R.
If Morones made a bad choice when he failed to support Obregon, 
he showed equally poor judgment when he rejected Calles and his new 
political party. With such disadvantageous political thinking and 
illogical reasoning what followed was bitter evidence of Morones' 
miscalculations and error in failing to enter the party. The 
decision was of crucial importance since the future of CROM lay 
in a reproachement with Calles and Portes Gil. Morones blocked any 
possible reconciliation. Without foreseeing the consequences, 
Morones blundered and adopted a policy, the results of which were 
disastrous. Mexico had no traditionally defined place for a "loyal 
opposition" in her politics. The initial reaction was to suspect 
the opposition of disloyalty to the regime. The wisest plan would 
have been to foster the friendship of those in political positions 
of power in order to carry forward, or at least maintain, the gains 
already accomplished.
MORONES VS. PORTES GIL
With relations far from being harmonious, the open breach and 
direct confrontation between CROM and the recently installed Portes 
Gil government came in December, 1928. When the ninth annual CROM 
convention met in Mexico City on December b two plays were running 
there in Roberto Soto's Lxrico Theatre,Desmoronamiento and Segun tu
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Portes Gil. Soto, a noted actor, presented severe criticism in the 
form of a caricature of Morones on his finea at Tlalpan presiding 
over great bacchanales. One scene portrayed the labor gangster half 
nude, surrounded by prostitutes and high officials of the former 
government with Morones lifting a bottle to shout, "Long live the 
proletariat." CROM passed a resolution demanding that President 
Portes Gil end the performance because it might "excite the political 
passions of the moment, cause a dangerous disorder, and give origin 
to conflicts that should be avoided." Portes Gil refused, and 
since CROM had warned it would take the "necessary steps" if the 
President refused, Portes Gil arranged for protection by 150 
policemen. CROM then voted to abandon the Lxrico Theatre where 
it had held some of its meetings since they now considered it 
government property. They also voted that all CROM members holding 
positions of responsibility in the government should resign at once 
(an almost empty gesture because cromistas held few positions since 
the resignations of July). CROM retaliation also included withdrawing
"Dissolution," a pun of Morones’ name and "According to you, 
Portes Gil."
Blanco Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana, III, 72,
115; Portes Gil, Autobiografia de la Revolucion Mexicana, ^90.
^^El Universal, December 1 9, 1928; Emilio Portes Gil, interview 
Mexico City, July 26, 1968. In his message of refusal sent to CROM, 
Portes Gil denied that cromistas were being persecuted and that he 
used his presidential power to create hostilities against any 
organization. In rejecting their request to cancel the productions, 
he reiterated a statement made in his inaugural address that the 
right of criticism would be respected and protected by his adminis­
tration. Charles W. Hackett, "Labor Opposition to Portes Gil 
Government," Current History, XXIX (February, 1929)j 850.
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its delegates from the labor-employer conventions called by Portes
protests, Morones was being verbally attacked in the Chamber of
pretended to support and aid the workers and campesinos for
political ends. Senator Lauro G. Caloca, among others, termed
Morones "The Pig of the Revolution," and a slavemaster for whom
the workers lost a day of their .inonthly salaries to finance
Morones' cars and bacchanales.
Portes Gil opined that Morones has become his most bitter
1^ 0
enemy and that the labor leader began an "unjustified fight."
The verbal warfare began the weekend after Portes Gil assumed the
presidency when CROM met for its ninth annual convention. Morones
was elected CROM president on December 4 and a committee was
formed to invite former president Calles to address the group and
become CROM's honorary president. Calles attended the convention
and sat next to Morones uninformed that the latter would attack 
4l
Portes Gil, Upon being advised that a group of disturbers had 
threatened to invade the meeting, Morones militantly announced to 
his organization that if there were any violence against its
^Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 1385 Dulles, Yesterday 
in Mexico, 4ll.
^Emilio Portes Gil, interview, Mexico City, July 26, 1968; 
Autobiografia de la Revolucion Mexicana, 487.
39Gil to formulate a federal labor law. ^ While CROM made these
Deputies and Senate. Senator Antonio Valdez Ramirez referred to 
Morones, Trevino, and Lombardo Toledano as enemies of Obregon who
Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana, 114.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
175
members even by Portes Gil, the unions throughout Mexico would lay
42down their tools, refuse to work, and call a general strike.
Morones’ aggressive statement added to Portes Gil's anger and
annoyance. The primary objective should have been reconciliation
and cooler heads might have used restraint, but not Morones. He
boldly voiced his indignation. One explanation of his strategy is
that he resented the position in which he found himself, "had
neither patience nor self-control to await future events, and
43
acted without a well-thought-out plan.”
CROM DISINTEGRATION
Morones' political eclipse meant the disintegration of the
labor movement. His administration-backed organization had enjoyed
a monopoly, but now without it CROM lost its cohesiveness. Clank
describes the president's methods which accentuated CROM's depletion:
The police and military forces, so freely used 
by Morones in organizing for the C.R.O.M., were 
now used just as freely to destroy it; labor 
inspectors began to throw their influence 
against C.R.O.M. organizations and to create 
opposing groups. In difficulties with employers, 
unions were given to understand that they could 
be entirely successful if, first, they separated 
from the C.R.O.M. So great was the pressure 
that a number of unions asked the C.R.O.M. for 
permission to separate from it openly, although 
secretly retaining their membership, as one means 
of escaping the persecution of state and municipal 
officials. All the methods the C.R.O.M. had 
employed were now turned against it .44
TTew York Times, December 8 , 1928.
4^ ,
Clank, Organized Labor in Mexico, 141.
44
Ibid., 134.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
176
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CR
OM
 
MA
NI
FE
ST
AT
IO
N,
 
MA
Y 
1,
 
19
29
177
Portes Gil was able to use military force against Morones and
CROM partly because "tbe army had always been unfriendly to
I4.5
them." CROM leaders had used their power in government to attempt 
to absorb the railroad brotherhoods into CROM. They were unsuccess­
ful. They also failed to suppress the C.G.T., a more radical trade 
union. Portes Gil used both these groups, communists, and other 
movements to undermine Morones.
As relations between government leaders and CROM chieftains 
worsened, widespread dissatisfaction and long-felt antagonisms 
against Morones began to be expressed openly. The speed with 
which Morones* CROM had grown was matched by the rapidity with 
which it disintegrated. His organization was racked with one split 
after another, most of them fomented or encouraged by state 
governors or ministers of the national government in accord with 
the regime's overall policy to divide CROM. In a loosely knit 
labor organization and with the president's displeasure, Morones' 
sanctions against seceding labor organizations were largely ineffec­
tive. In the textile districts of Veracruz and Puebla CROM unions 
maintained themselves for years, but in the country as a whole the 
confederation shrank in size.
During its hegemony, CROM maintained censorship. Morones 
exercised his control over printers, linotypers, reporters, and 
other newspaper employees to establish a strictly enforced censor­
ship so .that no articles critical of CROM or its leadership appeared.
U5 *
Emilio Portes Gil in El Excelsior, December 10, 1928.
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The control was exercised most directly through the mechanical 
departments which held up any article, news item, or editorial 
the linotyper deemed objectionable, until it was passed upon by 
Eduardo Moneda, one of the leading CROM leaders, head of the Union 
de Linotipistas, Federacion de Artes Graficas, and of the govern­
ment print shops. Morones had arrogantly used his power, and the 
staffs of the large dailies were delighted to escape from his rule.
The reporters were the first to leave CROM unions. Emboldened by 
their results, they were followed by the workers in the government 
printing shops, and later by those in the commercial printing 
establishments, especially in the capital. In mid-December the 
Union of Newspaper Editors and Reporters withdrew, and on 
December lU charges of misappropriation of funds totaling more 
than 1,700,000 pesos by CROM executives were made by the Union
k6of Slaughterhouse Workers and given wide news coverage. Luis
Araiza writes of Morones that:
after his resignation and fall, his enemies 
departed from their previous cowardice and 
jumped like a pack of ravenous hounds and 
attacked the man that before they dare not 
face flinging insults, injury, or slander.^7
The completely changed status of CROM is evident by reading the
capitoline newspapers after July, 1928.
How could CROM gain independence from political ties? It had 
to become more self-supporting. This would have required an increased
^Hackett, "Labor Opposition to Portes Gil Government," 851.
1+7
Araiza, Historia del movjmiento obrero mexicano, III, IO9.
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ability or willingness of the members to pay dues, but a serious
consequence of CROM's fall from official favor was a depleted
treasury. No longer was the government willing to subsidize its
activities or contribute to its party's coffers. Levies upon
government employees' salaries now went, not to the P.L.M., but
to the P.N.R. This explanation for the lack of funds was read
before the CROM convention held in 1928:
.. .the unfortunate events of July, when the 
President-elect was assassinated, wrested 
from us some sources of cooperation... 
since...a large number of employees related 
to C.R.O.M... .all of whom had spontaneously 
offered their economic cooperation, can no 
longer be counted upon for support. ^8
For the first time in its history, it became important that union
dues be paid. Even in the Grupo Accion, Morones was the only
member in 1929 who was in a position to provide extensive financial
aid to CROM.^ 9
In 1930 Frank Tannenbaum addressed the Fifth Seminar of the 
Committee of Cultural Relations with Latin America in the Federal 
District and asserted:
*4-8
Archivo de la CROM, expediente 0/l*4l(000)/8. The privilege 
of collecting from government employees was carried to an extreme 
undreamed of by labor. Portes Gil, by a presidential decree issued 
just before he left office, declared that the salary of every 
government employee, from highest to lowest, was subject to a 
discount of one day's wage in every month of thirty-one days. The 
P.N.R. was derisively dubbed the "Party of the Thirty-one." Clark, 
Organized Labor in Mexico, 1*4-3.
^9Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 1*4-3.
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The interesting thing about the Mexican trade 
union movement is that it is not in any way a
personal movement. It is true that some
individuals like Mr. Morones have played 
important parts, hut it is not a movement 
depending on any one individual. This is 
significant.50
The now deceased Mexicanist stated further that Morones and 18 
others got together 10 or 15 years earlier and through every
crisis, even at the death of Obregon when it seemed as if every
individual of any importance in the trade union movement would 
he destroyed, when every pressure was exerted upon them to turn 
against the movement and force for themselves a place of prestige, 
that "not a single one turned traitor to the group." He then 
opined: "If Mr. Morones were to die or he killed, the CROM as
such would go on. This group has left behind an institution 
much larger and more enduring than any of the individuals involved. 
Subsequent events proved the astute observer's analysis to he 
basically correct.
FEDERAL LABOR LAW OF 1931
Article 123 of the Constitution, the expression of labor 
ideals, was framed in general terms and required an elaborate code 
for its concrete application. The federal government increased 
its legal control over the labor movement with the passage of the 
Federal Labor Law in August, 1931j when all the labor legislation
50
Frank Tannenbaum, "Significance of the Mexican Trade Union 
Movement," in The Genius of Mexico, ed. Hubert C. Herring and 
Katherine Terrill (New York, 1931), 186.
53Tbid.
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that had teen enacted by the various states was rescinded by the
promulgation of this national code for labor. The legislation
defined the rights and obligations of labor and management in
collective bargaining, aspects of labor contracts, and regularized
52
relations between management and labor. No Mexican worker, could 
be fired or laid off without "just cause." The worker was con­
sidered the owner of his job and compensation must be paid if it 
was taken from him.
Morones opposed the new code whose purpose, he claimed, was 
"to restrict labor’s rights and attract foreign capital to Mexico." 
Speaking before the Union de Empleados de Restaurants y Similares 
in Orizaba, Morones alleged that it was evidence of its authors' 
incapacity and incomprehension of the situation of fifteen million 
Mexicans "feeling the grasp of misery." To regulate Article 123 
in this method was a "backward step, unpatriotic, antirevolutionary, 
and beneficial to the patron class and capitalists. The government 
did not realize that the laborers during the depression were dis­
satisfied, but reasoned that the agitation was only due to leaders 
who wanted to take advantage of the situation and seek the limelight 
"they are not dealing with Morones but with a social class." He 
denied that CROM was an element causing confusion and disorder and
^‘TJnited States Department of Labor, Labor Legislation of 
Mexico, Bulletin No. 569 of the Foreign Labor Laws Series 
(Washington, 1932), 566-579 contains a sketch of the provisions.
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vaguely urged that '"by using cooperation and discipline, triumph 
will he ours."^3
As the world depression engulfed Mexico in the early 1930's, 
the masses demanded their right to strike which had been curtailed 
by Morones and Calles. Abelardo Rodriguez as Minister of Industry, 
Commerce, and Labor, urged workers not to strike in 1932. Realizing 
that he had to discover fresh arguments to prevent strikes, he 
abandoned Morones' worn-out contention that because union leaders 
held government posts the interests of the working class were pro­
tected without strikes:
...it is logical to infer that the strikes 
in communications services are bound to increase 
our ills considerably, because the distribution 
of products will be upset, raising the prices 
of transportation sometimes to a prohibitory 
level. Then...the rate of unemployment will 
increase, because the.. .communications are 
restricted, the small businessman, the indus­
trialist, the farmer, and so on, will paralyze 
their enterprises and many will remain jobless 
who at present fin£ in these activities their
daily sustenance.5^
Neither Ortiz Rubio, who left office without finishing his term, 
nor General Abelardo Rodriguez wfcio succeeded him, did much for the 
labor movement during their presidencies, and Morones' power con­
tinued to wane.
^3C.R.O.M., May 15, 1931, 31-36.
5k ,
Abelardo Rodriguez in El Nacional, July 7, 1932.
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"CROM WILL BOUNCE BACK"
Before tlie twelfth anniversary meeting of the founding of the
P.L.M. held in January, 1932, Morones refuted the charge that after
four years of "CROM persecution" the Labor Party was inactive. What
appeared inertia, he continued, was an avoidance of "ostentatious
movements" -which would hurt the P.L.M. He then warned that "it will
he no small surprise to P.L.M. enemies to see how CROM will bounce
back." Later that year, the Labor Party attempted a resumption of
political activity by running candidates for the Chamber of Deputies.
Morones was permitted a vote of only seventy-eight in his district,
which made excellent propaganda against CROM. So thoroughly did
the P.N.R. control the election that every pro-CROM vote cast was
55done at the risk of physical injury.
INCARCERATION
Morones* criticism of the authorities and his various actions 
brought him to jail only twice; both times were for brief periods.
After attending the Convention of the Syndicates of Workers and 
Campesinos of the State of Puebla, Morones visited Colima,
Manzanillo, and Guadalajara before proceeding to Mazatlan where a 
meeting of cromistas was to be held. The l6th of August he left 
for Los Mochis, Sinaloa to investigate a labor conflict in the 
United Sugar Companies. Around midnight of August 17, 1932, Jacobo 
Holguin, Chief of Police of Los Mochis, arrested Morones for "spreading
55Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 146-1^7.
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subversive propaganda," specifically for supposed attacks on the 
army and government of the State of Sinaloa. This action 
followed Morones' speech that night in which he had energetically 
condemned United Sugar Companies * policies.
According to CROM headquarters, "many” accompanied Morones
to the jail desiring to he detained with him, and "crowds" of
synpathizers spent two days and nights outside the municipal jail
protesting the "unjust" arrest of their incarcerated chief. Arobal
Ocaya Payan, a CROM lawyer in Mexico City, flew to Morones1 aid on
the 19th. That night Morones was released, and wired CROM offices
in the capital that he had "energetically and clearly answered
numerous accusations before the Ministerio Publico y Procurador de 
57Justicia. During his brief stay in Hermosillo, Morones discussed 
labor problems in general, and cromista difficulties in particular 
with the state governor. He completed his tour speaking in Mexicali, 
Tecate, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juarez on August 28. He returned to 
Mexico City, where "fireworks" began within CROM in September.
CROM SPLITS OP 1932
The heterogenity of memberships that produces conflict in 
organizations is particularly striking in labor movements. It 
produces lines of cleavage around which struggles often rage with 
large degrees of intensity. In 1932, two new splits proved CROM's
^C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1928-1932, 558; New York Times, August 20, 
21, 1932.
57"La comision de la C.R.O.M. que encabeza el companero Luis N. 
Morones llego a la Ciudad de Mexico, despues de un resonado triunfo," 
C.R.O.M., September 15, 1932, *+7; C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1928-1932, 558.
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coalition unworkable. Alfredo Perez Medina had been a CROM "problem 
child" for a long time. Members of the Grupo Accion claim Obregon 
had earlier offered him a "considerable sum" to withdraw the Federal 
Districts unions from CROM. In December, 1931, the Grupo Accion 
tried one last desperate expedient to rid themselves of Perez 
Medina, but to retain control of these unions. They finally ex­
pelled Perez Medina on flimsy charges CROM had passed a motion in 
December, 1928 that all its members must withdraw from government 
administrative positions, and Perez Medina had continued his position 
in the Executive Council of the Rational Bank until December, 1931 
without protest. The official reasons for the expulsion were his 
"abusing" his position of secretary general of the Federacion de
Sindicatos Obreros del Distrito Federal and for his "having been
58converted into an agent of capitalism." The true explanation was 
that the Grupo Accion had long been eager to drive Perez Medina 
from CROM, but hoped to do so without subsequent loss of membership. 
When he refused to recognize the sentence of suspension, CROM 
expelled him, and with him went almost every important CROM union 
in the Federal District.
Instead of Perez Medina and his followers admitting they were 
outside of CROM, on the contrary, they claimed they were the CROM 
in the Federal District. Previous to this occurrence, Morones'
CROM had been content with a modest sign on its offices at Calle
crQ
"Discurso del companero Luis N. Morones pronunciado en el 
Teatro Lirico de la Ciudad de Mexico," C.R.O.M., May 15, 1933, 28.
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Republica de Cuba #60. No sooner was the separation accomplished
than a huge painted canvas sign was hung, announcing "C.R.O.M."
59to he replaced by an electric sign of the same nature. ^
The other important secession in 1932 was led by Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano, a relatively important leader of CROM since his 
entrance. In 1928, Lombardo had unsuccessfully proposed the dis­
solution of the P.L.M., the corrupted political arm of CROM. In 
March, 1932, Morones returned from a trip to Europe and CROM held 
a big public meeting to receive him. To his surprise, Morones was 
greeted by boos, hisses, and shouts of derision from the hostile 
Lombardo Toledano faction. Partly as a result of this incident 
there was ill-feeling between the two leaders. Lombardo planned 
to take over CROM in its next convention to be held in late 1932, 
but was defeated in the election for secretary general. In 
September, 1932, Lombardo was the principal speaker at a workers’ 
conference and launched a sizzling attack against the army.
Following him on the platform, Morones repudiated Lombardo's remarks
concerning the military, accused him of propagating foreign ideas,
6o
and of betraying the Revolution. Toledano, having his policies 
publicly repudiated, resigned from CROM's central committee the 
next day on tactical and ideological grounds. The following is 
a segment of Lombardo's letter of resignation:
^Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 262-268.
go  ^ ^
Lombardo Toledano, Teoria y praetica, 6 3.
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Companero Morones is against the ideology that 
I have sustained because he thinks it is a 
radical one and harmful to the labor organiza­
tion. He has stated that the organization 
cannot maintain an advanced doctrinary program 
nor establish itself as a permanent censor of 
the state and its government and, at the same 
time, call upon the government to solve its 
problems, as I have been constantly doing. He 
has stated that the labor organization cannot 
hope for its salvation as a social class but 
instead must work for the improvement of 
living conditions of all social classes, and 
that one must not dream of utopias like inter­
nationalism.
These assertions, among others, were made 
as a criticism of my speech, and the manner in 
which they were emphasized suggests, according 
to my interpretations...that my presence in the 
CROM is a hindrance to Companero Morones in his 
present dealings with the government, which 
consist of, in his own words, offering anew 
his cooperation to the government....
I am an enemy of the bourgeois regime and 
often I am against the government, yet I have 
friends among government officials, and I make 
appointments with all of them to ask for strict 
observance of the law and for the protection of 
the working class...
I will thus continue being a radical 
Marxist, even though not a Communist....1 will 
continue being an internationalist and shall 
fight against a chauvinistic nationalism and in 
sum will continue fighting for the advent of a 
better life, having liquidated first the current 
bourgeois system.6l
Not only was this resignation accepted, but CROM leadership
expelled him from the labor organization.
Lombardo’s expulsion robbed CROM of one of its more forceful 
and dynamic spokesmen. By capturing some of the old CROM unions
Leafar Agetro, Las luchas proletarias de Veracruz (Jalapa, 
19^2), 197-200 in James W. Wilkie and Albert L. Michaels, eds.; 
Revolution in Mexico: Years of Upheaval, 1910-19^0 (New York, 1969)5
18U-I85.
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and by organizing new ones, Lombardo created the C.G.O.C.M. or 
Confederacion General de Obreros y Campesinos. A number of his 
associates, who had received their training under Morones, were 
still open to bribery; but the new organization was considerably 
superior to CROM in both honesty and in theoretical foundation. 
CROM's influence dwindled to controlling the textile industry in 
Puebla and Veracruz, an area where workers had a longer trade- 
union tradition, especially with CROM. As a result of the 1932 
secessions, the Mexican labor movement of the early 1930’s was 
factionalized.
COMPARISON OF LOMBARDO TOLEDANO AND MORONES 
Lombardo Toledano was a contrast to Morones. Morones was a 
laborer risen from the ranks, Lombardo came from a background of 
wealth and privilege; Morones was a man of action with little 
formal education and a limited intelligence; Lombardo was an 
intellectual from the -universities and an author with a broad 
philosophical background who wrote from a knowledge of theory, laws, 
and ethics; Morones was fat, gross, and ostentatious; Lombardo was 
thin, rather short and reserved; Morones put primary emphasis on 
building labor unions as political weapons; Lombardo thought 
economic weapons were more important; Morones formed his own 
political party, Lombardo did not; Morones told the workers to put 
national development before social gain; Lombardo rejected this 
priority and admonished the workers to fight for present improvement.
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Both, were fiery speakers and ambitious men.
According to one Cuban labor lawyer, Lombardo "era un 
orador de primer orden." Fernnn Humberto Arrieta, interview, 
Hattiesburg, Mississippi, November l4, 1970. Dr. Arrieta beard 
Lombardo address a meeting of the Cuban Federation of Workers 
in Havana in the 19^0's.
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CHAPTER IX
MOSQUES' DECLINE UNDER CARDENAS, I93U-UO
By 1933 s Mexico was tired of callismo. Catholics were 
desperate; campesinos feared they would never own the land that 
had been promised them, and workers were chafing under Morones' 
diminishing labor dictatorship and his moratorium on strikes. On 
Calles' advice, the P.N.R. convention adopted the Six-Year Plan 
as its platform. The plan was designed to advance the proletarian 
cause, solve the agrarian problem, reorganize the national economy, 
conduct a vast system of public works, and install better education 
in the schools. General Lazaro Cardenas was selected to sell this 
fantastic piece of demagogy to the Mexican people.
The P.L.M. celebrated its eighth convention in the Capitolio 
Theater in Mexico City, June 9~H> 1930* Following Morones' and 
Celestino Gasca's farcical nomination as the party's presidential 
candidates, Morones stated it was an "inopportune time" to launch 
a Laborite's candidacy. Other nominees were Cardenas of Michoacan, 
and Colonel Adalberto Tejeda, ex-governor of Veracruz. Numerous 
delegates were from Veracruz and there was much enthusiasm for the 
veracruzano until cromista Sabino Calderon delivered a sensational 
speech accusing Tejeda and Lombardo of having sought to use the 
P.L.M. and CROM for personal ends; and censured Tejeda for "having 
served capitalist classes when he occupied high office." Cardenas 
then won the nomination 765“22.
191
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Cardenas, invited "by Morones, addressed the convention. Two 
months later Cardenas was invited to attend another P.L.M. rally on 
September 29- Morones, addressing the group in Orizaba's Llave 
Theater, informed the presidential aspirant that "We have always 
considered you, Mr. Cardenas as a sincere and sane element, a 
promise, a new hope."'*' Cardenas, in his acceptance speech, stated 
he would revamp the economy so that Mexico would have a new orien­
tation to benefit the working class.
Cardenas was a dark horse who had fought in the revolutionary 
ranks and as governor of Michoacan had earned a reputation for 
building schools and enforcing the land laws. Calles was careful 
not to allow him too much latitude and Cardenas ’ first cabinet was 
filled with callistas in key positions. When Cardenas was inaugurated 
on December 1, 193^» be realized that he was considered as Calles' 
instrument, and immediately set out to create a personality for 
himself independent of Calles. He believed in the P.R.R. program 
of paper promises and immediately began giving Mexicans some of 
the things which Calles had only promised them. To attract the 
peons, Cardenas offered land, not only to the villages in the form 
of e.iidos, the former practice of the Revolution, but to individuals 
as well. He carried on a well-planned campaign to gain the army's 
confidence, placing military chieftains loyal to him in command of 
strategic zones.
'*'"Velada en honor del Gral, de Div. Lazaro Cardenas candidato 
del Partido Laborista Mexicano, efectuada en al Teatro Llave de 
Orizaba, Ver., patrocinada por el Partido Veracruzano del Trabajo," 
C.R.O.M., supplement no. 225, 21.
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CARDENAS' LABOR POLICY 
Cardenas was clever enough to win the loyalty of the peasants, 
army, and workers. To attract this last group, he encouraged 
organization and strikes. Labor renewed its militancy and the 
1930's became turbulent years for Mexico as strikes began through­
out the country. In 1930 there were fifteen involving approximately
If, 000 workers, in 193^ the strike total rose to 202 involving
2
li+,685 workers, and by 1935 there were 6b2 strikes.
With his advent to power, Cardenas became interested in 
unifying the labor movement which had been splintered earlier. At 
first skeptical of Cardenas because he was the hand-picked candidate 
of Calles' oligarchy, the Lombardo Toledano unions rallied to 
Cardenas' support when he broke with Calles. Lombardo began nego­
tiations with other labor leaders to merge into a single powerful 
confederation to fill the vacuum created by CROM's fall. The 
founding meeting of the new labor organization was held in Mexico 
City and all existing major labor groups, except Morones' CROM, 
sent delegates. The Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico 
(C.T.M.— Confederation of Mexican Workers) emerged from this 
conference. C.T.M. had a class struggle orientation, its original 
motto was "For a society without classes." Although Lombardo held 
no governmental position, he ran a bigger, smoother-working monopoly
^Secretarxa de la Economfa Nacional, Anuario estadxstico de los 
Estados Mexicanos, 19^ -0 (Mexico, D.F. 19^ -0), 376. After the election 
of 193^, CROM tried to persuade the new president of its good inten­
tions and at the same time convince bim of the "sinister" character 
of its principal enemy, Lombardo Toledano.
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than did Morones. The C.T.M. was favored with grants of money, 
guarantees of union activity, and persecution of its enemies —  
these were favors and obstacles which Morones could not overcome. 
Cardenas accelerated his attacks on Calles and Morones by encouraging 
all anti-CROM labor elements, including communists, to seek political 
shelter under the P.N.R. roof. Larger in size and political power 
than when Morones and Calles were "siamese twins,” the C.T.M. 
became one of Cardenas' pillars of support. Although Cardenas 
supported the C.T.M., conditions were never convenient to crush 
CROM as' well as some other unions and state federations which 
remained outside the C.T.M. Thus, in the case of CROM at an 
earlier date, the ideal of a single confederation acting as a 
spokesman for the whole labor movement was not realized in spite 
of overt government support. The story of labor in the late 1930's 
was essentially the story of C.T.M. expansion.
One notes a change in Lombardo's tactics. From 1923 to 1932 
when he was in CROM he maintained a strict trade-unionist point of 
view, insisting that the labor unions should function primarily as 
economic organizations for defense of their rights against employers. 
Following his break with Morones who disagreed with this viewpoint 
and before the formation of the C.T.M., Lombardo moved toward a 
position in which he considered the role of trade unions being 
political as well as economic.
Morones selected Lombardo and other opposition leaders as his 
"whipping boys" and often lashed out at them during CROM meetings. 
Frequent targets were the "Five Little Wolves" who deserted Morones
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
195
in the 1930's and ultimately monopolized the top C.T.M. offices: 
Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Fidel Velazquez, Fernando Amilpa, Alfonso 
Sanchez Madariaga, and Jesus Yuren.
Labor questions became increasingly complex —  characterized 
by conflicts between employers and employees and bitter feuds 
between rival groups of labor. Relations between the C.T.M. and 
CROM rapidly became hostile. In 1935 and 1936, seventy-two workers 
were murdered in inter-union wars in the Atlixco textile region.
Soon after the June, 1935 crisis between Calles and Cardenas, 
cromistas renewed their attacks with riots, train wrecks, and other 
violent disturbances of the peace.
In July, 1935, Morones journeyed to Washington to confer with 
A.F.L. leaders. He went to obtain future cooperation between CROM 
andtheA.F.L.; this, he believed, was the remedy for exploitation 
of Mexican workers in the United States. He said in English, with 
a heavy Spanish accent, "every Mexican insufficiently paid in the 
Southwest or West signifies a U.S. citizen insufficiently paid or
O
idle." He spent the major part of July 6 with Harvey Flemming, 
President of the International Association of Workers of Oilfields, 
Wells, Gas and Refineries. On July 12, Morones made a brief speech 
praising Gompers for his cooperation lent to Latin America and laid 
a floral offering at his statue at the intersection of 10th Street 
and Massachusetts Avenue. John P. Frey, Santiago Iglesias, William
•3
^C.R.O.M., August 1, 1935> 31* Morones very seldom spoke xn 
English.
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Green, Frank Morrison, Philip Murray, and John L. Lewis, President of 
the Miner’s Union were a few of the A.F;L. officials there with 
Morones.**
Morones, who was in the United States, was not encouraged to 
attend the twelfth CROM convention July 23-26, 1935. With the 
disintegration of Calles ’ political machine in Mexico, the prestige 
of his henchman, Morones, fell considerably in labor circles, and 
even within his own CROM. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
this convention gave only a luke-warm response to Morones' San 
Antonio telegram which "hinted" for a welcoming gesture from the 
Grupo Accion that he end his trip in the American republic.
Relations between Calles and Cardenas worsened. On Calles' 
instructions, Morones organized CROM strikes in Veracruz, Tlaxcala, 
and Puebla against "communist activities," a term used by leading 
cromistas in reference to the labor agitation permitted by Cardenas. 
The growing uneasiness increased a few days later on Friday,
December 13, 1935j when a tri-motor plane returning from Los 
Angeles landed at Mexico City's Balbuena Airport. The aircraft 
which brought Morones and Calles, who had stayed a few months in 
Los Angeles "for health purposes," had stopped at Hermosillo, 
Mazatlan, and Guadalajara, but neither had left the plane. Unexpect­
edly they had returned to Mexico. Those who welcomed Calles as he 
followed Morones out of the plane included Senator Manuel Riva
4
Ibid.
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Palacio (Mexico), Senator Bernardo Bandala (Puebla), Senator 
Francisco L. Terminel (Sonora), Rodolfo Elias Calles, Juan de Dios
A car took Calles, Morones, Mange, and Fernando Torreblanca 
to Calles' residence -where the ex-president was greeted by old
appeared that Calles had nothing to say except that he had returned 
"to reside definitely in his country." Later that evening he issued 
a strongly worded press statement which said that he had come to 
defend the callista regime from the slanders of which he had been 
the "victim" for the past six months.
Calles' arrival, accompanied by Morones, aroused a storm of 
protest. Illustrative of this uneasiness were the 80,000 workers 
who paraded before the National Palace on December 22 demanding 
expulsion. "Out with Calles and Morones" was the keynote of the 
day. In the halls of the Senate, students agitated against their 
presence in the country. Portes Gil publicly declared, "I consider 
that the gravest error Calles has committed in his life is to have 
returned and above all accompanied by Luis N. Morones."
^Portes Gil, Autobiografia de la Revolucion Mexicana, 701; 
Eduardo J. Correa, El balance del cardenismo (Mejico, D.F., 19^1), 97.
Bojorquez, Bartolome Vargas Lugo, Ricardo Trevino (CROM secretary 
general), Jose Lopez Cortes, General Manuel Medinaveytia (Chief 
of Operations in the Valley of Mexico), and General Alejandro Mange.^
friends, among whom were General Jose Maria Tap£a and General 
Joaquin Amaro, Director of the Military College. At first it
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The political teapot began to boil more furiously than ever 
in the four months following Calles * and Morones * return. The 
situation assumed graver overtones when all officials who had 
welcomed Calles found themselves out of office. Senators Riva 
Palacio, Terminel, Bandala, Elfas Perez Gomez (Morelos), and 
Cristobal Bustamente (Sinaloa); ten members of the Chamber of 
Deputies, and the governors of Sonora (Ramon Ramos), Sinaloa 
(Manuel Paez), Guanajuato (Jesus Yanez Maya), and Durango (Carlos 
Real), were expelled for "treason to the revolutionary program and
■7
conspiring against the country's institutions."
CACHE OF ARMS
On December 18, the Mexican Senate convened as a grand jury 
and indicted Morones for sedition and incitement to rebellion.
Mexico City seethed with excitement and two days later the public 
was treated to another sensation when the Chief of Police announced 
the discovery of a cache of aims, machine guns, rifles, and ammuni­
tion in two of Morones' houses on December 20. At midnight, a 
policeman had noticed two men carrying large suitcases in the street. 
The late hour and the location made him suspicious of their actions. 
The officer halted the pair, forced them to open the luggage bearing 
the initials "L.M." and found four machine guns and ammunition. Upon 
being arrested, the men claimed they were "offered 50 pesos each for 
carrying the bags two blocks by a man who said he was a member of
Ibid., December 15, 1935; The Times (London), December 20, 
1935; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 661.
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the army." Both men were from Orizaba, and police found each had 
a return ticket to that Veracruz town. Entering two of Morones' 
properties, the Chief of Police discovered nine Thompson machine
g
guns, approximately sixty 30-30 mausers, and 13 ,000 cartridges.
Morones was summoned by the authorities, but waited almost
a week to respond to their call. On Christmas Eve, Morones appeared
before the Attorney General accompanied by Reynaldo Cervantes
Torres and Anxbal Ocana Payan, the same lawyer who had aided him
in Los Mochis three years earlier. Explaining his position,
Morones testified that the arms and ammunition had been there
since 1923 and were acquired with Obregon's permission. These
were to be used to arm laborers during the de la Huerta rebellion.
His evidence consisted of documents revealing that the weapons
were acquired by the Mexican Consul in New York with the official
9
authorization and intervention of the Secretary of War and Navy. 
Morones asserted it was impossible that one person constitute "a 
rebellion" and "it is infantile to believe we are going to start a 
revolution with such old and inservicable arms."
Morones' testimony left many questions unanswered. He alleged 
that the arms were to be used for self-defense against the "imminent
8 *
El Excelsior, December 21, 1935; New York Times, December 21, 
1935; photograph in La Prensa photo archives.
%EL_ Excelsior, December 25, 1935; El Universal, December 25, 
1935; Hew York Times. December 27, 1935; Casasola, Historia grafica 
de la Revolucion Mexicana, III, 2202; "El c. Luis N. Morones, explica 
el origen de las armas que se ehcontraron en su poder," „C.R.Q.M., 
supplement no. 273 3 28; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 66b.
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invasion” of Lombardo-communists •who were going to assault "various 
CROM offices and buildings." He further stated that neither Calles 
nor other cromistas knew of the weapons.1^ If Morones was expecting 
an "invasion" why would he wish to conceal the possession of the 
weapons from the persons and property he wished to defend? Further­
more, how effective would "old and inservicable" weapons be to repel 
invading armed cetemistas? The January 1» 1936 issue of C.R.O.M. 
availed itself of the opportunity to declare its organization had 
helped boost Cardenas to power, and had never opposed any of his 
principles.
EXPULSION OF CELESTINO GASCA
The CROM national council met in early January to treat matters 
pertinent to CROM. One important item on the agenda was the organ's 
constituting itself as a grand jury to hear Celestino Gasca defend 
comments he had published in El Dia on December 29, 1935- Following 
Gasca's 3i> hour defense, he was found guilty and expelled from CROM. 
Allegedly he was ejected because the charges he made against Morones 
and the central committee were "inopportune, anti-syndical, and 
pernicious for CROM."11 The "Old Guard" continued to disintegrate.
1<^ For additional information of the arms incident see: New York
Times, December 21, 25, 27, 1935; Josephus Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve 
Diplomat (Chapel Hill, 19U7), 62, and Casasola, Historia grafica de 
la Revolucion Mexicana, III, 2202.
^"El c. Celestino Gasca expulsado de la C.R.O.M.." C.R.QiM., 
January 15, 1936, 9*
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"CRIME WITHOUT PRECEDENT"
In April, 1936, the people of the State of Veracruz were 
agitated. For one reason a gubernatorial election campaign was 
in progress in which early prominent candidates were Colonel Eduardo 
Hernandez Chazaro, the former secretary of President Ortiz Rubio; 
and Deputy Manlio Fabio Altamirano, a former manager of the P.N.R.'s 
El Nacional. This campaign saw the assassination of Altamirano in 
June, and in August, the election of Licenciado Miguel Aleman who 
became a strong candidate late in the campaign after the slaying. 
Veracruz in April was also the scene of conflicts between Morones'
CROM and Lombardo's recently-founded C.T.M. At Orizaba, CROM called
- 12 a strike which President Cardenas declared to be unjustified.
The Veracruz incidents were further complicated in April,
when the British-operated Ferrocarril Mexicano's night train from
the port of Veracruz to Mexico City took on an oil-burning locomotive
at Paseo del Macho and began to wind its way through the rugged
uplands toward the capital. At 9:10 P.M., when the train had
rumbled half way across Paso Grande Bridge two hours out of
Veracruz, a dynamite explosion slapped the locomotive and tender
against the bank of a forty foot ravine and hurled two sleeping
I*
cars to the ravine's bottom. The other coaches, which had not 
reached the trestle remained on the rails, but the wreckage was
12E1 Universal, April 8 , 1936; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico,
67^ -675.
•^ El Universal, April 7, 1936; El Excelsior, April 7, 1936;
The Times (London), April 8 , 1936; "Bomb at Bridge," Time, April 20,
1936, 66.
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engulfed "by the flames which hurst forth from the oil tank car.
Thirteen persons died and eighteen were injured in this "crime
lUwithout precedent." Government investigators discovered two 
hundred yards of double wire leading from the bridge to a detonator, 
and several passengers testified they had heard a rifle shot,
"obviously" a signal to detonate the dynamite, before the explosion.^ 
Calles' and Cardenas' problems apparently came to a head with 
this startling incident since a contingent of Cardenas' politicians 
were passengers on the sabotaged train. Thus, one motive was 
furnished by the presence on the trains of politicians among whom 
were the three candidates of the P.N.R. in the primary elections for 
the governorship of Veracruz held the previous week. These were 
Colonel Eduardo Hernandez Chazaro, Ochoa Zamudio, and Guillermo 
Padilla. Hernandez Chazaro spoke with Cardenas about the event, 
and was convinced that his own enemies had done the bombing.
Despite the fact that there was a large amount of money aboard the 
express car, government officials disregarded robbery as a pretext.
For example, Senator Ernesto Soto F.eyes, President of the Left Wing 
bloc in the Senate, denied that robbery was the motive, and declared 
"the outrage of dynamiting was the work of some politicians." This 
was part of an. accusation issued on April 9s 1936 by the Left Wing in
^ El Universal, April 8 , 1936.
•^Ibld.
El Excelsior, April 10, 1936.
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connection -with the Paso Grande dynamiting: "It concerns a diabolic
maneuver by a political sector recently displaced from the Administra- 
17tion." This assertion cast doubt on Calles and discredited Morones
and other cromistas ■who were suspected of having masterminded the
catastrophe. The C.T.M. also issued a strong protest, accusing
various individuals of trying to cause uneasiness and strife:
The reactionary elements, the most intransigent 
capitans of the bourgeois, politicians already 
liquidated before history, and a group of dis­
honest labor leaders have in recent weeks 
increased their counter-revolutionary work and 
have sought to cause various sorts of upsets in 
the normal progress of the country.18
Despite various allegations of Morones* guilt, no concrete evidence
substantiated these charges. On the same day that the Left Wing
announced its censure, Police Chief Vicente Gonzalez, complying with
orders "from the top," instructed Lorenzo Diaz Gongalez, acting head
of the Safety Commission, to place Calles, Morones, Luis Leon, and
Melehor Ortega under guard. Suspected of complicity in the crime,
19they were to be thrown out of the country. One historian made 
the comment: "All great men have had in their hour of decline some
fEl Universal, April 10, 1936; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 
675* One member of the Left Wing was Damaso Cardenas, brother of 
the Mexican president.
18
Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 675*
19Ibid. Morones* widow, son, and personal secretary assert 
that Morones was not involved in the tragedy. Emilio Portes Gil, 
Alfonso Sanchez Madariaga, and Agustin Zapata Casasola in their 
interviews declared that any claim that Morones was the intellectual 
author of the railway disaster is pure hearsay and cannot be proven.
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weakness, disease, or fault. Napoleon had cancer. Calles had 
.,20Morones.
EXILED
The Mexican Chief Executive publicly demonstrated his political 
independence that same week when he forcibly exiled the "iron man" 
who had governed Mexico as unofficial dictator since 1924. The 
process was rapid and secret. One day the "Supreme Chief of the 
Revolution" and his former strong-arm man, Morones, found themselves 
unceremoniously dumped across the U.S. border. Calles' forced exit 
demonstrated graphicly to anyone who might need further convincing 
that President Cardenas was master of the political situation. 
Unequivocally, but peacefully, Cardenas proved his political inde­
pendence and supremacy.
The surprise began when General Rafael Navarro, Chief of 
Operations in the Valley of Mexico, accompanied by twenty soldiers 
of the Nineteenth Infantry Regiment and eight policemen went to 
Calles* home at midnight of April 9» 1936. The ex-president was 
in his bedroom reading Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf when the authorities 
entered. Calmly Calles stated, "At your orders, gentlemen." "By 
orders of the President you are arrested," Navarro replied solemnly, 
"and will leave the country at 7:00 A.M." Calles removed the bed­
covers, put on his slippers, stood, and stated: "I am your prisoner.
20 *  *Blanco Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana, III, 11.
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I have no forces at my command nor do I need them. You may put me
21on the airplane or "before a firing squad."
Earlier that day Morones was apprehended at 2:00 P.M. when
he arrived at his residence on Avenida Insurgentes -where his car
was "curbed" by a detective. After being informed that Police Chief
Gongalez wished to speak with him and that he must leave his vehicle
to ride in the detective’s, Morones turned pale. Perhaps visions of
the "last ride" passed through Morones’ mind. Upon surrendering the
small "Star" pistol which he carried in his coat pocket, Morones gave
the officer a 50 peso bill as a mordida (bribe) requesting that CROM
offices and his wife be informed. Attempting a bit of psychology
22Morones confided, "No one will know I offered you the money."
The detective refused the bribe, but accepted the weapon.
Morones protested his arrest and detention at Police Head­
quarters. He was taken to a cell in the Sixth Commissariat, but 
objected stating he was no bandit and was undeserving of such "a 
sinister place." He spent a sleepless night, frequently knocking at 
the metal door with the hope of easing his predicament.
General Rafael Melchor Ortega, ex-governor of Guanajuato, was 
arrested in Tehuacan, Puebla. Like Morones he was disarmed and 
placed in a Sixth Commissariat cell.
p~]  ^ ^
Carlos Alvear Acevedo, Lazaro Cardenas: el hombre y el mito
(Mexico, 3.P., 196l),131.
^^El Universal, April 11, 1936; El Excelsior, April 11, 1936; 
Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 677.
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Luis Leon, Calles' ex-minister of Agriculture, was arrested
at 6:00 P.M. after leaving his palatial home in Chapultepec Heights.
Leon's detention, like that of the others, was secret, rapid, and
23
accomplished without difficulty.
The following morning Calles was taken to Balbuena Airport 
■where to his surprise he found Morones, Leon, and Melchor Ortega
2hwho had teen conveyed from their cells at 6:00 A.M. The 5o year- 
old Calles was silent during the boarding procedure, and the forced 
departure from Mexico occurred on Good Friday in a trimotor plane 
of the Mexican Airlines. During refueling in Tampico, the exiles 
merely looked out the windows and were forbidden to leave the 
aircraft.
Josephus Daniels, the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City, received
a telephone call at 8:30 A.M. from Eduardo Hay, Mexican Minister
of Foreign Relations, stating apologetically that an airplane
containing Calles and others was bound for Brownsville. The
exiles, Hay explained, "Had not had time" to obtain a visa. Could
the Ambassador arrange for the Calles party to enter the U.S. as
political refugees? Daniels telephoned Washington, and arrangements
were made for the ex-president and his cronies to land in the south
25
Texas town "as visitors to the U.S." They arrived at Brownsville 
at 1:50 P.M. and were "escorted" across the bridge by six heavily
2k
El Universal, April 11, 1936.
25
Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat, 6 3; El Universal, April 12, 
1956; Townshend, Lazaro Cardenas, 136; Johnson, Heroic Mexico, b l6 .
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armed officers. All were fortunate in their punishment; the
earlier fate of losers in Mexican politics had been lengthy
/
imprisonment or death.
In Brownsville,General Calles was asked by a New York Times 
correspondent the reasons for his expulsion from Mexico. The 
following is part of a dispatch attributing the ejection to his 
opposition against communism. He and his three companions signed 
it:
General Calles states that the only responsibility 
for this situation lies with the government itself, 
which, for more than a year, has been developing a 
demogogic policy and has been attempting to implant 
communism. We have done all in our power as citizens 
to combat this tendency without violating the law.
The expulsion of the labor leader Morones is 
due to the wish of the government to destroy the 
Regional Confederation of Labor (CROM) ■which does 
not wish to capitulate to the Communist labor organiza­
tion that supports the government and is headed by 
Lombardo Toledano.
The desire of the government, whatever declarations 
it may make to the contrary, is to socialize the machin­
ery of production, disregarding the private property 
rights that guarantee our institutions, and to establish 
a collective system in agriculture similar to the Russian 
system.
We repudiate communism, as we consider it not 
adaptable to our country and because the Mexican 
people refuse to accept it.^7
President Cardenas justified the deportation by declaring that 
the conditions of the country demanded it. In response to Calles' 
statement, Cardenas issued a manifesto which was widely circulated 
to his startled nation the following day:
26
El Universal, April 11, 1936; El Excelsior, April 11, 1936. 
^New York Times, April 11, 1936.
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I desire to depart from the lamentable precedents 
■which exist in the history of our bitter political 
struggles and in -which frequently little value has 
been placed on the principle of respect for human 
life. Therefore I consider the circumstances 
demanded, as. imperative for the public welfare, 
the immediate departure from national territory of 
General Plutarco Elias Calles...Luis Morones...Luis 
Leon. ..and General Rafael Melchor Ortega.28
At one blow, Calles, leader of the consertative revolution, and
Morones, c h ie f ta in  o f the CROM corporations of syndicates of
Mexican labor and the major remaining barrier to Lombardo's
ambition to rule as undisputed dictator, were removed.
The plane left Brownsville, stopped in San Antonio, then left
for D a lla s where Calles spent Friday night with his entourage. In
San Antonio Calles stated,"...! had nothing to do with the bombing
of the Veracruz train. If the government had thought so they would
29
have executed me, not exiled me." Calles was met at Los Angeles 
by his son-in-law, Fernando Torreblanca. Morones, the CROM leader 
who had been instrumental in shaping labor policy for Obregon and 
Calles, went to San Diego with Melchor Ortega where he spent a short 
time before leaving for New York City. Morones' organization asserted 
that the government deported him without previous investigations of
the train derailing and without clarifying the true public respon-
30
sibility of the incident.
pQ
El Universal, April 12, 1936.
^"Mexico: solution without blood," Time, April 20, 1936, 25.
^°"Reparacion justiciera, " C.R.O.M., April 1, 1937, 5*
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Calles' son-in-law called Senora Morones telling her of her
husband's presence in California. Several weeks later she and
Luis Enrique joined Morones in New York City. Morones lived from
31funds his family sent him during his exile. According to his son,
Morones lived on Riverside Drive in Manhattan, and met expenses by
mortgaging one of their Mexican homes and selling various possessions
such as furniture and rugs.
Although Morones spoke and understood very little English
he was very interested in daily activities of American life. He
was an ardent New York Yankee fan and attended many of their home
games, ate hotdogs (more than hamburgers), and enjoyed riding the
roller coaster at Coney Island. A man of varied interests,Morones
could enjoy watching sports one day then attend the Metropolitan 
oo
Opera the next.'’
Daily activities, however, were not merely confined to hotdogs 
and the New York Yankees. Morones participated in A.F.L. matters.
Two weeks after Morones’ expulsion from Mexico he conferred with 
William Green and presented a report on the "serious conditions" of 
Mexican affairs. According to Green, "Brother Morones was expelled 
from Mexico and driven into exile. He was not accorded a trial by 
a jury of his peers nor was he permitted to face his accusers." Green 
continued, alleging that "Thirty-nine leaders of the Mexican Federation
Jose Petrieioli, interview, Mexico City, June 25, 196 8;
Berta Pena Yiuda de Morones, interview, Mexico City, August 2b ,
1968.
32Luis Enrique Morones Pe’Ba, interview, Mexico City, August 2b ,
1968.
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are in prison there, not because they committed crimes against the 
government but simply because they are known to be labor leaders."
The A.F.L. president ended by saying, "All of this is shocking to 
the sense of justice and fair play so universally held by the officers 
and members of organized labor in the United States." This naive 
statement reveals that Green knew little of previous Mexican history 
and "Mexican justice." Could American "fair play" be applied in 
Mexico? Green had a simple and uncritical criterion for accepting
Morones' report as official and unbiased. The gullible president's
reasoning was why should he not accept Morones' report, "It was 
submitted through labor channels."
CROM and C.T.M. hostility continued and the latter sent a 
telegram to the convention of International Oil Workers meeting in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma on June 1. The C.T.M. objected to Morones' and
Calles' attacks on the Cardenas government made at that conference.
Their communique stated that Morones and Calles were expelled from 
Mexico "for labors tending to repress the just demands of the 
workers" and for attempting "to establish a Fascist regime." The 
new Mexican confederation continued its attack by alleging: "The
presence of Calles and Morones at a convention of petroleum workers 
is ironical for the policy of defrauding the Mexican people in
OO
All quotes are taken from the New York Times, April 26, 1936. 
During Morones' exile, Matthew Woll and Chester Wright "opened the 
doors of their homes to him." "La C.R.O.M. ni se rnuere ni se rinde," 
C.R.O.M., November, 1920, 16.
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3bpetroleum matters was due to them. Verbal attacks were soon supple­
mented by physical warfare.
Of all the labor conflicts during Cardenas’ administration, 
perhaps none was more hitter than those occurring in the textile 
industry, largely because many of them involved inter-union disputes 
among the affiliates of CP.OM and C.T.M. Morones feared C.T.M. 
encroachment in Veracruz, and his fears soon materialized as these 
C.T.M. intrusions became a great problem. Constant fights for 
jurisdiction in the textile mills in the State of Veracruz led to 
murderous warfare ending in scores of deaths between CROM and C.T.M. 
Feeling ran high, the industry suffered, and Cardenas' pet idea of 
a united front for the working class received a decided set-back.
In September, 1936, trouble between the two federations 
exploded in Atlixco, Puebla. CROM had been supreme there for a 
number of years, but agitators from the C.T.M. were making gains.
Late that month Cardenas visited Atlixco, assembled leaders from 
both organizations, and stressed that rivalry and bloodshed must 
cease. The ten most irreconcilable leaders of each group were 
ordered to leave the area. An ideal arrangement was formulated.
If a laborer belonging to the C.T.M. were murdered, CROM would 
have to indemnify his family, and vice versa. Practice was divorced 
from theory in this case, and Morones ordered his lieutenants to 
refuse the bland agreement.
oh
New York Times, June 3, 1936.
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RETURN TO MEXICO
Since Morones' deportation in April, 1936, CROM's central
committee negotiated with Cardenas for Ids return. Finally on
February 2 k, 1937, the Mexican Secretary of Interior permitted
Morones' return. A "great applause" occurred in CROM's meeting
following Ricardo Trevino's announcement of that fact. In March,
1937, newspaper articles in the Federal District press publicly
revealed that Morones could return to his homeland. Morones,
however, was not summoned to Mexico by Cardenas to revamp the
labor organizations as he and Green alleged in the U.S. According
to Lombardo, who had spoken with Cardenas about the matter, Morones
was merely returning protected by the Law of Amnesty, and this neither
constituted special permission nor an extraordinary behest on the
35government's behalf. On the other hand, Morones would neither 
have any of his rights decreased nor be subject to any extra 
restrictions. Nevertheless, CROM propaganda announced that Morones 
had "triumphed over the government, justice was being fulfilled."
Morones, accompanied by his wife and some friends, arrived in 
Monterrey and declared that he would enter action in the social
37field, and in the political field by reorganizing the Labor Party.
On April 29, his caravan which comprised eromistas headed by Jose 
Lopez Cortes who drove to meet him, entered the capital. Upon
35 *
Vicente Lombardo Toledano in El Excelsior, April 28, 1937*
"Reparacion justiciera," 5-6.
^ L a  Prensa, April 28, 1937.
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Morones' entry into Mexico City, lie boldly announced, "I come to resume
oQ
my activities at the service of the labor organizations." He returned 
at an opportune time since there was a split in the C.T.M. Overesti­
mating their forces in the confederation, the communists had tried 
to take over in March, and when they failed withdrew their unions.
"THE OIL IS OURS"
Labor troubles had beset oil companies for months as oil field 
workers demanded better wages. Near the end of 1937 a federally 
appointed conciliation board told the petroleum companies to raise 
salaries by 26 million pesos annually. They refused and sought 
redress in court. Early in March, 1938, the Supreme Court held the 
companies were bound by the decision and ordered that monies be 
deposited. Still the companies refused. Cardenas in a radio address 
to the Mexican nation, approached the microphone at ten o'clock on 
the night of March, 19, 1938 and said, "The oil is ours."
In what Nathaniel and Sylvia w'eyi have eulogistically called 
"the reconquest of Mexico." Cardenas nationalized land, railroads, 
and ultimately the foreign-owned petroleum industry. His nationalism 
aimed to promote economic independence, protect Mexican industries, 
and remedy the conflict long existent between capital, mostly foreign, 
and labor, mostly Mexican. Morones claimed that Cardenas called
In the thirteenth CROM convention Jose Petricioli presented 
Morones with a medal from the Sindicato de Dependientes del Comercio 
del Distrito Federal. The medal symbolized "brotherly love" and was 
neither gold nor silver "which lacked force and were effeminate,"but 
of iron which represented tenacity. Since Morones had a reputation 
of being a bon vivant, the historonic presentation was a farce.
"XIII Gran Convencion de la C.R.O.M.," C.R.O.M., September, 1937, 13-16.
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Morones to Chapultepec and asked him and Florentino Maya of the
CROM central committee for advise, and for the stolen records of
the 1926 U.S. "invasion" of Mexico, in order to expose the American
petroleum companies' role in plotting the would-be intervention.
After Morones consented, Cardenas never asked for them again; and,
according to Morones, "With an air of theatricalism paid indemnities
39which cost Mexico millions of pesos and many deprivations.” If 
the story is true, and it is doubtful, it would have been an excellent 
opportunity to gain favor with Cardenas. It would exemplify how CROM, 
through Morones1 efforts, attempted to influence and shape government 
policy, but failed. When asked by newsmen what he thought of the 
March 18 expropriation and nationalization of the petroleum companies, 
Morones stated that his organization supported Cardenas' actions and 
considered them perfectly just, but that he was surprised when he
1+0read the newspapers on March 19 and discovered the expropriation.
Strife between the C.T.M. and CROM flared again in January, 1938* 
At midnight of January 16 a twenty-four-hour general strike began in 
the State of Veracruz. Called by Lombardo as a protest against a 
presidential ruling several months earlier favoring CROM workers, its 
purpose was to paralyze Veracruz. Lombardo did not hold free sway. 
Cardenas had ruled that CROM workers constituted a majority in the 
Cocolapan textile factory at Orizaba, and that C.T.M. must leave
^Luis N. Morones in El Universal, March 18, 1957; Luis N. 
Morones in El Excelsior, September 1953-
lj_0
Luis N. Morones in El Popular, May 18, 1939; Luis N.
Morones in El Universal, March 18, 1957-
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that plant for another nearby. The decision followed an altercation
between the rival unions in which eight persons were killed and 25
wounded. After the rival unions ignored the president's plea that
they "unite for the Revolution," the situation was so serious that
Cardenas hurried there by automobile. Following a sanguinary battle
on the 17th, the presence of the Chief Executive, who ordered arms
taken from both groups, brought an "armistice" and relative peace to
Orizaba. La Prensa was highly critical of Morones'accusing Cardenas
of instigating the agitation which culminated in the loss of lives.
According to this press, the workers of the Cocolapan factory had
progressed in "tranquil fashion" even though there were cromistas
and cetemistas until "Morones arrived in the country and began
ll
agitating the situation."
CROM SPLIT OF I938 
In the midst of this struggle, CROM was racked by "fifth 
column" pressures. Since unity and the appearance of unity are 
essential ingredients in a political formula for group effectiveness, 
most politically-orientated groups are careful to reveal as little 
as possible concerning internecine struggles. Such action did not 
characterize Morones' CROM in 1938 when its "Old Guard" experienced 
a major split. Morones had returned from exile under a general 
amnesty issued by Cardenas in April, 1937j but remained a staunch
Ul
La Prensa, January 23, 1938.
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enemy of the president. Cardenas was in the process of forming a 
new governmental political party and CROM leadership disagreed about 
whether CROM should support Cardenas or follow Morones1 dictates to 
revive the P.L.M. and prevent the organization from cooperating with 
the government.
Another reason for the leadership's dispute was the inter-union 
struggle caused by internal .jockeying for supremacy between the old 
Morones clique and leaders with a different orientation. The night 
of January 8 Morones claimed at the Hidalgo Theatre that, "Perhaps 
none of the labor organizations that now exist in Mexico have been 
attacked as much as the C.R.O.M., but the C.R.O.M. has been able to 
exist because of its members' discipline." Events soon disproved 
his statement concerning CROM solidarity. Eduardo Moneda, Jose Lopez 
Cortes, and Eduardo Buenrostro delivered a letter to the El Nacional 
office on January 15 stating that they advocated loyal and sincere 
cooperation with Cardenas' actions. They disagreed with Morones' 
conduct and announced that "no division exists in the CROM and the 
actions of the ex-CROM leader ought to be taken as those of one 
single member."^2
According to the C.R.O.M. Memoria, a Morones organ, Ricardo 
Trevino’s treason to the confederation dated from 1936 when he 
served as the central committee's secretary general. When Morones 
was exiled, Trevino"considered it an opportune time to become CROM's 
only director" and disregarded other opinions. With Morones' return.
II Nacional, January 16, 1938.
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Trevino and bis following "refused to rectify tbeir ways, continued 
to create distrust against Morones," and tried to expel bim from the 
confedederation be bad founded. The C.R.O.M. Memoria alleged that 
Trevino and bis allies received aid "from tbose tbey should bave not 
been receiving it." Another charge leveled at Trevino was the 
"disappearance" of five thousand pesos of the union's funds.
The split was formalized in April, 1938,when the Morones- 
dominated national committee expelled Trevino's following from CROM. 
Among cromistas ousted were Trevino, Eduardo Moneda, Jose Lopez Cortes, 
Juan Lozano Padilla, and Mario Suarez. Some of these men had partici­
pated in CROM's founding; Trevino, Moneda, and Lopez Cortes had served 
in the Grupo Accion for 20 years.
The expelled group also called itself "CROM" and looked upon 
itself as labor's legitimate representative. The Trevino CROM devoted 
much of its energy to exposing the corruption of Morones' clique; 
moronistas retaliated with documentary evidence to prove that these 
rivals were corrupt and were subsidized by the federal government. 
During Cardenas' administration a principal CROM activity consisted 
of inter-union fights between the Trevino and Morones factions. But 
when not fighting each other, they engaged in bloody struggles with 
the C.T.M. for jurisdiction of the textile mills.
2^3
On August 5, 1938, Morones presented "copious documentation" 
to the general assembly. This consisted of receipts from the central 
committee's treasury. A segment of this evidence was a receipt of 
Blanca Rubin, cashier of the central committee, which said that 
Trevino'took" b,k75 pesos from the treasury. C.R.O.M. Memoria, 
1937-1939 ■< 17^- See pages l8l-l86 for itemized accounts of Trevino's 
alleged graft.
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Despite the fact that the once-powerful CROM had dwindled,
Morones maintained the fiction that his CROM was still potentially
powerful. He, Reynaldo Torres, Juan Fonseca, and Fernando Rodarte
were invited to participate in the meeting of the Confederacion de
Sindicatos Obreros y Campesinos de Puebla on November 21, 1938, to
celebrate the 28th anniversary of the Revolution. Morones' speech
at the factory "la Eoonomica," contained this gem of propaganda,
"Despite all the attacks, I have never doubted that the C.R.O.M.
would resurge, that we would triumph, and be the true guide of the 
)|)|
labor movement." Rivalry continued and when anti-Morones CROM 
elements in Rio Blanco began a sitdown strike on Saturday, March 16, 
I9U0, the Morones union consequently refused to cooperate with them.
In September, 1938, Lombardo Toledano convened a labor congress 
to create an international Latin American labor federation. Thirty- 
seven delegates from the more important Latin American labor unions 
of twelve countries attended. The C.T.M. took the lead to found the 
Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina in September, 1938 
in Mexico City. Lombardo, the leading figure in setting up the 
C.T.A.L., was elected president, and shaped its policies during 
its formative years.
) | ) i
"Los logreros y traidores, son los que hablan de revolucion- 
arismo," C.R.O.M., December, 1938, 9* 1 8. According to Petricioli, 
Morones revised his definition of them as "traitors" to that of 
"separatists." Petricioli was describing Morones "qualities of 
forgiveness" in his later years. Interview, Mexico City, June 303
1968.
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ELECTION OF 19^0 AND THE MORIBUND P.A.F.L.
The founding of ihe :C.T.A.L. helped influence Morones and. the 
A.F.L. to "reinvigorate" the P.A.F.L. Matthew Wo 11, •vice-president 
of the A.F.L., and Chester Wright arrived in Mexico City in October, 
1938 for "a visit of observation" for the A.F.L. executive council.
Only one hope actually remained for the A.F.L. if it wished to 
rejuvenate the P.A.F.L. in Mexico: could Morones spring back into
power?
General Juan Andrew Almaz an believed he had the natural right 
to the presidency because he was the highest-ranking officer in the 
army. Almazan expected to receive serious consideration from the 
P.E.M., but when the official party ignored him, he joined the 
opposition. Encouraged by generals opposed to Manuel Avila Camacho, 
business and landowner interests opposed to Cardenas' radical policies, 
Morones' CROM, and certain elements of the Catholic Church, Almazan, 
on June 30, 1939,resigned his post as commander of the Seventh 
Military Zone in Monterrey. One month later Almazan launched his 
presidential campaign with a manifesto offering positive and specific 
advantages to the army, capital, Church, labor and peasantry. Morones' 
CROM through its satellite organ, the P.L.M., endorsed the general 
hoping to pick up a few crumbs from the victor's table.
Morones' gamble failed. Almazan was unsuccessful; Avila Camacho's 
main strength came from organized labor, CROM excepted. When the 
defeated general refused to raise the banner of armed revolt to 
nullify the official electoral count, he was politically dead; so 
was Morones' and the A.F.L.'s hopes to revive the waning P.A.F.L.
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Shortly after his election Avila Camacho publicly declared "Soy 
creyente" (I am a "believer), and thus placated many Mexican "Catholics 
■who might have supported any rebellion against him. Furthermore, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent Vice-President Henry A. Wallace 
to attend the inauguration; and although Wallace was harassed by a 
pro-Axis mob shouting "Death to the gringos," Almazan realized that 
insurrection would be hopeless. After the general's electoral 
defeat, Morones, his "fair weather" ally, showed his true colors in
an effortless about face when he attacked the general and attributed
- 1^ 5
Almazan’s defeat "exclusively to himself."
After the 19^0 election Morones tried to revive the A.F.L.'s 
interest in the P.A.F.L., but his attempts received little attention. 
Still the P.A.F.L. was not dissolved. The offices of treasurer and 
English and Spanish secretaries were combined and given to Matthew 
Woll, although he knew no Spanish. At the last A.F.L. convention 
held before the United States entered World War II, there was a 
spiritless discussion of the P.A.F.L. It was clear to everyone that 
the organization had practically died with Santiago Iglesias in 1939> 
Almazan's defeat provided the coup de gr&ce.
The sixth P.A.F.L. congress was to be held in Havana but the 
depression and insufficient funds made reorganization a hopeless task.
^Casasola, Historia grafica de la Revolucion Mexicana, IV,
2kb7. Morones' endorsed Gustavo Casasola's multivolume history "como 
un documento de verdadera importancia y como una exacta contribution 
a la Historia de nuestro Pais; especialmente en su epoca convulsiva." 
Morones to Casasola, January 9s 19^ -8, Historia grafica de la Revolucion 
Mexicana, IV, 2333.
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With CROM's influence on the Mexican government virtually nil, the 
A.F.L.'s interest in retaining close connections quickly diminished. 
There was little the A.F.L. or CROM could gain from continuing close 
relations with each other, and contacts between the two movements 
rapidly dwindled to little more than occasional ritualistic appear­
ances of delegates at each other conventions. Nevertheless, the 
significant international position which Morones' CROM occupied was 
that of a trail-blazer among the incipient Pan-American labor 
movements.^
U6Philip Taft in his The A.F. of L. in the Times of Gompers 
believes Gompers' death was the greatest factor contributing to the 
P.A.F.L.'s decline, because he had been its prime support and inspira­
tion. Whether one accepts Taft's thesis or not, it cannot be denied 
that the death of Morones1 intimate and mutual-admiring friend, was 
a severe blow to the Federation.
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CHAPTER X
MORONES AND EERONISM
Having failed to support a successful presidential candidate 
in 19^0, Morones endorsed Miguel Aleman's election. During Aleman's 
administration, I9U6-52, the name of the governmental party was 
changed to Partido Revolucionario Institucional, but the basic form 
was maintained. Therefore, unsuccessful in his efforts to augment 
his prestige and power by conventional methods, Morones tried 
another tactic —  support from Argentina's Chief Executive.
PERON'S LABOR POLICY 
One of Juan Domingo Peron's power bases was the working class 
or descamisados (shirtless ones). His .justicialismo doctrine 
stressed political sovereignty, economic independence, and social 
justice. Prior.-to Peron's ascendency, the labor movement played 
an insignificant role in Argentine affairs. He raised wages, 
established collective bargaining, set up housing projects, reno­
vated social security, and reorganized the Argentine C.G.T. Through 
overtones to Morones, he attempted to extend his influence into Mexico.
LIMA INTER-AMERICAN TRADE UNION CONFERENCE 
In I9U7, several South American labor groups wrote the A.F.L. 
requesting closer unity with the North American labor movement. The 
A.F.L. assigned Seraflno Romualdi, a Spanish-speaking Italian immigrant 
to the United States who had been active in the International Ladies'
22k
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Garment ‘Workers' Union, to work on this‘project. Largely as a result 
of the efforts of Romualdi and of Bernardo Ibanez, President of the 
Chilean Confederation of Lahor, several South American labor organi­
zations agreed to an A.F.L.-sponsored Pan-American labor conference 
in 191*8 .
On January 10, the Lima Inter-American Trade Union Conference 
began its sessions in the main assembly hall of the House of 
Representatives with delegations present from the United States,
Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia, Dutch Guiana, Mexico, Puerto 
Rico, El Salvador, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Ecuador. All commissions had 
full powers except those from the Dominican Republic and Venezuela 
which were represented by fraternal delegations, and Ecuador, which 
only sent observers. The conference's objectives were to analyze 
the situation of the workers' movement in the Western Hemisphere, 
study methods of collaboration, raise the standard of living, and 
promote human liberty and social progress.^"
CROM secretary general Morones, having been a leading figure 
in the P.A.F.L., could not resign himself to play a secondary role 
in the establishing of another inter-American labor group. Morones 
attended this conference with his own plan to organize the confedera­
tion. At the beginning of the conference, an Argentine delegate charged 
that the A.F.L. representatives were financed by the United States 
State Department. Morones rose, began speaking, and expressed the
1C.R.0.M. Memoria, 19U7-19U9, 32.
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antecedents of the Argentine case; the conflicts, difficulties, and 
misunderstanding created by Romauldi's "awkward politics." Sabroso, 
President of the Congress, interrupted Morones stating that "only ten 
minutes is allowed to the speakers and your time has expired."
Morones quickly retorted that the ruling had been approved without 
the knowledge of all present and that the members had agreed that 
important matters would have no time limit. Morones emphasized the 
"importance" of his topic and continued his delivery. He accused 
Romauldi, "an agent of the State Department," and the A.F.L. of 
supplying money for the Lima Conference. He repeated, "There are 
delegates in this hall who have been bought by Romauldi." Romauldi 
denied the allegation and stated Morones had no right to suppose
2
that the conference was instigated by the United States government.
CROM maintained that it had documentary proof that Romauldi 
was a United States government agent, and Petricioli showed this 
evidence to Professor Alexander in August, 19^8. It is a letter of 
introduction for Romauldi written by Adolf Berle to Ambassador 
Messersmith in Argentina (written in the summer of 19^6, after 
Berle had ceased having any part in the government). This corres­
pondence mentions Romauldi's war services in the Coordinator's office, 
and relates that he is "well looked upon" by the American government. 
The damaging portion in CROM's opinion is Berle's statement that a
Ibid., 59j 95- Serafino Romauldi, Presidents and Peons; 
Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America (New York, 1967), 
7 8. This work is a personal and first-hand accountof twenty years' 
service by a key A.F.L. representative in Latin America.
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number of people, mainly communists, bad been going to Latin America,
alleging they represented United States labor, so Berle suggested to
A.F.L. leaders that they appoint an official representative. As a
result, Romauldi was named; this is why Morones and CROM considered
3
Romauldi an official agent.
In the Lima Conference the worst criticism of the United States 
came from a man who admittedly had contacted the Argentine Embassy 
in Mexico City before his going to Peru —  Luis N. Morones. Morones 
charged that the A.F.L. report of March, 19^7> which damned the 
Argentine Labor Confederation as being Peron's tool, was made in bad 
faith and resulted from the maneuvering by Romauldi, Latin American 
representative of the A.F.L. and key man on the commission of inquiry 
that visited Buenos Aires in 19^7- Morones thus blamed Romauldi for
having "rigged the conference just as Romauldi had rigged the A.F.L.
Ij.
condemnation of Argentine labor a year ago."
Robert J. Alexander interview of Jose Petricioli, Mexico City, 
August 27, 19^ +8 • Romauldi died of a heart attack in 1967 while serving 
in Mexico City as a consultant for the State Department and as a lecturer 
at Cuernavaca Labor College. A.F.L.-C.I.0. News, November 18, 1967.
N^ew York Times, January 26, 19^8 . In 19^7, Peron attempted to 
endear himself to U.S. labor by inviting A.F.L. leaders to visit Argen­
tina and observe the freedom of his trade unions. After the visit the 
American delegation published its findings that Argentine labor was 
dictatorially controlled by Peron's government through such measures 
as armed forces, bribery, and expulsion. New York Times, March 10,
I9V7. Morones accused Romauldi of having gone to Buenos Aires with 
A.F.L. officials not only to investigate the Argentine labor movement, 
but all of Peron's acts for which Romauldi had to flee to Montevideo. 
C.R.O.M. Memoria, 19^7-19^-9, 56-57. Born in the province of Perugia 
in Italy, Romauldi was forced to leave that country in 1923, at age 
23, because of his active opposition to Benito Mussolini's dictator­
ship —  this background helped formulate his opposition to the 
fascistic Peron regime and Morones' defense of it.
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A five-nation "Committee of Honor," which resulted from 
Morones' denunciations, unanimously rejected all of Morones' charges 
against Romauldi at the conference's final session on July lU. The 
convention hailed the commission's findings in which there was no 
positive response to Morones' emotionally-based appeal. A defeated 
minority of one, Morones chose to abandon the conference rather 
than compromise or accept humiliating defeat. He neither appeared 
before the Committee of Honor when summoned, nor attended the final 
plenary session.^ As a result, Morones' name was stricken from the 
list of accredited delegates following his departure.^
VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES 
According to Petricioli, Morones had not intended to go to 
Argentina, but that country's delegation invited CROM to send 
"someone" to Argentina, Morones was given a "hero's welcome" and 
following a two hour audience with President Peron, Morones was 
the guest of honor at an Argentine Labor Confederation rally held 
in Buenos Aires' Luna Park on January 23, 19^8. Following the 
speech of Jnan Barreiro, a C.G.T. official who opened the ceremony, 
Morones began his discourse by attacking Romauldi, "a propagandist 
against Argentina." He spoke on the general theme of "imperialist"
^Milton Bracker in the New York Times, January 1^, I9U8 ; 
Serafino Romauldi, "Action at Lima," American Federationist, LV 
(February, 19^8), 25. Romauldi summarized the situation writing,
"May I add, modesty aside, that I received a standing ovation and, 
in typical Latin American fashion, I was embraced by many." Romauldi, 
Presidents and Peons, 7 8.
g
American Federationist, February, 19^8 , 25.
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attempts to infiltrate and manipulate the Latin American working
masses. Morones assailed Assistant Secretary of State Spruille 
7
Braden, and declared that he had been branded "a liar" at Lima 
"only because I dared to impugn the reputation of a member of the 
United States delegation.” He boasted that it had been "an honor 
to defend the honor of the workers’ movement of Argentina." The 
meeting with Peron added credence to the circumstantial evidence 
and proved to those who suspected that Peron and Morones had schemed 
in advance to disrupt the Lima Conference.
ORGANIZATION OF THE C.I.T.
One of the important results of the Lima Conference was the 
organization of the Inter-American Confederation of Workers (C.I.T.), 
of which the Chilean Bernardo Ibanez was elected president in 19^8 .
7
Two weeks before the Argentine presidential election of 
February 2k , 19k6, the U.S. State Department published its 131-page 
"Blue Book on Argentina," the work of Braden and his staff. It gave 
what it termed "incontrovertible evidence," much of it drawn from 
recently captured German documents, that "the present Argentine 
Government and many of its high officials were so seriously com­
promised with the (Nazi-Fascist) enemy that trust and confidence 
could not be reposed in that government." Peron himself was prominent 
among those against whom such testimony was presented. The "Blue 
Book" gained Peron more votes than it lost him, for it was a fresh and 
flagrant example of United States intervention in Latin America which 
Argentines had long taken the lead in opposing. Arthur P. Whitaker, 
"The Election of February 2k , 19^6: Braden or Peron: Second Phase,"
in Why Peron came to Power. The Background to Peronism in Argentina, 
ed. by Joseph R. Barager (New York, 196 8), 221-222.
g
New York Times, January 26, 19^8. Morones' speech eulogized Eva 
"as an example for all women and for America's first ladies." Morones 
was followed by Angel Cofino Garcia, secretary general of the Cuban 
Federation of Workers who had missed the Lima Conference, but attested 
that had he been there "he would have adopted Morones' attitude." La 
Prensa (Buenos Aires), January 2k , I9U8 .
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
230
Despite Morones’ actions in Lima and Buenos Aires, Petricioli told 
Professor Alexander that "the CROM is not peronista," except that 
CROM believed that the "international labor organizations in the 
Americas should not be directed by the United States State Depart­
ment and its agents in the C.I.T." One of the purposes in creating 
C.I.T., an organization of non-communist trade unions, was to 
terminate the communist-orientated C.T.A.L. Lombardo had created 
ten years earlier. The second C.I.T. congress which met in Havana
in 192+9, refused Morones' demand that his CROM become an affiliate;
o
CROM soon afterwards allied with Argentina's C.G.T.
The C.I.T., a union of paper affiliates and lineal descendent 
of the P.A.F.L., failed to prosper and was liquidated in 1952 after 
the formation of the world-wide International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions. Its member organizations joined with several which 
had not belonged to the C.I.T. to form the Organizacion Regional 
Inter-Americana de Trabajadores (O.R.I.T.).
INVITATION TO THE EERONISTS 
Peronists caused considerable disorder at the January, 1951 
meeting in Mexico City which organized the American affiliate of 
O.R.I.T. Argentina, Panama, and the Dominican Republic were not 
invited to the conference because O.R.I.T. directors in Brussels 
assumed that these countries lacked "democratic trade unions free
^Alba, Historia del movimiento obrero en America Latina, 2+71.
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from government control."1^ CROM, however, favored admitting the 
Argentine C-G-.T., and Morones took independent responsibility for a 
belated cable inviting the Argentine Labor Federation to send dele­
gates. On January 9, three C.G.T. leaders after a last-minute 
conference with Peron, left Buenos Aires to fly to Mexico City in 
response to Morones’ strategy of issuing an unexpected invitation 
the previous day. A dispute about whether the Argentine delegates 
who arrived January 10 should be allowed to participate threatened 
to disrupt the conference before it could form a Western Hemisphere 
branch of the I.C.F.T.U. The Argentine group with Morones1 assistance, 
almost managed to enter the meeting hall, but only the timely inter­
vention of the chairman prevented a clash with a group of delegates 
who rushed toward the door to block their entrance. Morones, a 
member of the United Labor Committee who handled local preparations 
for the conference, announced his CROM would not only withdraw if 
the Argentine delegation was refused admission, but would hold a 
separate protest meeting. 11 In reality, this was an empty gesture. 
Morones was in no position to adopt strong measures. His role was 
more negative than positive.
1^New York Times, January 11, 1951.
1LCbid. When Morones' term as CROM secretary general terminated 
in I9I+9 he was designated as permanent advisor and councilor and 
Secretary of International Affairs of CROM, positions he exercised 
until his death in 196k . Cromistas felt they "had" to consult Morones 
during this period because of his vast experience and knowledge. 
Fernando M. Lluck, interview, Acapulco, March 29, 1971.
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After a titter debate, the delegates refused to seat tbe 
•peron!stas. Only CROM which had summoned the Argentines without the 
consent of the I.C.F.T.U. secretary general, voted to admit the 
C.G.T. Jacob Potofsky, head of the Latin American Affairs Committee 
of the C.I.O., and George Meany led the fight against accepting the 
Argentines; they were vigorously seconded by the A.F.L. representa­
tives who agreed that the C.G.T. did not constitute "a truly free 
labor organization." Both American organizations stated that the
basic principles and policies of the I.C.F.T.U. were opposed to 
12
totalitarianism. Morones' attempt to sneak the three peronistas 
in through "the back door" had failed. He vigorously denounced 
"United States maneuvers to dominate the conference" which would 
prevent Mexico from electing a president of the hemisphere body and 
establishing its headquarters in Mexico City.
Following Morones' announcement that meetings would be held 
the following week to hear the Argentine case, CROM representatives 
walked out in protest. The peronistas were the chief speakers at a 
reunion where the platform was shared with cromistas. A photograph 
in the archives of La Prensa in Mexico City shows Morones, Moises 
Calleja, Florentino Maya, and several other cromistas at a banquet 
given on January 12 for Isaias Santin, secretary general of the 
Argentine C.G.T., Jose Erriole, and Feliz Odorigo, two other 
peronistas.
12Ia Prensa (Buenos Aires), January 11, 1951; William P. Carney 
in the Hew York Times, January 12, 1951.
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When the C.G.T. representatives were ready to return to 
Argentina they encouraged a large number of Mexican trade unionists 
to accompany them. Rigoberto Gonzales and Florentino Maya accepted 
for CROM. In Buenos Aires they were feted at dinners and receptions, 
visited the Eva Peron Foundation, and made the customary tour of 
Argentina. Upon returning to Mexico, they published a long and 
detailed letter in La Prensa. This propaganda aid to peronistas 
praised Peron, Eva, and the Argentine economic situation. The 
exchange of visits accelerated Morones' and Argentine efforts to 
solidify Argentine-Mexican ties to support a new Latin American 
labor organization.
The Morones-Peron flirtation of "brothers in purpose and 
colleagues in fact" did not go unmentioned in Mexico City after 
the visits. Beginning in January, 1952, Jorge Prieto Laurens 
published in the capitoline Todo a series of articles and a letter 
Morones allegedly sent to Peron offering his services to implant 
.iusticiali.smo in Mexico. Morones and Petricioli responded by pre­
senting an accusation before the Procurador de Justicia of the 
Federal District which charged Prieto Laurens with falsification 
of documents.
Morones' long-range design to swing Mexico into the column of 
the Argentine-led "Third Force" countries in the event of a world 
•war, came to light in a strange document, a photostatic copy pur­
ported to be a letter from Morones to Peron dated March 3> 1952.
This correspondence which covered twenty single-spaced typewritten
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Courtesy La Prensa
CROM DELEGATION ARRIVES IN ASUNCION, PARAGUAY, FEBRUARY, 1952
Back row: Maria Teresa del Valle de Morones, Hector Cerrillo.
Front row: Luis N. Morones, Federico Gobernatore, Jesus Corona.
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pages, contained a careful analysis of the Mexican political situation,
plans for establishing the peronista theory of government in Mexico,
and a request for Argentine funds. The dominant theme ■was an anti-
United States feeling:
In order to spread our anti-Yankee position, we 
have been cooperating with the native Stalinist 
Communists. This is the only thing on which we 
agree with the Communists. Otherwise we are 
quietly fighting them and pushing them out of 
their positions of influence.^3
DEATH OF EVITA
A few months after Peron established his own international
labor union Morones flew to Argentina in the summer of 1952; Evita
Peron, whose magnetic charm had captured audiences Peron could not
reach and the heroine of thousands of "shirtless ones,” had died of
cancer. Morones and his second wife attended the funeral in Buenos
Aires on July 26, 1952. Morones rendered homage at Eva's burial in
the name of CROM, stood over her coffin during her capilla ardiente
(wake), and placed flowers at the foot of her casket. Symbolically,
Morones deposited a small chest of Mexican soil in Argentina, and
1^carried some Argentine earth to his homeland.
A.T.L.A.S
Consistent with the justicialist philosophy of the Third Position 
which stressed Latin Americanism and combatted Pan-Americanism, Peron
~*~^ New York Times, December 8 , 1952.
•^ C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1951-1953, 2Ul, 2^9.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
237
decided to create his own inter-American "body. In November, 1952,
CROM co-sponsored the Peron-dominated Latin American Association
of Trade Unionists.'*’^  An overture on November 2k, 1952 from the
communist-dominated C.T.A.L. to join forces in the fight against
"imperialism" received cold treatment from A.T.L.A.S. United States
and Latin American labor officials who did not attend the congress
branded it as an Argentine attempt to spread anti-Americanism
through as many Latin American unions as it could influence. Jose
Espejo, Peron’s ex-Secretary of Labor, announced at the opening
meeting that the organization would be anti-capitalistic, anti-
communistic, and dedicated to maintaining the "independence of Latin
American workers." It therefore came as a surprise when Lombardo
Toledano, head of the C.T.A.L., sent a formal "fraternal salute" and
invited the new organization to formulate a basis for common action.
Morones explained that Lombardo was absent from the conference
because he was deliberately not invited, and emphasized that "there
could under no circumstances be any understanding with Senor Lombardo
because of his known communist connections." In his formal speech
Morones also charged the United States with "colonial oppression" of
3-6Latin American workers. CROM was the only important Mexican
"^See John Terrill Deiner, ^ "ATLAS: A Labor Instrument of
Argentine Expansionism Under Peron" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Rutgers University, 1969), for a detailed study of various A.T.L.A.S. 
activities, an evaluation of A.T.L.A.S. contributions to peronista 
foreign policy, and an examination of its impact on labor organizations 
in Latin America.
l6New York Times, November 2k , 1952.
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federation in attendence, and by far the largest and most important 
contingent non-Mexican federation at the constituent congress was the 
Argentine C.G.T.; no other major Latin American country sent delegates.
A.T.L.A.S. was only strong in Argentina and exerted little 
influence in the workers' movement of other Latin American countries 
where peronistas never accomplished more than making a few contacts 
and distributing a lot of Peronist propaganda. Never powerful, 
A.T.L.A.S. became little more than a paper organization after the 
Argentine dictator's fall in 1955.
John Deiner, one of Robert J. Alexander's students, concludes 
that A.T.L.A.S., which was a part of Peron's propaganda apparatus, 
primarily failed because it was obviously an organization oriented 
to Argentine interests rather than to those of Latin American trade 
unionists. Morones, though willing to work with the Argentines, 
geared his efforts toward Mexican affairs, rather than toward the 
promulgation of Peronist ideology. CROM and C.G.T. were the only 
national organizations which ever contributed financial support, and 
CROM's donations were insignificant. In 1924, death deprived Morones 
of Samuel Gompers, his chief ally in a foreign country; thirty years 
later a coup d' etat achieved the same results with Peron.
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CHAPTER XI
MORONES AND COMMUNISM
The majority of Latin American trade unions in the early 
twentieth century were either socialist or anarcho-syndicalist, 
except in Mexico where CROM, the dominant labor group of that 
period, had a political orientation of its own. Morones' CROM 
has been peculiarly politically minded and not only have communists 
and anarchists made little inroads into it, but it has taken a 
strong position against communism. One factor partly explaining 
this "immunity" to communism is the fact that CROM was well- 
established before the Communist International, founded in 1919? 
had extended beyond the borders of Russia.
Morones abandoned anarcho-syndicalist doctrines which had 
dominated the thinking of earlier Mexican labor leaders, and 
adopted a socialist philosophy "adapted to Mexican conditions."
This socialism contended that society was divided into two classes, 
the "exploited and the exploiters." It held that the exploited 
class consisted largely of manual workers who possessed the right 
to declare class war in order to secure economic and spiritual 
betterment, and in the end complete liberation from "capitalist 
tyranny."1
^Morones distinguished between socialism and syndicalism. He 
conceived of socialism as being an egalitarian doctrine; socialism is 
the "idea" and syndicalism, the "action." In the Chamber of Deputies, 
Morones, a deputy representing Tacubaya, stated, "In the tribune I 
have declared that the thesis we must defend is the application of the
239
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In November, 1918, Morones and M s  associates conferred with 
Samuel Gompers and other A.F.L. leaders at Nuevo Laredo. Labor 
representatives from other nations were present, and the P.A.F.L. 
was established with Gompers as president and Morones later becoming 
vice-president. This first congress was one of organization primarily 
but it managed to touch upon all the purposes for which the Federation 
was founded, especially the fight against "missionary" communism. As 
would be expected, communistic labor elements in Mexico criticized 
this "imperialistic American" association.
A socialist congress meeting the following September was t o m  
by dissension over several major issues. Representatives of the 
Socialist Workers' Party, which Morones had organized; and well-known 
leftists such as Jose Allen and Manabrenda Nath Roy, an Indian 
nationalist, were present. The desire of the congress to establish 
a political party of the proletariat was frustrated because of the 
divergent tendencies among the delegates. Some wanted to create a 
communist party witMn the International CommuMst Movement wMle 
others like Morones and Samuel Yudico strenuously objected to this 
proposal. T Ms resulted in the establisMng of two parties. The 
first, the Partido Comunista de Mexico, was established by Jose 
Allen and M s  colleagues in September, 19195 "the second, Morones' 
P.L.M., was founded three months later and functioned in Mexico's
Revolutionary criterion." Diario de los debates de la Camara de 
Diputados, August 27, 28, 192^. As one can see, this is a vague 
remark typical of a Mexican politician where it was not feasible 
to oppose the Revolution.
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"democratic" political system.
Morones toured Europe following his participation in the P.A.F.L. 
founding. The soviet foreign office began its dealings with Morones 
before Mexico diplomatically recognized the U.S.S.R. Because of 
CROM's ties with the A.F.L., Pravda published several anti-CROM 
articles. Therefore, when Morones appeared at the Russian legation 
in Berlin he was refused a visa to visit Russia. This angered him. 
Furthermore, other CROM leaders who later entered Russia were ignored 
or shown only minor consideration.
When Calles assumed office he recognized the Soviet Union.
Several factors influenced his decision. First, Russia was a 
possible market for Mexican henequen and other products. Second, as 
president-elect, Calles had gone to Europe where he was received with 
great distinction, and military parades and other gestures, especially 
in Germany. Returning via the United States Calles was practically 
ignored; thus, one reason for Calles' recognition of the soviet 
government was his desire to irritate the United States government 
for its slight. Soviet Minister Petskovsky blundered in Mexico by 
criticizing CROM as being a "reactionary organization opposed to the 
true interests of the workers and peasants of Mexico." Morones was 
farther angered when the soviet railroad federation sent money to a 
rival organization's strike fund during a railroad strike. Though 
the donations were technically sent by the railroad workers, Morones 
believed that no money could be dispatched from the Soviet Union
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without the full approval of that government.
After a brief flirtation with the Russians in the early 1920’s,
CROM leadership was forced to choose between cultivating close
relations with them or with the A.F.L. It was obvious that the
A.F.L. could not consider an organization which had close relations
with soviet labor unions as an ally. The A.F.L. openly admitted that
its cordial relations with CROM had been possible because of the anti-
communistic nature of that organization. Their reasoning is revealed
by the following:
The fact that the Mexican Federation of Labor is 
officially connected with the AFL should be enough 
to indicate that it is not a communistic movement...
If the Mexican Federation of Labor itself or its : 
leaders were believers in the system which has 
brought so much wreckage, destruction, and suffer­
ing in Russia instead of being affiliated with 
the AFL, they would have affiliated themselves 
with the Red International. 3
In fact, CROM adopted a reciprocal resolution to oppose all attacks
The Third Congress of the Mexican Communist Party was held in 
April, 1925* The meeting attacked CROM and pledged the communists 
to expose CROM leaders "as paid agents of the government and instruments 
of American imperialism in Mexico," and to "campaign against their 
sowing of divisions in labor's ranks, their attacks against the 
independent unions not affiliated with them, their betrayal of all 
strikes against American capital, their class collaboration and 
anti-strike theories and their servility to the government."
Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick,
1957), 323-324.
O
John P. Frey, "Trade Unions and the Civil War in Mexico," 
American Federationist, 1924, 303-308. The State Department, on the 
other hand, persisted that "Relations with Russia are being fostered 
through the medium of direct representatives, the present one being 
Luis Morones." Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 
1910-1929, Summerlin to Hughes, February 20, I923, 812.20211/6
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which the A.F.L. ' s enemies undertook against it in Mexico. CROM
also refused to seat a communist delegate in its sixth convention
held in Ciudad Juarez, November 17-21, 192k.
Green wrote Morones telling him that he was gratified at the
Mexican's refusal to affiliate with the Russians as long as the A.F.L.
5
held aloof. Green issued various statements that Morones and his
CROM were staunch defenders against communism —  this constituted
"CROM's clean bill of health." When charges were raised in the
United States Congress that Morones and Robert Haberman were Bolsheviks,
the A.F.L. was ready to defend them with all honesty and a skillful
public relations program. In July, 1925, the A.F.L. Information and
Publicity Service issued a statement defending Morones and denying
that he was a communist. A portion stated:
The unwarranted charge made against Mr. Morones 
that he is a Communist is most unjust. There 
is not scintilla of truth in the charges. Those 
who make them know better. But they are pub­
lished for the effect,it will have on the people 
of the United States.
A.F. of L. Encyclopedia and Reference Book, IH, Part 2, 1593*
'’Green to Morones, November 19, 1925 in Levenstein, "The United 
States Labor Movement and Mexico, I9IO-I951, " 178-179* The A.F.L. 
was significant because of the support it was-able to arouse in the 
United States for the Mexican Revolution, and because it was able to 
counteract pressure in the United States favoring armed intervention 
in Mexico. Informing Secretary of State Kellogg of the American 
labor movement's efforts to better conditions in Mexico, Green wrote, 
"As you know, no other group of American citizens has done more to 
make possible a situation under which constructive development is 
possible than the American labor movement." U.S. Political Relations, 
Mexico, 1910-1929, Green to Kellogg, June 15, 1925, 711.12/552.
g
U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929, February 15, 1926, 
711.12/5951
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Mexican affairs and recent Mexican-American relations attracted 
considerable discussion at the Fifth P.A.F.L. Congress •which opened 
July 18, 1927 in Washington. Morones indirectly answered recent 
charges that Mexico was "Red" when he denied that any country affil­
iated with the P.A.F.L. found "inspiration in Russian quarters." He 
asserted that "propaganda" to that effect had been circulated by 
unspecified "enemies" of organized labor, and that it had spread
just as this congress assembled in an effort to discredit its deli-
7
berations and conclusions. The P.A.F.L.'s executive council's 
reports denied that CROM was communistic, and at the closing of the 
congress the Mexican Federation of Labor was commended for its 
resistance to the "overt and insidious activities of the communist 
propagandi sts."^
In September, 1925» Morones was interviewed in Washington and 
New York by industrialists and journalists regarding possible commu­
nistic tendencies in the Mexican Labor Party. Morones declared that 
while there were a "few" individual communists in Mexico, they had 
no party and were not recognized by CROM. He claimed that organized 
Mexican labor was an intelligent movement for social betterment, anti- 
communistic in form, and had improved not only the wages of the 
laboring class* but also its food, clothing, homes, and education.
In this Waldorf Astoria interview, Morones remarked that Bolshevism
^New York Times, July 19, 1927.
g
Charles W. Hackett, "Mexican Government frees imprisoned 
Catholics," Current History, XXVI (September, 1927), 959*
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had "been grossly exaggerated in Mexico, especially regarding his 
connection with it. He pointed out that each time he crossed the 
United States he had always been carefully examined by American 
immigration authorities, and concluded that "Bolshevism has the same
Q
chance in Mexico as it has here which makes it rather insignificant."
There was little danger of communism in Mexico in the 1920's, 
for the Revolution was too ardently nationalistic to fall under 
foreign domination. Nevertheless, the State Department was vehemently 
opposed to anything which savored of Bolshevism; and the occasionally 
violent utterances of Mexican officials, which were in reality intended 
for home consumption, usually in order to allay the discontent caused 
by their failure to do anything "revolutionary," were taken seriously 
in the U.S. Even when CROM was engaged in warfare with the extreme 
leftist elements, Secretary of State Kellogg accused that labor 
confederation of having intimate relations with the Russian communists.
The State Department and Ambassador Sheffield in particular were 
convinced that Morones and numerous individuals surrounding him were 
communists, radicals, or "agents." Guilt by association became the 
criterion. By this standard, Robert Hammond Murray, a one-time 
correspondent for the New York World and translator of Calles' public 
documents and public addresses, was an "agent for the Mexican govern­
ment" in the "employ of the office of the president at a fixed monthly 
stipend."10 According to Sheffield, Frank Tannenbaum was:
q
New York Times, September 2, 1925.
10U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. February 15} 1926, 
711.12/S95T
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...far more Mexican in sympathy than he is 
American, a dangerous man for American interests, 
apparently a "believer in the personal destiny 
of Morones. He is a graduate of Columbia, a 
Phi Beta Kappa man, with a distorted view of 
society and government.-1-1
Wilbur Bates accused Ernest Gruening of being a radical, professional
12propagandist, and Calles' press agent in the United States. Sheffield
also commented on Gruening, "an American citizen having close relations
with President Calles" who "cancelled" an informal meeting between
Calles and Sheffield because of his "indiscretion" in prematurely
13releasing information to journalists. Gruening was also "a Phi
Beta Kappa man" and the State Department seems convinced that these
"extremists" served as Morones1 men. In its crusade against Bolshevism,
the State Department discovered J.H. Retinger, Morones' first biographer,
who was described in 1926, the year he published his Morones of Mexico,
as "a German radical," and an agent for the Mexican government who
14
had been "on the payroll of Morones for years." Robert Haberman,
X1Tbid., Sheffield to Kellogg, February 16, 1926, 711.12/685. 
12Ibid., February 15 j 1926, 711.12/6 9 5.
13Ibid., December 19, 1925, 711.12/658; December 23, I925,
711.12/660. Gruening evaluated the American Ambassador when he 
wrote, "...Sheffield was a hopeless reactionary and his attitude 
was that of a small group surrounding him in Mexico in the Twenties,
and he equated association with Mexicans as treason to the United
States." Gruening to Buford, April 16, 1970, L.S.U. Archives.
Ik
U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. February 15> 
1926, 711-12/695. While in Mexico, a lack of funds caused Retinger 
to accept employment as interpreter for Morones, head of the 
Departamento de Fabriles. Records Relating to the Internal Affairs 
of Mexico, 1910-1929, February 12, 1926, &L2.2021l/l8.
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Morones' interpreter and liason agent between Morones and Samuel 
Gompers, was an "American draft jumper" who escaped to Yucatan and 
"made himself conspicious in that state and Mexico as a Bolshevik and
15
radical propagandist."
The United States Embassy in Mexico City frequently received 
"reliable information" concerning communism from unnamed Americans. 
Some was forwarded on October 21, 1925, and contained an alleged 
conversation between Morones and one of his intimate friends who 
held a lucrative position in his department. "The intimate" is 
unidentified as is the source of the information, except that his 
memorandum was prepared by "a reliable American." The passage is 
worth quoting in length because it illustrates the type reports 
the State Department received. Morones is supposed to have stated 
that:
he had just had his most successful journey 
to the U.S.; that he had the Soviet propaganda 
going finely in the U.S., with good organizations 
in New York, Chicago, Denver, and other cities; 
that he fooled the Americans he met by denying 
that he had Bolshevik sympathies; that many 
people of various nationalities are arriving in 
increasing numbers, principally through Tampico
Wilbur Bates to Department of State, January h, 1926, 
8l2.5000.152 in U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929,
February 15, 1926, 711.12/695- Sheffield wrote, I learn from a 
well-informed American newspaper source that certain foreigners 
in the pay of the Mexican Government draw their pay under assumed 
names and receive their mail at Box l855> Mexico City." He included 
the following names with corresponding pseudonyms of "agents of the 
Mexican' government." John Retinger (Antonio Reachis), Robert 
Haberman (Rodolfo Herrera), Ernest Gruening (Erasmo Guerra), and Frank 
Tanneribaum (Fernando Torres). Records Relating to the Internal 
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. Sheffield to Kellogg, April 2 8, 1926, 
812.20211/3^-•
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and Veracruz, all Bolshevik!, for propaganda in 
the United States, and they are being put over 
the border with plenty of money as teachers or 
other professions and as tourists; and that the 
whole frontier is well organized with his people, 
meaning his labor organizations. ^
The Mexican Communist Party continued its efforts to get CROM 
to join the Red International of Labor Unions and in Moscow CRQM's 
Labor Attache was invited to attend a meeting of the Red International 
of Labor Unions Executive Bureau. The attache invited the Inter­
national to send an observer to a CROM convention. These auspicious 
beginnings aborted by the short-sightedness of the First Secretary 
of Soviet Legation, who as a dinner speaker at a CROM banquet, 
berated his hosts for not holding membership in the R.I.L.U.
Relations between CROM and the International cooled and their 
reciprocal invitations were cancelled. In March, 1926, Morones 
used an incident involving snooping by the Russians on Eulalio 
Martinez, the CROM Labor Attache in Moscow, as an excuse to sever 
connections with the Soviets. Martinez was withdrawn, and the next
CROM convention was asked to suspend official relations with the
17soviet labor movement.
Morones was described in the following terms; "for several 
years he has been classed as an ultra-radical labor agitator, 
working more or less along the lines of Socialism." U.S. Political 
Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. February 16, 1926, 711.12/695.
17New York Times, March 9? 1926. Morones’ intrigues also helped 
to oust the governors of Nuevo Leon, Aguasealientes, Oaxaca, and San 
Luis Potosi. The first two refused to back strikers affiliated with 
CROM, while the others were in sympathy with the communists. Records 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. Bay to Kellogg, 
December 10, 1925s 812.504/750.
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Another "reliable friend" dispatch described a farewell supper
allegedly given by Obregon at Chapultepec Castle on November 23, 1926.
Calles, Morones, Puig Casaursnc, Luis Leon, and Obregon retired to a
smoking-room to converse and gamble as they drank coffee and liquers.
Obregon is supposed to have said, "I have made it clear to the whole
world that we are not afraid of the Gringos and that I pulled Uncle
Sam's whiskers." "For several years," he continued, "we have been
sending over our border, daily, many soviet delegates who have been
carrying on an admirable propaganda in the United States." At this
point, there was much enthusiasm among those present over these
remarks, and Morones embraced Obregon saying, "Now I know that you
l8
are an eternal companion." Several questions must be raised about 
this dialogue. Whs was the Embassy's "mysterious" informant? Was 
he a qualified intelligence specialist? Why was Obregon in Mexico 
City instead of in Sonora at this time? Who was meant by "we," and 
why was Morones unaware of Obregon's "daily sending of soviet agents 
into the 'Gringo Republic?"' If one is skeptical of the veracity of 
this dispatch, and there is sufficient room for doubt, another 
communique sent ten days later is more questionable.
On December 17■> 1926, Sheffield sent "absolutely authentic" 
data that "an reliable informant" had furnished him concerning an 
informal after-dinner talk in Queta's house in Tacubaya. "Qneta" 
was a nickname for Enriqueta,■the alleged mother of Morones' children,
3_8
U.S. Political Relations, Mexico. 1910-1929, December 7,
1926, 711.12/810.
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and a ■woman who was reputed to own a tequilerxa or low-class drinking 
place. According to this source, a "friend said" Sheffield had 
arrived and asked Morones what would he the Mexican government's 
position. Morones replied the same as ever, "fooling the United 
States and making a damn fool of the Ambassador." He bragged of the 
multitudinous elements in Central America, South America, and the 
United States "which at the cost of much patience and money we have 
been able to introduce among the Gringos thousands of propagandists 
of our communist doctrines." Much of this money, he continued, was 
spent, since "we have to pay many newspapers in the United States 
and many Americans have helped us in this direction." Morones 
allegedly said that an expert arrived "to show us how to make and 
produce aspyziating gases and other advantageous weapons." Further­
more, "our strength" is increased by the fellow feeling of the 
working classes of all Europe and Asia, principally that of the 
Japanese people and government. He then praised "our big friend"
(amigota) Madame Kollantay, a great propagandist whose job it was 
to work especially among Mexican women destroying their religious 
sentiment, "the cause of the misfortunes of humanity." The supposed 
conversation came to a stirring end when Morones declared:
Now you know, boys, that our plan of action with 
the Gringos is to make damfools (sic) (pendejos) 
of them, telling them that we are not Bolsheviki; 
that, on the contrary, we are Christians, for in 
this sense our President will shortly make some 
declarations. (Applause and singing of the 
Internationale).
Sheffield's comment about this "reliable" dispatch was that, "It is 
primarily of interest as illustrating the point of view of men in
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government here hut less interesting, perhaps, as an expression of 
19concrete policy."
CROM leaders denied any collusion with the communists. Morones, 
for example, asked the expulsion of the Russian Ambassadoress Madame
Kollantay, "who converted the anbassy into a center of Soviet
20 ~  
propaganda." Ricardo Trevino, CROM secretary general, also
wired Kellogg to refute the Secretary of State’s speech charging
that CROM was communistic before the Senate Foreign Relations
21
Committee on January 12, 1927*
Following his return from Europe in March, 1930? Morones took 
advantage of welcoming receptions to promote discord and harass 
Portes Gil. Addressing a meeting of the P.L.M. in the street in 
front of CROM offices, Morones and Lombardo Toledano bitterly attacked 
Portes Gil and the P.N.R. Morones accused the former president of 
using communist elements to instigate a plot against the life of
1^Ibid., Sheffield to Kellogg, December 17, 1926, 711*12/780.
20Luis N. Morones in El Universal, August 31? 1956.
^ . S .  Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. January 13?
1927?-711.12/855. Kellogg, who was invited beforethe committee to 
explain the basis and justification of the government's policy in 
Nicaragua and Mexico, claimed: "The plots to combat and overthrow
American imperialism, particularly in Latin America, are formulated 
and fostered by the P.L.M., which is the communist organization in 
the country." See U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Sixty-Ninth 
Congress, Second Session, LXVIII-Part 2 (Washington, 1927)? 16U9-I65I 
for Kellogg's undocumented claims. Kellogg released to the press a 
statement which tried to link the Mexican government and its inter­
ference in Nicaragua with the communist party in the United States 
hence with Russian Bolshevism.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
252
Courtesy Archivo Casasola 
LUIS N. MORONES IN HIE 1930's. EDUARDO MONEDA IN THE BACKGROUND
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
President-Elect Ortiz Rubio during the latter's visit to the United
States. According to Morones, Portes Gil brought various gunmen from
22
Chicago and New York with him to Los Angeles "to do the job." Portes 
Gil, who was head of the P.N.R. against which the Morones elements 
would contend in the July, 1930 election for deputies and senators, 
described Morones' accusations as absurd. There is no reliable proof 
to support Morones' allegations that Portes Gil was behind any such 
plot.
After its fall from official favor, CROM’s "self-defense
against the Red menace" became the battle cry of a narrow and
embittered faction. Morones and Lombardo Toledano persistently
accused each other of communism on the one hand, and peculation
and fraud on the other. During the 19^0' s Lombardo became the
"kingpin" in communist trade union activities in Latin America, but
refused to join the official Communist Party of Mexico. Morones
continuously labeled Lombardo "communist" in addition to many other
unflattering terms, such as, "traitor," "eunuch," and "man without
a country." One particular charge, that Lombardo "smokes a pipe to
23
imitate Stalin," borders on the ridiculous.
The formation of the C.T.A.L. in 1938 indicated to the P.A.F.L. 
leadership that a new era in international labor organization was 
beginning. There was still available a number of labor organizations
^Miguel Gil in La Prensa, February 12, 1938.
^Luis N. Morones in El Excelsior, July 23, 19^5.
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in Latin America which, might he brought into the P.A.F.L. Acting on
the A.F.L.'s decision, the P.A.F.L.'s executive committee, including
Morones, decided to make a survey by correspondence in 1939 to
ascertain opinion about assembling a sixth P.A.F.L. congress to
improve international labor cooperation. Morones met with Green,
Woll, and Iglesias in an executive council meeting in Washington
in May, 1939? and they decided to hold an international conference
in Havana in 1940. The object was to unite unions of "good faith"
24
against Nazi, fascist, and communist syndicates.
Lombardo Toledano greeted Morones' announcement that the P.A.F.L.
would convene with derision:
The political cadaver of Luis Morones declared 
yesterday in Washington, in the name of the 
defunct Pan-American Federation of Labor, that 
this shadow of.. .Pan-Americanism of the epoch 
of Theodore Roosevelt proposes to revive the 
tactic hated in all of Latin America, that of
organizing the workers of its nations in order
to subordinate them to the policies of the labor 
leaders of the U.S. who are in the services of 
the imperialist forces.
Lombardo charged that the real intention of those behind this move
was to get Franklin D. Roosevelt's and Cardenas' enemies to participate
in the forthcoming presidential elections in the United States and
Mexico. "Fortunately," concluded Lombardo, "Morones has about as
El Popular, May 18, 1939* At the annual A.F.L. convention 
meeting in Cincinnati in November, 1939, Morones again suggested that 
the P.A.F.L. renew its activities in Mexico, Central America, and 
South America. He asserted that the communistic C.T.M. was attempting 
to destroy CROM, and reasserted an empty CROM pledge— to uphold 
justice and democracy. "Luis N. Morones pide que se reanuden las 
actividades de la Confederation Obrera Pan-Americana," C.R.O.M., 
November, 1939> 26, 29.
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much power in the social life of Mexico as he has in the Dominican 
Republic."25
Morones alleged that Fidel Velazquez, C.T.M. secretary general,
fearful that Lombardo would prevent his re-election and that Lombardo
was implanting communist ideas in Mexico, suggested that CROM and
C.T.M. merge in 19^ -3• According to Morones, a close friend of
Velazquez went to Morones1 home to invite him to lunch with the
C.T.M. boss. Morones arrived promptly and was apprised by the rival
secretary general that he wished to combine the two unions to fling
the communistic Lombardo "down from his pedastal" two weeks before
the national C.T.M. congress. The meeting was cordial, included
+ 26abrazos, and high praise for Morones from Velazquez. Confronted
by such inconclusive evidence, it cannot be verified that Velazquez
ever approached Morones with such an offer.
In December, 19^ +95 Morones instigated his "communist hunt."
He requested Miguel Aleman's government that Lombardo Toledano and
the remainder of the communist leaders be deprived of their nationality
27and released his list of "known or suspected communists" to the .press.
25gi Popular, May 18, 1939.
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El Excelsior, July if, 1945; Eduardo Tellez V. in El Universal, 
July 6, 1945; El Nacional, July 6 , 1945* Morones' anti-communist 
feelings were "colored" by his belief that cetpim'stas had "sold out" 
to Avila Camacho's government. Morones considered Lombardo and C.T.M. 
leadership traitors to the working class for their agreeing to prohibit 
strikes during World War II. Luis N. Morones in Las Novedades, April 19*- 
19^ 5.
2 7
'Lombardo Toledano, Ortega Arenas, David Siqueiros, Diego Rivera, 
Agustfn Guzman^V., Vidal Diaz Munoz, Alfonso Palacios, Juan Manuel 
Elizondo, Gongalez Flores, Marfa Asunsolo, Dolores del Rfo, Flores 
Zaragoza, Sanchez Cardenas, Juan O' Gorman, and Narciso B'assols were a 
few of those named. Las Novedades, December 30, 19495 La Prensa, 
Decenber 30j 1949.
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Later he publicized a copy of information sent to the Cominform by 
the Mexican Communist Party relating to a communist congress celebrated 
in Guatemala. Morones alleged that Valentin Campa, who represented 
the Mexican cells, said, "I greet you in the name of our comarade and 
ex-president Cardenas." This statement, to Morones, signifies that 
the ex-president acted as communism’s chief in Mexico. After this 
disclosure, the CROM leader claimed that Cardenas was having his con-
oQ
federation's offices "watched" by cars. Morones celebrated other 
anti-communist congresses in the Palace of Fine Arts in June and 
July, 1950. Stating that misery is the principal ally of the expan­
sion of the communist doctrine, Morones urged the remedy of higher
29wages; and again read a list of "known communists."
During his "fight against international communism," Morones 
attended a conference held at Cuenca del Rio de la Plata, Paraguay 
in February, 1952. In his address to the forerunner of A.T.L.A.S., 
Morones asserted that the "executioners and enemies" of the workers 
are "capitalistic and communistic imperialism," and urged the
30
organizing of "the great army of workers of the fields and city."
In 1957, Morones wrote that he accepted Russia's governmental 
form for its country since "it is the best to judge its own acts,"
pQ
El Excelsior, July 18, 19^5.
29 *
The list included Jesus Silva Herzog, Luis Padilla Nervo, and
Luis Quintanilla among others. El Universal, June 30, 1950; El Zocalo,
July 1, 1950.
^ E l  Excelsior, November 23, 1952.
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Courtesy Archivo Casasola
Front row left to right: Robert Haberman, Miguel Aleman. Luis N.
Morones, Rogelio de la Selva. Back row (right of center): Jose
Petricioli and Juan Fonseca.
"but opposed Russia's attempt to transplant its system and -way of
life. Morones, who was nationalistic and anti “communistic in
orientation, considered both, communism and capitalism as inadequate
answers to Mexico's problems. He recognized that communism was not
only a threat to national independence, but to his leadership of
31Mexico's organized labor movement.
Morones wrote, "not only have I never been affiliated with 
communism, but I have fought it for a long time." Luis N. Morones 
in El Universal, February 20, 1957*
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MORONES, THE MAN 
FAMILY LIFE
Since little has "been written about Morones' personal life, the 
purpose of this brief chapter is to elucidate this neglected area. 
Morones had three wives, but not more than one at a time as was 
stated in a United States diplomatic dispatch. He married Felipa 
Pena Morales, Marfa Teresa del Valle Monroy, and Berta Castillo 
Angellini. By his first wife, whom he divorced in 1922, he had 
his first child, Luis Enrique, who was born in December, 1916.
Luis Enrique stated that although Marfa Teresa joined Morones in 
exile in 1936 and "passed" as his wife, they did not marry until 
much later. Morones divorced her to marry Berta who still resides 
in Mexico City.
BSYSICAL APPEARANCE 
Berta admits that Luis was not handsome, but claims that his 
"magnificent personality" attracted her. Commenting on Morones' 
personal appearance, she used the phrase "siempre estaba bien 
presentado"; he wore expensive ties and silk shirts, tailor-made 
suits, and never went without shaving. Professor Robert J. Alexander, 
who observed Morones in 19^8, described him as being stocky, advanced 
in baldness, and tall for a Mexican. Alexander commented that Morones 
was so well-dressed that he did not resemble a labor leader. Bertram 
Wolfe supplied a fairly accurate portrayal of Morones when he described 
him as:
259
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Gross, fleshy, thick-lipped, heavy-jowled, 
soft and pudgy-handed, redolent of perfume, 
fond of silk underwear and diamonds, he looks 
more like the newspaper cartoon conception 
of a capitalist than he does a labor leader.
His sybaritic softness of exterior gives' no 
inkling of the ruthless hardness and lust 
for power that enabled him to bestride the 
confused, chaotic, mistrustful and immature 
labor movement of the twenties and bend it 
to his will.l
Morones was corpulent. Bertram Wolfe's Portrait of Mexico 
contains numerous reproductions of murals drawn by Diego Rivera, 
one of Mexico's outstanding artists. Rivera had a strong dislike 
for Morones. One of his murals on the National Palace stairway 
portrays Morones' fleshy face with a straw hat over his eyes, and 
another portrays him as a huge pig beating cymbals behind a figure 
representing Calles. In this last fresco, "The Big Boss and his 
Labor Lieutenant," Morones has puffy cheeks and thick lips.
Morones’ son, Luis Enrique, calculates that Morones weighed 
220 pounds during 192*4-29. If his estimate is correct, it disproves 
the excessively high figure of 300 pounds which Hubert Herring and 
John Edwin Fagg printed (without documentation) in their Latin 
American history texts. Partly because of his obesity, Morones 
enjoyed Turkish baths, and his widow relates that he went several 
times daily during his latter years.
Bertram D. Wolfe, Portrait of Mexico (New York, 1937), 179* 
^Ibid. See plates 226 and 2*4-6 in Portrait of Mexico.
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Courtesy El Excelsior 
LUIS N. MORONES ADDRESSING CROM, 19^0
Courtesy Jose Petricioli 
JOSE EETRICIOLI
Courtesy L.E. Morones PenaCourtesy Arciiivo Casasola
ZAPAIA AGUSTIN CASASOLA
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PERSONALITY
Morones' volatile, forceful personality and "blunt manners 
aroused strong dislike. An excitable, emotional and strong-willed 
person, bis poignant verbal attacks and demeanor aroused tempests 
of polemics.
The point is frequently made that Morones was austere and 
humorless, but this basically depended on his relationship and inter­
action with those around him. Carleton Beals, for example, evaluated 
him as "a cold man -who tried his test to be cordial." Ramon Eduardo 
Ruiz wrote:
I never met Luis Morones, though I spoke with 
many who had. Frankly,. I never had a high 
opinion of the man....Katherine Anne Porter's 
short story...on Morones...is fiction but, I 
think, descriptive of the man. The title is 
Flowering Judas.
Since Morones rode in a bullet-proof automobile during his 
tenure as Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor, Luis Enrique 
related an interesting anecdote about his father. Without specify­
ing when the incident happened, he stated that Morones escaped 
injury when the car he drove collided with a cow on the Laredo
^Beals to Buford, February 19? 1970, L.S.U. Archives. One of 
Morones1 attempts at humor was a pun on Jesus Corona's name: I "Por
que a los perros les llaman chuchos y a las cervezas coronas?"
Petri cioli, El eompanero Morones, 62.
^Ruiz to Buford, December 2b, 1969, L.S.U. Archives. Miss 
Porter knew Morones and had told Carleton Beals that she intended to 
write a sketch of the detestable labor boss. Braggioni, a Mexican 
labor leader in Flowering Judas, could very easily be Porter's 
"fictional" portrayal of Morones: callous, corrupt, malicious,
wicked, vain of his talents, dangerous to offend, powerful, and clad 
in expensive garments with a diamond hoop in his necktie.
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Highway.^
ALTHUISM
Since Morones was a ruthless man who faced up to situations 
of life and death fearlessly, one is apt to diminish his "good" 
side. According to his widow, if a poor person asked Morones for 
"bread on the streets, he would take the impoverished individual 
to a restaurant and tell the waiter "to serve this person what he
g
wants." Morones would then pay the hill. Beals, however, who was
riding in Morones' limousine, witnessed Morones laughingly refuse
7
an elderly woman's modest pleas for fifty centavos.
Remembering the difficulties of his childhood and realizing that 
the youth are the future of Mexico, Morones was supposedly generous 
to children (especially the newspaper vendors in the streets). 
Occasionally he would inquire how many papers the hoys had, then 
he would huy ten or twenty issues from them. These acts, Morones'
g
widow believes, demonstrated her husband's generosity.
Beals described another interesting anecdote concerning two
incidents of Morones' beneficence when he wrote:
He was very kind to one of his secretaries 
Mary Doherty, an American girl, who was 
faithfully devoted to him. And an American 
anarchist, an ex-cook who sabotaged elite
'Interview, Mexico City, August 28, 1968.
^Interview, Mexico City, August 3, 1968.
7
Interview, Baton Rouge, April 12, 1970.
g
Interview, Mexico City, August 3, 1968.
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banquets "by putting emetic in the soup, and 
had finally to flee to Mexico, and went insane 
while doing a biograpby of Morones. Morones 
visited him in the asylum and saw to it he 
had good care.9
Morones’ widow related that Morones had a very noble heart and 
was loyal and devoted to his camarades. "He was always a friend to 
his friends," she said. Judging by Morones’ prolonged hostilities 
with Portes Gil, Lombardo Toledano, and Aaron Saenz, the converse 
also appears to have been true; "an enemy was always an enemy."
DIVERSIONS AND PASTIMES 
Berta describes CRCM as being "the true passion of Luis’ life." 
Morones often cancelled plans he had made with her for some unexpected 
CF.OM business. He once told her, "It is my life, I cannot leave it." 
After only partially recuperating from surgery in 1958, for example, 
Morones travelled to Acapulco to inaugurate a CRCM building in that 
port town. According to Berta, Morones had a paternalistic attitude 
toward workers and viewed them as a father would his rebellious
Morones loved music, especially classical, opera, and the 
"folklorico" of Spain. He played a mandolin during his youth, and
%eals to Buford, February 19, 1970, L.S.U. Archives., The would 
be biographer thoroughly enjoyed the sight of persons regurgitating on 
banquet tables. Beals met the cook on a Mexico City street corner two 
days before the latter was committed to the asylum. Interview, Baton 
Rouge, April 12, 1970.
^Interview, Mexico City, August 3» 1968. When asked if she had 
read Petricioli's biography, she expressed her disappointment and dis­
agreement with the superficial volume. Her husband died an "idealist 
with many deceptions"; Petricioli "imagines Luis without knowing him, 
what he has written is not Luis —  it is too flowery."
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frequently accompanied his friend Jesus Corona who played the piano. 
Morones later switched to playing the guitar, which like the mandolin 
he never formally studied, hut "played by ear." He was so captivated 
by guitars that he once bought an expensive, beautiful Valenciana 
guitar in Spain.
Luis Enrique relates that his father often played dominoes 
during his youth, but preferred rentoy, a card game, in his later 
years. He confined his sports to fronton, a handball game which he 
preferred to play with a tennis racket to make it a much faster game. 
During his interview with Morones in February, 1957, Professor John 
W.F. Dulles was impressed by a large stuffed fish which was hanging 
on the wall and which Morones stated he had caught several years 
earlier.^" It is unlikely that Morones ever fished since he never 
liked to participate in sports.
Morones’ taste in food was cosmopolitan. Invariably he had a 
good appetite and his third wife cannot recall a food he disliked. 
Some of his favorite dishes were crepes suzette and sopa de medulla 
con criadillos. He enjoyed drinking wine, whisky, cognac (with or 
without coffee), but refrained from drinking beer or pulque. Beals 
states that Morones was discrete in his drinking habits, he had his 
copas but Beals never saw him "tight." Morones likewise smoked 
cigarettes but in moderation.
^Dulles to Buford, March 7, 1970, L.S.U. Archives.
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ORATORY
Morones1 oratorical ability was one of his chief assets. During 
his lengthy career he made thousands of speeches and trained himself 
to think and speak on the spot. Both Portes Gil and Alfonso Sanchez 
Madariaga admit that Morones possessed a facility for words and a 
quality for speaking effectively. After reading many of Morones' 
unpolished and monotonous speeches (in which he often circumvented 
the major questions), it is obvious that his effectiveness depended 
on the verve of his delivery and the audience's involvement with the 
issues.
Morones often employed an inflammatory oratory which could
seize the imagination of an audience with the persuasiveness of his
speaking style. An illustration of his success in persuasion occurred
at a private dinner given for the Mexican labor leader in New York
City in 1925* After having answered questions "of the most searching
character" for almost two hours concerning the extraordinary advance
in the condition of Mexican laborers in the past twenty years, one of
his listeners wrote:
It is encouraging to all who are interested in 
the progress of democratic government to have 
knowledge of an Administration which is devoted 
with such high intelligence to an earnest effort 
to know and to seek the truth and to put in 
practice principles around which millions of 
men have gathered and to which they have con­
secrated their lives.^
12George Foster Peabody in the New York Times, September 10,
1925. In 1962, Morones addressed a CROM meeting in the Lxrico Theater. 
By this time the seventy-two year-old labor leader had lost his vibrant 
delivery. Luis Araiza, Historia de la Casa del Obrera Mundial, 271 
Considering that he gave so many speeches, Morones never wrote much 
compared with his rivals Lombardo Toledano and Portes Gil.
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MEDICAL HISTORY 
Morones suffered diverse illnesses throughout his life. His 
physical misfortunes began in 1916 when a partial facial paralysis 
left him inflicted with a nervous tic in his upper lip and right 
eyelid. A bullet pi-reed his left side grazing his left lung during 
a gunfight in the Chamber of Deputies in November, I92I+. Morones 
later developed diabetes, uremia, and ulcers. He fell in the bathtub 
fracturing several ribs in 195^*
As a result of a gangrene infection, Morones lost the toes of 
his left foot; his right foot was amputated to the shin in 1957. 
Following this operation, Morones attended the Rehabilitation 
Institute in Tlalpan to learn to walk with the aid of parallel bars 
and crutches. He used a wheelchair in his home, but refused to 
utilize it or crutches outside of his residence. Morones was forced 
to use a compliment which was added to his left shoe, and a modified 
artificial leg for his right appendage. Although walking tired him, 
Morones remained fairly active and continued to address labor meetings. 
On one occasion, the seventy-two-year-old leader had to be helped 
down the aisle of the Lxrieo Theater by means of a cane held in his 
right hand, and walked arm in arm with Dionisio Sanchez for additional 
support.^
The last year of Morones’ life was painful. He was hospitalized 
from November, 1963 to January, I96U because of a tumor on one of his
C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1961-1963, 121; picture in photograph archive 
of La Prcnsa.
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kidneys. Following his discharge from the National Medical Center, 
Morones went to Cuernavaca and Acapulco to recuperate. Two weeks 
later he suffered a relapse and doctors decided to return him to the 
capital. Morones lived for the last two months by virtue of injections 
and blood transfusions given him at his home.
DEATH AND BURIAL
Morones, undermined by years of illness and suffering from a 
renal infection and diverse complications, died in his home on 
April 6 , 196b at 3:00 P.M. Shortly before expiring,he painfully 
murmured to his old friend Reynaldo Cervantes Torres, "Don't move 
me from bed...I want to rest in peace for one time."
His corpse was transferred to CROM offices, where his coffin 
was placed between four candles and under a crucifix to receive 
posthumous homage. CROM secretary general Antonio Hernandez,
Rigoberto Gonzalez, Jose Petricioli, Fidel Velazquez and Justino 
Sanchez Madariaga of the C.T.M., some founders of the Casa del Obrero 
Mundial, Licenciado Julio Santos Coy representing President Adolfo 
Lopez Mateos, and others stood watch. Santos Coy stated, "We deeply
lament that one of the pioneers of the Mexican labor movement has
II4.
died."
Numerous government officials sent their condolences. A few 
of these were: President Lopez Mateos, Benito Coquet, Director of
Social Security; Salomon Gonzalez Blanco, Secretary of Labor; Tomas
^ E 1  Excelsior, April 7» 196 .^
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Morentes, ex-governor of Yucatan; and ex-president Miguel Aleman 
who sent a floral arrangement of chrysanthemums and telephoned 
from New York.
The Pateon Frances de la Piedad on Avenida Cuauhtemoc was 
selected for the funeral services. Some five hundred persons attended 
Morones' last r i t e s L u i s  Araiza and Antonio Hernandez helped 
carry the gray metal coffin draped with a CROM flag, the word 
"lealtad," (loyalty) and later covered with twenty to forty 
wreaths of flowers.
Some complimentary things were said at the funeral of the
once criticized and maligned labor czar. Antonio Hernandez gave
the first speech, a short biographical sketch which was followed
by his praising of Morones' high values as a national director,
politician, and great patriot. Celestino Gasca, who had been
expelled from CROM twenty-eight years earlier because of Morones'
"trumphed up charges," claimed that "the workers' organizations of
16the Republic and of the world have lost a great flght."'1"^  Lombardo 
Toledano added that "I am a son of the CROM; with all respects,
^Some of those in attendance were: Jose Maria Tapxa, Melchor
Ortega, Undersecretary in Charge of Gobemacion in Calles1 cabinet; 
Jesus Yiiren, secretary general of the Federation of Workers of the 
Federal District; Julio Santos Coy who represented President Lopez 
Mateos; Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Fidel Velazquez who paid homage 
for the C.T.M. central committee, Morones' widow, his children (Luis 
Enrique, Luis Hernando, Elvira, Josefina, and Alma Morones Viuda 
de Vallejo), and several of his grandchildren.
La Prensa, April 7, 196k .
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
272
17 /
gentlemen, in these moments we are all equal." Alfonso Guzman Neyra,
head of the Mexican Supreme Court:, then said of Morones, "Although he
was very controversial, he was one of the persons who was most
interested in the welfare of his class and fought for it...one must
realize that he was a prominent figure within the Mexican workers'
18movement." Following the eulogies and as a band played "Silencio," 
Morones' cadaver was interred at U:00 P.M.
^ E 1  Excelsior, April 7, 19&+-
18 ^
Ibid. Morones' well-kept marble grave (No. 183 of the first
avenue of the Panteon Frances de la Piedad), is adorned by a bronze
bust of the labor leader and the inscription, "Luis N. Morones, 11
Octubre I89O-5 Abril 196U. Recuerdo cariSoso de su esposa, hijos y
nietos." Berta Castillo bought the burial ]Dlot for Morones on
August 9, 19^5 for 320 pesos. Olga Maria Diaz Portillo, interview,
Mexico City, April 1, 1971. Senora Diaz Portillo is the cemetary's
director.
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CONCLUSION
Although, in its congresses and through its press CROM advocated 
direct action, its leaders engaged heavily in political labor action, 
■which Morones disguised under the name of multiple action. Less 
radical'than anarcho-syndicalist groups, CROM under the conservative 
Morones was content to be a virtual partner of the government and 
helped shape labor policy from 1920-28. In the hey-day of trade 
unionism under Calles and Morones, the strength of labor, which 
meant the power of CROM, depended upon a federal government whose 
head was personally eager to support labor's demands with government's 
force. Instead of the state falling under labor control as Morones 
earlier promised in his pre-CROM days, CROM fell increasingly under 
state control and served as the backbone of Calles' forces during 
his administration.
Morones enjoyed a unique position during CROM's golden years.
The double position of "government man" and union head gave Morones 
decisive power to augment CROM membership, enforce the closed shop 
in CROM plants, and cripple rival unions. Morones served as Minister 
of Industry, Commerce, and Labor, and other CROM leaders were congress­
men, state legislators, and governors. One must not exaggerate the 
implications of this relationship, but one should be careful not to 
underestimate it. If Morones' CROM was not running the government, 
it came as close as possible to making the relationship a diarchy.
273
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In appointing Morones to his cabinet (a cabinet position had 
greater importance in Mexico than in the United States) Calles, who 
liked, trusted, and needed Morones, repaid a political debt, but 
exceeded a mere political obligation by giving organized labor a 
recognition and standing surpassing any it ever had enjoyed. As 
Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor, Morones accomplished 
little that was noteworthy. He was, in fact, distinctly mediocre 
in that position. During his period of control of the government's 
labor relations, no labor legislation of any importance was enacted.
A rather ineffectual law was passed in 1925 regulating the right to 
work, but it seems to have been forced on Morones by the demands of 
labor.
Many of Minister Morones' actions reflected no particular merit 
on him. He served as an actual impediment to advance since he used 
his labor dictatorship to smash independent and rival unions (such 
as the railway strikes of 1922 and 1926, and tranviarios strike in 
1923)> practice collusion, utilize extortion, harass business and 
industry, attempt judicial subservience, and accomplish little for 
the campesinos. Another socially divisive and disintegrating affebt 
was the alienation of one wing of labor, Morones' CROM, from other 
labor wings and from the agrarians. In short, Morones was not 
"detached" enough to devote to his important ministry the seriousness, 
earnestness, objectivity, and enterprise which it required.
Although many of the problems with which Morones contended had 
their roots in the past, he knew little of monetary economics, credit 
analysis, or agricultural economics. In addition, he curtailed remedial
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technical progress which he regarded as negative and undesirable.
In order to protect jobs, he misguidedly fought progressive methods 
which would have increased factory output. In order to provide work 
for unemployed or •underemployed urban, workers, Morones tended to 
emphasize labor-intensive techniques. He used his governmental 
position to prevent progress in the factories by refusing to install 
modern machinery, except in the new mills. Acting under the belief 
that efforts to change methods of manufacture would inevitably increase 
unemployment, an economic ill which he hoped to limit, Morones carried 
his inefficient principles too far and adversely affected the nation's 
aggregate product by retarding labor-saving technological develop­
ments.
Labor organization is an excellent idea, but ideas, if they 
are to be of much use, require intelligent and dedicated direction. 
Unfortunately, labor did not receive the altruistic guidance of 
leaders who were unselfishly and genuinely interested in the up­
grading of the laborers' social and economic position. One may 
censure CROM leaders for sacrificing the labor movement to oppor­
tunism, personal fortunes, unscrupulous conduct, and labor liderismo. 
The wealth amassed from this graft could have been employed for 
beneficial purposes: the foundation of schools, clinics, and libraries.
Instead, Morones and his cohorts in the Grupo Accion vainly adhered 
more to luxury than to noblesse oblige. Labor leadership under 
Morones tended to be corrupt, combined whenever necessary, with 
violence and strong-arm methods. Morones, for example, imposed 
Carlos Riva Palacio as governor in the State of tyexico against the
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will of the people "by sending large numbers of laborers to Toluca and 
to other important voting centers, by special trains where they were 
able to control or prevent voting.
Even when Morones* party, P.L.M., was at the peak of its power, 
it made no effort to correct or eliminate any of the major political 
evils in Mexico. An excellent opportunity was lost during which 
leaders might have taken steps toward formulating a federal labor 
code, and toward establishing a unified labor movement in Mexico 
which would be able to stand on its own merits when a change in 
government ended its support. The opposition of Morones, who wanted 
to keep as much control over labor as possible in his own hands and 
make himself indispensable to labor by making labor dependent on him, 
seems to have partly been responsible for the lack of a federal labor 
law. Regarding himself as the patron of the labor movement, Morones 
intended that the rank and file should look up to him for both 
economic and political protection; and did nothing to develop perma­
nent economic power in the unions and protect labor by legislation. 
Therefore, no reform in political practices exists today as a result 
of his CROM*s favored position in the government.
Morones’ influence was also negative in the petroleum controversy 
where he proved to be an obstacle to harmonious Mexican-United States 
relations. The Mexican government delegated the authority of cancelling 
the permits to drill for oil to Minister Morones who spoke rather 
vaguely in spelling out "the rules of the game." The lower Mexican 
tribunals decided in favor of the companies; but Morones asking for 
revision, passed the case to the Supreme Court. On November 17, 1927,
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this superior tribunal decided that the Minister of Industry could 
not cancel drilling permits for lands on which "positive acts” had 
not been made before May 1, 1917> because the owner had failed to 
apply for a concession of fifty years prescribed by Article 15 of 
the petroleum law* On December 26, 1927> Calles sent a message to 
the Mexican Congress proposing the modification of the articles in 
question, and this was done.
Although Morones failed to fulfill many of his demogogic 
promises, CROM policies yielded many positive results, and certain 
gains accrued to the workers. Labor came more nearly to the.point 
of being completely unified under CROM's banner than at any other 
period since Mexico had become "labor-conscious." Labor, or at 
least a part of it, achieved the right to organize, strike, and 
bargain collectively. CROM, through its influence in the government, 
helped enforce Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution which provided 
for shorter working hours, better working conditions, higher wages, 
health and safety measures, indemnification of injured workers, and 
partitioned seme lands.
The organization of great numbers of persons who were illiterate, 
inexperienced, and who had never previously been organized in any way 
into unions, was a tremendous task and was accomplished. .• Morones gave 
impetus to the formation of a worker's organization of considerable 
importance in the political future of Mexico and no one influenced 
or determined the labor movement in Mexico as much as Morones did 
until his downfall in 1923. To some extent,labor was politicized 
and admitted to society's decision-making processes. CromLstas
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participated politically in naming candidates for political offices 
and in formulating governmental programs. This tendency toward a 
more pluralistic process broadened the basis of Mexican society and 
served as a link between tradition and modernity.
One laudatory evaluation of Morones comes from Frank Tannenbaum,
a leading Mexicanist whose published comments were based on a close
personal association with him. The American professor wrote in the
early 1930's that:
It has always seemed to me that the work of Morones, 
in its general and specific influence upon the place 
of labor in the scheme of Mexican life and labor, of 
Mexican politics and policy, in the bringing of the 
worker into the arena where he is both counted and 
counts, compares with that of Zapata in the agrarian 
field. It is true that for the moment the labor 
movement in Mexico and even the leadership has 
declined, as so often everything seems to decline 
in Mexico, sacrificed to political ends and personal 
ends and personal fortune. The leaders may be cen­
sured, but no group in Mexico has been more loyal to 
its broader a.img than the labor group collected about 
Morones. Neither Calles nor Obregon can boast of 
having given to Mexico so permanent and, in the long
>nin *ia nro ■? + a
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ends as is to be had in the trade-union movement 
regardless of what happens to the personal fortune 
of Morones or of the Grupo Aceion.l
The 1928 presidential election, a major turning point in the 
organization's history, changed Morones' and CROM's future. CROM's 
leaders believed that it was time that a civilian became president 
and, in addition, that he should be Morones. Ex-president Obregon, 
however, had decided that he wanted to return to the presidency, and 
Calles not only supported him, but even facilitated the arrangement
■^Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution, 2^+6-2^7.
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by changing the Constitution to make it possible.
It is uncertain whether Morones had anything to do with the 
death of Obregon; but it was generally believed.'in Mexico that Obregon 
had been responsible, while he Was president, for an attempt on 
Morones* life; and it was no secret that Morones did not feel personally 
secure with Obregon in the capital in a position of presidential power.
It has been alleged that Morones was the intellectual author of the 
assassination, and although it remains problematical, the burden of 
proof must lie with the accusers whose charges are indefinite.
One central theme emerging from a study of Morones and his CROM, 
and a salient fact that must be underscored, is the key role played 
by the federal, government. Between 1920 and 19^0 there is a direct 
correlation between CROM's strength and the favorable or unfavorable 
governmental policy manifested toward CROM. Therefore, when Morones 
resigned from the cabinet, and CROM in effect joined the opposition, 
virtual war was declared between the administration and the labor 
group. A number of circumstances contributed to these events:
Morones* support of and partnership with Calles, the labor leader's 
possible role in Obregon*s assassination, the personal feud between 
1928 and 1930 with President Portes Gil, the Paso Macho train explo­
sion, as well as the reactions which finally occurred against this 
corrupt gangster, help explain CROM's swift decline during the adminis­
trations of Portes Gil and Cardenas whose animosity Morones had provoked.
Morones lacked a few of the essential requisites of success in 
political life: he was not conciliatory, and did not master or grasp
the importance of respecting his opponents’ opinions. He was incapable
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of shifting with the currents and tenaciously stuck to his "views 
regardless of how ruinous and short-sighted they were. These flaws 
quickened his undoing and he committed "political suicide" by 
refusing to join the P.R.R. Morones blundered and hastened the 
confrontation with Portes Gil by adopting a collision course.
Morones* power was curtailed and minimized and CROM came out of 
the struggle much poorer, less influential, and on the defensive 
against continuing threats to its decreasing power.
Morones, characteristic of the Latin American concept of 
personalismo, was the labor organization’s major asset under Calles, 
yet he was its chief liability under Portes Gil and Cardenas. It 
was more a question of personality and temperament than of fundamental 
issues. It must be remembered that "Morones" and "CROM" were virtually 
synonymous. CROM languished and failed to shape governmental labor 
policy under these two presidents because it was chained to a corpse —  
the stigma of its unending association with Luis N. Morones. What 
happened after 1935 when a cache of arms was found in two of Morones' 
buildings seemed more in the nature of an anticlimax —  any fright 
he inspired was due to unpleasant memories he awakened rather than 
to his actual power.
Less significant but more spectacular than his exile was Morones' 
flirtation with Peronism. A.T.L.A.S. was strong only in Argentina and 
exerted little influence in the labor movement of other Latin American 
countries where peronistas never accomplished more than making a few 
contacts and distributing Peronist propaganda in Mexico. Morones was 
out of power and tried, but to no avail, to regain his lost prominence.
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The influence of the organized ldhor movement within the
government political party declined considerably in'.the quarter of a
century following the Cardenas administration. This was due largely
to the stabilization of the country's political life, the economic
development of the nation, and the increased membership of the
Popular Organizations Sector of the P.R.I. As the security of
the government became greater, and the possibility of armed
insurrection against it declined, the regime came to depend less
than in the past upon the potential military help of organized workers
under leaders like Morones. An example of this occurred in 1959 'when
Morones advised that the one method to unify the workers would be to
form a Consejo Technico Obrero without a preference of some organiza- 
2
tions over others. Such a suggestion from a "powerless power" is 
understandable. Morones had fallen from the driver's seat, but still 
demanded equal treatment. Nevertheless, this pioneer labor leader 
had made an all-important beginning and accomplished more for organized 
workers than had any Mexican predecessor.
^Sl Diario de Mexico, May 3s 1959*
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APPENDIX A 
A BRIEF MORONES CHRONOLOGY
I89O, October 11. Born in San Fernando de Tlalpan.
1 9 0 7. Began to use the initial "N" between his Christian name and 
surname.
1913* Joined the Casa del Obrero Mundial.
1915» Named Director of the Mexican Telegraph and Telephone Company.
1916, Secretary of the Pachuca municipal council.
1916„ Sentenced to death by Carranza.
1917, February. Unsuccessful Socialist Workers* Party candidate 
for Federal Deputy.
1918, May. CROM founded in Saltillo, Coahuila.
1918, November. P.A.F.L. founded in Laredo, Texas.
1919 j August 6 . CROM-Obregon pact signed.
1919, December. P.L.M. founded in Mexico City.
1920, April 11. Helped Obregon escape from carrancista police in
Mexico City.
1920, April 2k. Plan of Aqua Prieta announced.
1920, July. Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama withdrew from CROM.
1920. President Obregon named Morones superintendent of the Government 
Military Manufacturing Establishments.
1920, Deeember-December, I92I. Federal Deputy from Tacubaya.
1921, February. C.G.T. formed.
1923, January. Crushed streetcar workers’ strike.
1923, September. Resigned as head of Government Military Manufacturing 
Establishments to take charge of Calles* presidential campaign.
1923, September 23- "First socialist wedding celebrated in Mexico."
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1923j December. CROM helps defeat de la Huerta uprising against 
Obregon.
1924, January 3 . Governor Felipe Carrillo Puerto assassinated in 
Merida, Yucatan.
1924, January 23- Senator Francisco Field Jurado assassinated in 
Mexico City.
1924, October. Coerced the National Eucharistic Congress to cancel 
its production of "El divino Narciso."
1924, November 12. Wounded in gunfight in the Chamber of Deputies.
1924, November 30-July 21, 1928. Calles* Minister of Industry, 
Commerce, and Labor.
1924, December 13• Samuel Gompers died in San Antonio, Texas.
1925, December. New Petroleum Law and Alien Land Law enacted.
1926-2 9. Cristero Rebellion.
1926, December. Crushed railway strike.
1927, January 1. New Petroleum Law and Alien Land Law became effective
1927, March 3 0. Calles refused Morones* resignation.
1927, October 3- General Francisco Serrano assassinated in Cuernavaca
1927, November 4. General Arnulfo Gomez assassinated near Coatepec, 
Veracruz.
1928, March 2 8. Amicable termination of the petroleum controversy.
1928, July 17. President-Elect Obregon assassinated in La Bombilla 
Restaurant in San Angel.
1928, July 21. Cromistas resigned from their appointed governmental 
positions.
1928, July 30. Jose Toral, Obregon’s assassin, declared that Morones 
had nothing to do with the murder.
1928, December. Elected CROM president; launched strong verbal 
attack on President Emilio Portes Gil.
1930, August 21. CROM-Obregon pact made public.
1932, August 18-20. Detained in Los Mochis jail.
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1932. Alfredo Perez Medina and Vicente Lombardo Toledano broke with 
CROM.
1935j December 13. Returned to Mexico with Calles.
1935} December 18. Mexican Senate indited Morones for sedition 
and incitement to rebellion.
1935} December 20. Arsenal found in two of his homes.
1936} January. CROM expelled Celestino Gasca.
1936, April 7. Paso Macho train explosion.
1936, April 10. Exiled to the United States with Calles, Luis Leon, 
and Rafael Melchor Ortega.
1937, February 2b. Secretary of Interior permitted Morones' return 
to Mexico.
1938} March. Allegedly offered President Cardenas "secret documents" 
pertaining to foreign petroleum companies.
1938} April. CROM expelled Ricardo Trevino.
1938. Unsuccessful attempt to strengthen the P.A.F.L.
1939, December 5* Santiago Iglesias died.
19^1-19^3• Served as CROM secretary general.
19^3. Fidel Velasquez allegedly proposed C.T.M.-CROM merger.
I9U7-U9 . Served as CROM secretary general.
I9U8, January. Defended Argentine C.G.T. in Lima Conference.
19^8, January 23- Visited President Peron and addressed C.G.T. 
rally in Buenos Aires' Luna Park.
19ij-9. Designated as CROM's permanent advisor and councilor,
1951} January. Received three C.G.T. representatives who Peron sent 
to Mexico City at Morones’ request.
1952, July 26. Attended Eva Peron*s funeral.
1952, November. A.T.L.A.S. founded.
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1956, December-March, 1957* Wrote "Calles obligo a las companxas 
petroleras a cumplir las leyes," his only major writing.
I96U, April 6. Died at 3 P«M. in his home in Mexico City.
I96U, April 7. Buried at 4 P.M. at Panteon Frances de la Piedad, 
Mexico City.
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APPENDIX B 
GLOSSARY
A.F.L.: American Federation of Labor.
Agrupacion de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos (A.T.L.A.S.): Latin
American Association of Trade Unionists.
Amparo: Mexican writ combining tbe characteristics of habeas corpus,
mandamus, and certiorari.
Asociacion Catolica de la Juventud Mexicana (A.C.J.M.): Catholic
Association of Mexican Youth.
Bloque de Unidad Obrera (B.U.O.): Labor Unity Bloc.
Callista: follower of Plutarco Elias Calles.
Cardenista; follower of Lazaro Cardenas.
Carrancista; follower of Venustiano Carranza.
Casa del Obrero Mundial: House of the World's Workers.
Confederacion de Trabajadores Cubanos (C.T.C.): Confederation of
Cuban Workers.
Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina (C.T.A.L.): 
Confederation of Latm American Workers.
Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (C.T.M.): Confederation of
Mexican Workers.
Confederacion General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico (C.G.O.C.M.): 
General Confederation of Workers and Peasants of Mexico.
Confederacion General de Trabajadores (C.G.T.): General Confederation
of Workers.
Confederacion Interoamericana de Trabajadores (C.I.T.): Inter-
American Confederation of Workers.
Cristero: "man of Christ."
Continuismo: one person maintains himself in power.
Cromista: CROM supporter.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
312
De la buertista: follower of Adolfo de la Huerta.
Establecimientos Fabriles y Milltares: Military and Manufacturing
Establishments.
Gomista: follower of Arnulfo Gomez.
Grupo Accion: "Action Group." Elite policy-making group of CROM.
X.C.F.T.U.: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
I.W.W.: Industrial Workers of the World.
Mordida: bribe.
Moronista: follower of Luis N. Morones.
Obregonista: follower of Alvaro Obregcn.
O.R.I.T.: Organizacion Regional Interamericana deiTrabajadores.
Pan-American Federation of Labor (P.A.F.L.): Confederacion Obrera
Pan-Ameri cana.
Partido Comunista Mexicano (P.C.M.): Mexican Labor Party.
Partido Nacional Revolucionario (P.N.R.): National Revolutionary
Party.
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (P.R.I.): Institutional
Revolutionary Party.
Partido Socialista Obrero (P.S.O.): Socialist Workers’ Party.
Personalismo: personalism.
Plan Green: alleged United States invasion design for Mexico,
192^-27.
Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (S.M.E.): Mexican Union of
Electricians.
W.F.T.U.: World Federation of Trade Unions.
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APPENDIX C
CROM SECRETARY GENERALS, 1918-68
Raymundo Valdes 
Eulalio Martinez 
Jose F. Gutierrez 
Eduardo Moneda 
Ricardo Trevino 
Eduardo Moneda 
Ricardo Trevino 
Reynaldo Cervantes Torres 
Eucario Leon 
Martin Torres 
Ricardo Trevino 
Eucario Leon
Samuel Vargas R»
Luis N. Morones 
Florentino Maya 
Emilio Barragan 
Luis N. Morones 
Rigoberto Gongalez Flores 
Florentino Maya 
Nicolas Lopez Galindo 
Florentino Dominguez Leal 
Antonio J. Hernandez
1919-20
1920-21
1921-22
1922-23
1923-21+
192U-26
1926-28
1928-32
1932-3^
193^-35
1935-37
1937-39
n ror* )ii -*-yjy— r-A-
191+1 -1+3
19U3-1+5
191+5-I+7
19U7-I19
19^9-51
1951-53
1953-55
1955-57
1957-59
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Agustm Perez Caballero 
Alfonso Elorza S. 
Antonio J. Hernandez 
Filemon Perez Cazares
31^
1959-61
1961-63
1963-65
1965-68
Atlas, May 15> 1968.
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ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE GRUPO ACCION
Luis N. Morones
Ezequiel Salcedo
Celestino Gasca
Juan Rico
Ricardo Trevino
J. Marcos Tristan
Eduardo Moneda
Juan B. Fonseca
Fernando Rodarte
Juan Lozano
Jose Lopez Cortes
Reynaldo Cervantes Torres
Adalberto Polo
Pedro Suarez
Pedro Rivera Flores
Salvador Alvarez
Samuel 0. Yudico
Jose F. Gutierrez
Electrician
Typographer
Shoemaker
Linotypist
Carpenter
Coal miner
Photoengraver
Shoemaker
Typographer
Shoemaker
Typographer
Carpenter
Tailor
Molder
Tailor
Mechanic
Federal District 
Federal District 
Federal District 
Federal District 
Tampico 
Coahuila 
Federal District 
Federal District 
Federal District 
Coahuila 
Federal District 
Oaxaca
Hidalgo
Federal District 
Federal District
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 6 3; Robert J. Alexander 
interview of Jose Petricioli, Mexico City, August 27, 19^8*
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CALLES' CABINET
Undersecretary in Charge of Gobernacion 
Licenciado Romero Ortega 
Minister of Finance and Public Credit ■ 
Ingeniero Alberto J. Pani 
Minister of Foreign Relations 
Licenciado Aaron Saenz 
Minister of Communications and Public Works 
Cor.onel Adalberto Tejeda 
Undersecretary in Charge of War and Navy 
General Joaquin Amaro 
Minister of Agriculture and Development 
Ingeniero Luis L. Leon 
Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor 
Senor Luis N. Morones 
Minister of Public Education
Doctor J.M. Puig Casauranc
Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 21.
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APPENDIX F
CALIFS’ EXPLANATION OF HIS EXPULSION FROM MEXICO
A grave attack which violates our constitutional guarantees has 
"been made upon the undersigned. The only reason given by the govern­
ment for expatriating us is the anarchical conditions which prevail 
in the country.
General Calles states that the only responsibility for this 
situation lies with the government itself, which, for more than a 
year, has been developing a demagogic policy and has been attempting 
to implant communism. We have done all in our power as citizens to 
combat this tendency without violating the law.
The expulsion of the labor leader Morones is due to the wish 
of the government to destroy the Regional Confederation of Labor 
(CROM) which does not wish to capitulate to the Communist labor 
organization that supports the government and is headed by Lombardo 
Toledano.
The desire of the government, whatever declarations it may 
make to the contrary, is to socialize the machinery of production, 
disregarding the private property rights that guarantee our institu­
tions, and to establish a collective system in agriculture similar 
to the Russian system.
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We repudiate communism, as we consider it not adaptable to our 
country and because the Mexican people refuse to accept it.
P. Elias Calles,
Melchor Ortega,
Luis N. Morones,
Luis L. Leon.
New York Times, April 11, 1936. General Calles, when asked by 
the New York Times on April 10 why he was expelled from Mexico, issued 
the above statement which he and his companions in exile signed in 
Brownsville, Texas.
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APPENDIX G
Luis N. Morones 
Mexico, D.F.
16 de febrero de 1957
Sr. J.W.F.Dulles. 
Apartado 251. 
Monterrey, N.L.
Muy estimado senor Dulles:
Me refiero a su atenta carta fecbada el 7 de los 
corrientes, la cual no conteste con la premura que debia haberlo 
becho, debido a que salx de la ciudad, pero ahora me apresuro a 
hacerlo de acuerdo con mi ofrecimiento.
La primera pregunta que usted me bizo es la
siguiente:
1.- En abril de 1920 el General Obregon fugose 
de la Ciudad de Mexico despues de baberse presentado como testigo 
en el juicio de Roberto F. Cejudo. Segun entiendo el General Obregon 
se disfrazo de mecanico a fin de efectuar la^mencionada escapatoria. 
De acuerdo con algunas fuentes usted le ayudo a llevar a efecto la 
multi eitaaa escapatoria. Serxa usted tan amaule de darme aj-guros
detalles al respecto? Es tambien: cierto que algunos otros
Obregonistas salieron de la Ciudad de Mexico al mismo tiempo?: el 
General Hill, Rafael Zubaran Campany, Cutberto Hidalgo y Miguel 
Alessio Robles.
A esta pregunta me permito informar a usted lo
siguiente:
 el General Obregon salio para Tampico, y
en esta plaza se inicio en forma precisa, el ataque oficial a la 
candidatura, hasta el grado de que fue abierto un proceso como usted 
lo dice, y fue citado por las autoridades militares de Mexico que 
lo obligaron a presentarse, en dos ocasiones, ante los tribunales 
del fuero militar.
Al regresar a esta Capital el General Obregon 
se bospedo en la casa del Licenciado Miguel Alessio Robles- ubicada 
en las calles de Colima No. 182. En la segunda presencia ante los 
jueces militares, el General Obregon se dio cuenta de que deseaban 
aprebenderlo y encarcelarlo con el proposito de inbabilitarlo como
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candidato a la Presidencia de la Republica y no estuviera, desde 
lnego, en aptitud de continuar su campaSa electoral. El General 
Obregon me cito para connmicarme su molestia por la continua 
vigilancia de que era objeto por parte de la policia, y tambien 
me dijo que habia tenido una conferencia con Margarito Ramirez 
conductor del tren que hacia el recorrido de Mexico a Iguala y 
que se ofrecio a ayudarlo a salir de Mexico, cosa que se hizo la 
madrugada del 12 de abril, en la forma siguiente:
El dia 11 de abril de 1920, a las 9 de la noche, 
salio el General Obregon de la residencia del licenciado Alessio 
Robles, acompanado del propio licenciado y de Rafael Zubaran Capmany, 
otra persona cuyo nornbre no recuerdo y yo. Ocupamos un automovil de 
siete asientos. En la parte de atras iban sentados el General y los 
licenciados Zubaran y Alessio. Enfiiamos bacia la plaza de Orizaba 
y con el auto en movimiento salto el General Obregon ocultandose 
rapidamente entre los arboles del parque, para abordar el automovil 
Ford, placas 5473 que de antemano le tenian preparado Margarito 
Ramirez y Faustino Gutierrez, este ultimo garrotero del tren a Iguala. 
Una vez que el General Obregon subio al auto que lo esperaba, tomo 
el rumbo de la Colonia Guerrero, y los pasajeros se bajaron en la 
calle de Camelia, para dirigirse a pie a la casa de Margarito Ramirez 
que estaba situada en la calle de Magnolia No. 2^3j letra C. Los 
motocielistas que nos vigilaban no se dieron cuenta de la maniobra 
ejecutada por el General Obregon y siguieron persiguiendonos 
creyendo que el General seguia con nosotros. Terminamos nuestro 
recorrido en el Cafe Colon, que estaba ubicado entonces en el Paseo 
de la Reforma. En este lugar ordenamos que nos fueran servidas unas 
copas de conac y en esos momentos la policia bizo irrupeion buscando 
al General Obregon al cual no pudieron, naturalmente, encontrar.
En el citado cafe acordamos dispersarnos en 
distintas direcciones los licenciados Alessio Robles, Zubaran y 
yo, y cerca de las 11 de la noche fui a^la calle de Magnolia para 
recibir instrucciones del General Obregon y^para informarle que 
estaban cumplidos sus encargcs y que ya babia encontrado un lugar 
donde pudiera refugiarse el General Benjamin Hill, ^ para burlar la 
vigilancia de que era objeto por parte de la policia.
Entre los encargos que me hizo fue el cobro de 
un cheque contra la COmision Monetaria, en la que me presente a 
sabiendas que el General Obregon carecia de fondos en la mencionada 
Institucion, pero despues de algunas gestiones logre bacer efectivo 
el documento cjue amparaba la^cantidad de quinientos pesos, de los 
cuales adquin medicinas, pues se encontraba enfermo, una maquina 
dc ccrtar si pelc pcrqus deseaba disfrazarse un poco y del resto me 
autorizo a disponer de algo de dinero para dejar a mi familia lo 
mas indispensable, cosa que no bice dado lo reducido de la cantidad.
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El lugar donde deje al General Hill fue la casa 
del companero Francisco Castrejon, que se encontraba ubicada en el 
Jar din de los Martires, de Tacubaya, en San Pedro de los Pinos.
Cuando el General Obregon abandono la casa de 
Margarito Ramirez salio con un abrigo puesto, tocado con un sombrero 
de los que llamaban ferrocarrilero, o de "pedradas", al cuello un 
paliacate y una linterna en la mano. El objeto de ponerse el abrigo, 
fue para que no se viera que le faltaba el brazo.
Cuando me separe del General Obregon me dio 
instrucciones de que me rcuniera con el en la ruta de Mexico a 
Cbilpancingo, sin poder precisar el lugar exscto en donde nos 
encontrariamos.
Al dia siguiente o sea el dia 13 de abril sail 
con rumbo a Iguala, para reunirme con el candidato, pero no lo 
encontre en ese lugar y segui mi viaje, por tierra, rumbo a Mexcala. 
En este lugar, se reunio con nosctros el General Obregon, los 
licenciados Eduardo Neri, Mastache y yo, y deeidimos continuar el 
viaje hacia Cbilpancingo.
La seguda pregunta es:
2.- Una fuente me ha informado que el "Grupo 
Accion" estaba formado por seis personas. Algunos libros mencionan 
que dicho Grupo estaba formado por veinte personas. Me podria 
informar al respecto y quiza tambien sobre los fines que perseguia 
el "Grupo Accion"?
Respuesta: El "Grupo Accion" fue constituido
por veinte personas, representativas de las agrupaciones obreras en 
los Estados. Se reunia periodicamente para conocer los problemas 
que la organizacion obrera teraa en todos los lugares del pais y 
orientar la lucha sindical dentro del programa que la C.R.O.M. 
aprobo en su Congreso Constitutive, celebrado en el mes de mayo de 
1918 en la Ciudad de Saltillo. Para narrar el trabajo social que 
desarrollo este grupo, se necesita disponer de un gran espacio pero 
baste con decir que fue muy importante y que precisamente a su labor 
se debio el afianzamiento de las organizaciones obreras en la lucha 
por su mejoramiento.
La pregunta tres dice asi:
3-- Cuales fueron las razones por las cuales los 
Jefes del Partido Laborista Mexicano no se entusiasmaron con la 
propuesta reeleccion del General Obregon en 1928?
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Respuesta: En el espiritu de mis companeros
estaba firmemente cimentado el principio de no reeleccion, y cuando 
nos dimos euenta de que el General Obregon aceptarxa su nueva 
postulacion, y ue que de no apcyarlo las fuerzas revolucionarias 
podrxan sufrir un quebranto en su uniaad, decidimos eooperar para 
su reeleccion.
La pregunta cuatro dice asx:
1+.- Me podrxa decir algo acerca de la carrera y 
personalidad del Coronel Jose G. Preve?
Respuesta: En relacion con el Coronel Preve
puedo decir a usted que fue un elemento de valia y que presto sus 
servicios a la Revoiucion en Tabasco, en el campo militar; que 
abrazo la causa obrera en Campeche y que se distinguio por su 
actividad en ese terreno.
Por lo que se refiere a su carta del dia 8, me 
permito manifestarle que la Secretarxa de Industria cambio su nombre 
ante el imperative de la Constitucion de 19175 que tiene un capxtulo 
dedicado al trabajo, cuya aplicacion necesitaba de ion organo 
gubernamental que reglamentara el precepto referido. Como no 
existxa la Secrets.*la del Trabajo, la de Industria amplio su radio 
de accion cr este capxtulo, creando oportunamente la Junta Federal 
de Conciliacion y Arbitrage que tiene por obligacion conocer los 
conflictos de jurisdiccion federal. Anos mas tarde quedo establecido 
la Secretarxa del ramo en substitucion del Departamento del Trabajo 
autonomo, creado en la epoca del Gobierno del General Calles.
En la seguridad de haber dejado satisfechos sus 
deseos, me es grato quedar como su atento seguro serviacr.
(Signed) Luis N. Morones
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APPENDIX H 
A NOTE ON SOURCES
CROM OFFICES, AVENIDA KEPUBLICA DE CUBA, NO. 60, MEXICO CITY
The CROM Archive in Mexico City, is virtually unknown to 
historians of Latin America in the United States, despite the 
richness of its holdings in later history. Few North American 
scholars have used the archives, and there is little in print, 
either in English or Spanish, that can acquaint one with what 
documentation is available.
The archive itself is contained in one room, which also 
doubles for a working area for cromistas. This small, poorly- 
illuminated room has one long table, a few chairs, and very few 
other amenities. The walls, from floor to ceiling, are occupied 
with the archive's holdings; therefore, one looks for data in a 
random manner. The researcher, when using these documents, must 
search folio by folio and document by document for information 
relevant to his period and topic. No formalities are necessary 
before one may begin to use the archive, and seldom is there any 
competition for a good seat (near the windows and, hence, the 
light). Aside from such drawbacks, and the noise from cromistas 
inside the building, there are few problems.
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VITA.
Nick Buford, the son of Lena Turano Buford and the late 
Norvel Buck Buford, was horn in Port Arthur, Texas on November 20, 
I9U1 . He received his elementary and secondary education in the 
public schools of Houston, Texas, and graduated from John H. Reagan 
High School in June, i960. Entering Lamar State College of Tech­
nology in September, i960, he received tne degree of Bachelor of 
Arts from that institution in August, 196^, and Master of Arts in 
May, 1967, after having had a graduate teaching fellowship-,
In February, 1967, Mr. Buford entered Louisiana State 
University. During the years 1968 to 1971 he was a graduate 
assistant in the Department of History and Instructor of Latin 
American History for the Division of Continuing Education, 1969-7 1*
He lived in Puebla de Zaragosa during the summer of 1967 and spent 
the summer of 1968 and spring of 1971 researching in Mexico.
On December 27, 1969* He was married in Yonkers, New York.
The bride, Gloria Herminia Creagh-Larramendi, is the daughter of 
Dr. Enrique Creagh-Creagh, M.D., and Doctora Marfa Gloria Larramendi 
Vivar de Creagh from Guantanamo and Santiago de Cuba respectively.
Mr. Buford was awarded an Organization of American States 
Fellowship to Mexico where he completed his research for his 
doctoral dissertation in spring, 1971. He is a candidate for the 
degree Doctor of Philosophy at the August commencement.
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